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ABSTRACT

I present a novel interpretation of Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenology wherein I argue that
his seemingly antagonistic and exclusive notions of "totality" and "infinity" are best
understood, rather, as symbiotic, interdependent, and mutually conditioning. My demarche
uses close textual analysis, constant reference to Levinas's (admittedly sparse) comments on
philosophical method, and an important return to, and then departure from, Cartesian thought
in order to advance my thesis that infinity and totality are essentially intertwined and
"symbiotic." As such, they are not essentially opposed in any sort of preferential, evaluative,
or eliminative sense, to name some prominent (and misguided) caricatures that regrettably
pervade many aspects of Levinas scholarship, whether pro or contra Levinas. I use this
insight to show that certain Levinas commentators misunderstand the meaning of, and
relationship between, "totality" and "infinity." Lastly, as against those who claim that
Levinas essentially has no philosophical argument in such works as Totality and Infinity, I
show that Levinas's argumentative rigor and strategy is best understood by way of a carefully
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nuanced and textually documented interpretation of the way that "infinity conditions
totality."

vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: A CLARIFICATION OF LEVINAS'S OBSCURANTISM .................... 1
CHAPTER 1: LEVINAS'S UNDERSTATED DEBT TO, AND REAPPROPRIATION OF,
DESCARTES' THOUGHT........................................................................................... 6
On the Very Idea Of an Infinite Other ........................................................................ 10
Descartes and the other person reconsidered .............................................................. 22
Levinas's Reappropriation of Descartes ...................................................................... 31
CHAPTER 2: THE CASE FOR A DYNAMIC CONSIDERATION OF LEVINAS'S
THOUGHT: A DUAL ASPECT AND SYMBIOTIC READING OF "TOTALITY"
AND "INFINITY" ...................................................................................................... 47
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 47
Introduction: The Problem and its Topography .......................................................... 47
The Projected Resolution ............................................................................................ 54
The Tandem and Coequal Importance of Totality and Infinity .................................. 56
Situating the very notions of totality and infinity. .......................................... 56
A Re-Cartesianized reading of Totality, Infinity, and Their Conjunction .................. 64
"Totality" and "Infinity": Passing the Torch from Descartes to Levinas .................... 75
Conversation ............................................................................................................... 77
Teaching and Learning ............................................................................................... 87
Eros and the Caress ..................................................................................................... 90
A Levinasian Defense Against Wolinesque Totality Versus Infinity ......................... 96
A Levinasian Remedy against other Harmful Supplements: Badiou ....................... 112

viii
CHAPTER 3: LEVINAS'S CONDITIONS—"A FIELD OF RESEARCH HARDLY
GLIMPSED AT…"................................................................................................... 121
The Problem .............................................................................................................. 121
The Projected Resolution .......................................................................................... 121
The Importance of the Notion of "Infinity Conditioning Totality" .......................... 122
The Problem: Totality and Infinity Allegedly Has No Philosophical Argument ...... 145
The Projected Solution: The Elucidation of Levinas's Conditions ........................... 148
De Boer: Levinas's Other Is Ontologically Foundational ......................................... 158
The Preobjective Other Considered Genealogically, and as a Third Person ............ 164
Badiou Reconsidered ................................................................................................ 186
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 192
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 194

1
Introduction: A Clarification of Levinas's Obscurantism
In what follows, I present an interpretation of the thought of Emmanuel Levinas's
(1906-1995) that clarifies both his philosophical sources, as well as his phenomenological
ambitions within what one calls his "middle period" (1946-67). This period begins with
Levinas's reintegration into family, society, and philosophical life after his five-year
internment in various German "camps" that were reserved for Jewish French officers
during the Second World War.1 This period ends with Levinas's appointment to
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris-Nanterre in 1967-8, during which he
developed lectures and publications that would eventually form the core of his later
period, including the publication of his second great work, Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence (1974). One could say that his "early" period begins when he receives
his License (or, roughly, "Bachelor of Arts" degree) in philosophy in 1927, whereupon he
embarked on an intellectual journey that led him to study under Husserl and Heidegger in
Freiburg (1928-9), and then to germinate the seeds for some of the 20th century's most
interesting thought.
His middle period interests me the most because it is the most conversant with the
history of Western philosophy and phenomenology, and its exposition is by far clearer
than that of either his early or later period. That being said, the writing style of the most
notable works from Levinas's middle period (such as Totality and Infinity, which receives
the lion's share of my attention) has been characterized as "infuriatingly sloppy," by
1

Levinas was taken prisoner in Dunkirk, June 1940, and the sole reason for which he did not go to a
"death" camp for Jews is the fact that he was an officer in the French army, and Jewish officers were spared
at least the most severe of "treatment" by their Nazi warders. As Solomon Malka notes in his wonderful
biography, Emmanuel Levinas: His Life and His Legacy, Levinas was one of "1, 600, 000 French POWs (4
percent of the [French] population) in Germany spread out over more than 60 stalags and 20 oflags
throughout the country" (67).
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critical commentators such as Dermot Moran.2 B.C. Hutchens, one of Levinas's
staunchest supporters, even goes so far as to say, quite unapologetically, that "Levinas
delights in paradox and contradiction" in such works as Totality and Infinity.3 The
general take on the clarity of Levinas's philosophical prose is perhaps most succinctly
stated by Simon Critchley, who simply notes that "the obscurity of Levinas's prose
troubles many of his readers."4
I have struggled with this admittedly "sloppy" and "obscure" prose for over seven
years, and it is undeniable, for instance, that Levinas capitalizes terms inconsistently, that
he rarely defines important technical notions, and that his language can oftentimes seem
paradoxical and contradictory. This same prose, from a different perspective, however, is
at once marvelously rich in description, suggestion, and, from the right vantage point,
thoroughly replete with compelling philosophical arguments and critiques. In this last
vein, then, I see the chief worth of this dissertation as a sustained attempt to elucidate, at
least in large part, that which is truly lapidary in such works as Totality and Infinity. In
the former vein, the philosophical diamonds that do, in fact, lie within the rough of
Levinas's "sloppy" and "obscure" prose can easily remain unnoticed without the right
kind of contextualization.
For his part, and no doubt to the chagrin of many readers, Levinas seems utterly
dismissive of the worth of making one's philosophical method clear, as the following
passage (perhaps too candidly) reveals.

2

Moran. Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge (2000), 322.
Hutchens. Levinas: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Continuum (2004), 5.
4
Critchley. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. Cambridge: Cambridge UP (2002), 6.
3
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I do not believe that there is transparency possible in method. Nor that philosophy
might be possible as transparency. Those who have worked on method all of their
lives have written many books that replace the more interesting books that they
could have written. So much the worse for the philosophy that would walk in
sunlight without shadows.5
To write entirely in darkness would only lead to the converse problem, however,
and in what follows I try, earnestly, to interpret Levinas with at least a modicum of
methodological clarity and close textual analysis. This approach, when coupled with an
emphasis upon situating Levinas's thought against the background of his philosophical
predecessors, helps to bring out, and burnish, many of the philosophical gems in a
philosophy that (perhaps too often) writes, and sometimes remains, in the shadows.
Briefly stated, Levinas's thought is too valuable and insightful in general, as well as
personally edifying to me in particular, to remain obscure.
I certainly do not claim to have shed light on all of the philosophical ambitions
that one finds within his middle period. The three chapters that follow, however, do shed
light on three important and related regions of Levinas's thought that are pivotal in such
works as Totality and Infinity. In the first chapter, I show that many of Levinas's key
technical terms, his notions of subjectivity and agency, and, importantly, his
philosophical method, ought to be understood from an accurately nuanced return to, and
then salient departure from, Cartesian thought. The main point to this comparative
enterprise is not so much to revive or rehabilitate Cartesian notions, but rather to lend
support and traction to key Levinasian ideas that his often obscure philosophical prose
does not clearly exposit. These ideas include: "totality," "infinity," and "desire";
important aspects of the Levinasian self's mental economy and the same self's apparently
5

Levinas, "Questions and Answers." Of God Who Comes to Mind, Bettina Bergo, (trans.) Stanford:
Stanford UP (1998), 89.
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paradoxical relation to an "infinite" Other; and, lastly, a retrospective reading of
Descartes' Discourse on Method that elucidates a proto-philosophical version of Levinas's
interhuman Other, as well as a prototype of Levinas's interpersonal phenomenology.
Levinas's phenomenology is a reappropriation of Cartesian thought and so it does,
however, importantly distance itself from Cartesianism in relevant ways. Levinas's reminting of many Cartesian coins serves as a segue to the main labor of the second
chapter, which articulates a symbiotic, or dual aspect, reading of Levinas's notions of
"totality," "infinity," and their interrelation.
Chapter 2 develops my interpretation of both Levinasian and Cartesian "totality"
and "infinity," which shows that they are two distinct and equally important perspectives
that an agent can adopt on the world, oneself, and others. This interpretation is important
both because it faithfully reflects Levinas's interpersonal phenomenology, and because it
deflates some recent criticism that alleges that the implications of "totality" and "infinity"
render Levinas's thought as either "quasi-philosophical" and or incoherent. I show that
these critiques rest on a mistaken, yet pervasive, reading of these notions that ignores the
tandem and interrelated nature of "totality" and "infinity," as well as the Cartesian
inspiration that informs these Levinasian notions.
My interpretation of totality and infinity is of further value because it dispels
many of the seeming "paradoxes and contradictions" that superficially inform Levinas's
claims about self and Other, language, teaching, and erotic relations, to name some
prominent examples. This same interpretation also helps to explicate the (implicitly
indicated) ontological structure of the Levinasian self and his or her possibilities for
"totality" and "infinity," and the third chapter attempts a systematic and rigorous
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elucidation of the ontology of self and Other that Levinas does not, however,
systematically develop. This elucidation helps to deflate recent critiques of Levinas that
claim that his ontology is either insufficient to ground his claims about the self and the
Other, or that his ontology is simply quasi-philosophical.
The general point to the dissertation is to showcase the brilliance and novelty of
Levinas's thought in his middle period, which can lie fallow if one does not take pains to
interpret it with a measure of clarity and consistency. His novel brilliance is arguably at
its most remarkable when we highlight the primacy of the personal and interpersonal
aspects of his thought. So, although I show that Levinas does indeed borrow, "sample," or
repeat with a difference many of the key strategies of his philosophical precursors, I have
also tried to vigilantly accentuate that which is distinct in Levinas's descriptions,
arguments, and critiques of the human situation that imbues (literally, in his sense of the
terms) "ethics" and "totality and infinity."
Lastly, I cannot express in written (or perhaps any other) words the extent to
which I am thankful to my teachers for helping to instill the conditions and perspective
out of which I am able to craft a work of this scope.
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Chapter 1:
Levinas's Understated Debt to, and Reappropriation of, Descartes' Thought
René Descartes is not commonly regarded as a philosopher of alterity; indeed,
conversely, he is often regarded as the philosopher of ipseity, or even as the "father" of
solipsism. This chapter nevertheless argues that Descartes is a foundational philosopher
of the Other and alterity, and further that this foundation is key toward understanding
many of Emmanuel Levinas's philosophical claims and argumentative strategies. By rereading the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) and Discourse on Method (1637)
alongside texts from Levinas's middle period (1946-1967) I shall make a compelling
case, by way of textual examination and extrapolation, for a shared nexus of
philosophical kinship and methodological strategy.
We can readily see that Levinas the philosopher is in many respects preoccupied
with Cartesian philosophy. With no fewer than 20 textual passages that directly consider
Descartes' philosophy, Totality and Infinity seems to take a page from his teacher
Husserl, in that it often reads like Levinas's own Cartesian Meditations. When
commentators downplay the shared interests and direct lineage between Levinas and
Descartes' thought, far too many essential themes and philosophical gestures get swept
under the rug.6
The importance of clarifying and developing the points of similarity between
Descartes and Levinas is significant for at least three reasons. First, although there are
notable exceptions, the majority of Levinas scholars and commentators tend to take his
appropriation of Descartes as largely, if not wholly, restricted to some version of his
6

See, for example, Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco, On Levinas, 26.
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appropriation of the Cartesian idea of the infinite God. This unique focus often leads to
an understated appreciation of what I shall show to be a much more complex and
nuanced philosophical relationship that outstrips a more or less robust substitution of the
Other for God. Even when many commentators rightly accentuate and ably amplify the
philosophical transformation of Descartes' God into Levinas's Other, a further look at
other shared thematics and points of similarity generally gets overlooked.
In the Cambridge Companion to Levinas (2002), for example, we see only a
handful of references to Descartes' contribution to Levinas's thought, and hardly any that
go further than the Levinasian reappropriation of the Cartesian God and the subsequent
idea of infinity. In Face to Face with Levinas (1986), a collection of 12 essays devoted
to Levinas's thought, the same problem can be observed. My chief ambition, accordingly,
more thoroughly and systematically fills in a relative lacuna in Levinas scholarship by
augmenting the shared fund of similarity between the two thinkers. In making such a
contribution to the scholarship, this chapter would serve as a check or counter-balance to
such claims as Peter Atterton's and Matthew Calarco's, that:
It should be noted that Levinas's reading of Descartes in Totality and Infinity is
highly atypical and selective. Descartes supplies Levinas with a model of
philosophy as "critique" understood "as a tracing back to what precedes freedom,"
but nothing more. (On Levinas, 26, my emphasis)
Second, scholars and philosophers the world over often dismiss Levinas as a
rogue or patricide to the philosophical tradition. To an extent, he brings this reputation
upon himself when he seemingly hastily criticizes many aspects of the Western
philosophical tradition for their being systematically "egological," "narcissistic," and
such. He can appear to corroborate the latter point by sometimes neglecting to explicitly
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develop positions that he either borrows or criticizes. To better understand the letter of
many key Levinasian claims, however, as well as the often implicit importance of his
Western philosophical precursors, we should have a broader understanding of the debt he
owes to such philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and, I argue, Descartes. Levinas's debt
to his actual teachers Husserl and Heidegger (1928-9, Freiburg) is almost ubiquitously
emphasized, yet his arguably deeper debt to Descartes is not; or, again, if it is, it is
generally understated and under-appreciated in its complexity. By contrast, I shall
advance an interpretation of Levinas as being at least as much of an intellectual pupil of
Descartes as of Husserl or Heidegger.
Third, the robust notion of subjectivity or ipseity found in Descartes' Meditations
arguably provides as good a starting point as any out of which to grasp the Levinasian
agent perspective from the inside, or through what he calls "interiority" and "separation."
In many respects the Levinasian agent of Time and the Other and Totality and Infinity is
far closer to Heidegger's Dasein in terms of the self's interaction with the world and the
structures of Being revealed therein. This same agent nevertheless evinces a psychic
economy that is in many respects fundamentally Cartesian. Levinas reappropriates these
psychological features and transforms them phenomenologically, and so a better
understanding of the shared roots between Descartes' and Levinas's notions of
subjectivity will clarify the notion of subjectivity that Levinas first criticizes, and then
phenomenologically rebuilds. I shall argue, by way of anticipation, that Levinas's work is
at its most brilliant when he phenomenologically scrutinizes the self so as to show its
social and ethical dependence on human others, as opposed to Descartes' divine Other.
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As the scholarly literature on Levinas has amply demonstrated, Descartes' idea of
God undoubtedly contains within it the seeds for the most basic formulation of Levinas's
Other. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that, in addition, many other key Levinasian
formulations ought to be understood against a more solid Cartesian background, out of
which we see crucial concepts such as "atheism," "inner life," "separation" and especially
"totality" and "infinity."7 On a more methodological plane, we shall show that some of
Levinas's notions of the self's philosophical maturity are analogous to those of Descartes',
and in addition one can easily see (with proper context) that some of Levinas's thoughts
on the nature of what he calls "Desire" and "exteriority" are originally Cartesian. Lastly,
I make the interpretation that Descartes himself has articulated a proto-Levinasian notion
of the "face" and "discourse" in the 5th section of his Discourse on Method.
It is important to show that Levinas's oeuvre seeks to diagnose certain basic
philosophical problems putatively beginning with, and continuing in the wake of
Cartesian philosophy, and then to surpass them through a phenomenological
reappropriation and critique. One cannot fully contend with his middle period, however,
without concrete recourse to seminal Cartesian ideas. If it is true, as Borges says, that
many unique thinkers create their own precursors, then the first chapter of the dissertation
shows how Levinas "creates" Descartes as one of the seminal proto-philosophers of the
Levinasian Other.8

7

Since "totality" and "infinity" are the most important of his technical terms, they receive lengthy
treatment in chapters 2 and 3 as well.
8
See Borges, Jorge Luis, "Kafka and his Precursors," in Selected Non-Fictions, Eliot Weinburger, ed., New
York, Penguin Putnam Inc., (1999), 363-5.
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On the Very Idea Of an Infinite Other
The greatest possible idea as such, from Descartes' (and a retrospective Levinas's)
point of view, is the paradoxical but pivotal notion of a finite human subject bearing a
thought the content of which necessarily exceeds the capacity of the thinker. This ideal
excess, or what Levinas will often call "a more in the less" or "Desire," is purportedly
discovered at a point in the Meditations where Descartes has just established revealing
truths about his mental economy, whereupon he turns his inquiry towards the "outside"
or, in Levinasian terminology, the "exterior" of such an understanding.
It is not often mentioned, but Descartes is philosophically preoccupied with the
problem of being alone in the world and finding a way out of the possibility that he may
be the sole author of things and people judged "external"—all to the detriment of his
philosophical enterprise. The Second Meditation's labors have enabled Descartes to be
certain about a limited variety of judgments regarding both his mental existence and
objects considered representationally, yet he nonetheless admits that such certainty has a
provisional character.
This character in part stems from his concession that he can be certain about clear
and distinct things only while he is judging them, that is, while he is "attending to the
arguments by means of which we deduce things."9 In order to be certain that things do
not radically or chaotically change, he believes that a benevolent and non-deceptive God
is needed to stably and rationally hold reality together, as it were.10 And since Descartes
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AT VII 140.
Concerning the need to establish God's importance in philosophical matters, Descartes says of God that
he is the being "in whom all the treasures of wisdom and science lie hidden." (AT VII 53) By comparison,
the Other for Levinas will render conceptualization, objectification, and even rationality possible, as we see
below, and especially in chapter 3.
10
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believes that the moment-to-moment preservation of reality is effectively no different
than its initial creation, he ultimately sees the supreme and benevolent Other (God) as its
guarantee. A true mathesis universalis, therefore, will never get off the ground until
God's supreme transcendence and non-deceptive character have been established.11 Thus
the letter of the Meditations clearly states that unless he can establish a transcendent
bridge to the world through the supreme Other, all of Descartes' judgments about
"external" things and people remain, over time, subject to doubt. As he puts the point
generally:
[A]s soon as the opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a God, and, if
there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, is seems that I
can never be quite certain of anything else. (AT VII, 36)
In this vein the Third Meditation's struggle encompasses Descartes' attempt to
transcend his ipseity and concomitantly to affirm that what lies beyond it grounds and
justifies his very existence as a rational and moral being over time. As is well known,
Descartes will conclude that he must owe his creation, existence, and future to what he
takes to be the preeminent transcendent being—God. Interestingly for the purposes of
section 1C, furthermore, Descartes makes some proto-Levinasian remarks in this
Meditation, such as stating that the infinite is "in some way prior" to the finite self, and
that as a self he is, in the last analysis, "a thing which is incomplete and dependent on
another."12 As Colin Davis, whose Levinas: An Introduction (1996) makes significant

11

In a rather subtle and often misunderstood point, Descartes makes a distinction between the indubitable
character of certain judgments made in real-time, i.e. the present, versus recollections of the conclusions of
such judgments. The latter remain fallible precisely because the cogito and similar judgments depend upon
an immediate intuition or unbroken chain of such in order to be indubitable. In a word, recollections are at
a distance and hence the chain is broken, and thus dubious. A rational and non-deceptive God, presumably,
would bridge such knowledge together. [Cf. AT VII 36, 69, 140]
12
AT VII 45-6, 51.
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strides toward fully understanding the Levinas-Descartes encounter, puts the point
generally:
For Levinas the significance of the Cartesian discovery lies in the encounter with
the infinite as something beyond knowledge and utterly resistant to the solipsism
of the transcendental Ego. Most importantly, this encounter does not endanger or
annihilate the subject, but on the contrary enables its constitution. (39)
Descartes additionally concludes that the relationship between himself, qua finite being,
and God qua infinite being cannot be one of adequate comprehension (or an aspect of
"totality," as Levinas would call it) because, like Levinas with self and Other, there exits
a radical asymmetry between the self and God, which we shall now develop.
We can further appreciate Levinas's idea of infinity and what he means by the
Other having a priority over the self when we carefully analyze Descartes' notions of a
mental subject's being representationally overwhelmed by what he terms the "infinite."
Importantly for the comparison with Levinas, the Third Meditation could readily bear the
subtitle, "Is there really an Other who informs the Self?" This is because its central
strategy involves an argument by elimination whose purpose is to see if any true
candidate for (infinite) alterity could possibly exist independently of Descartes' mental
economy. In other words, Descartes would have asked himself, am I aware of anything
that I could not possibly have created? From a different point of view, he again realizes
that the conclusions of the Second Meditation provide only a restricted certainty about
limited acts of thinking in the present—Descartes, then, needs to 'get out of his head' and
connect to the world somehow if his philosophy is to have any real traction, and his
argument for God's existence serves just this function.
To this extent, he founds a method of transcendental reflection that purports to be
able to identify various kinds of thoughts the contents of which are gauged according to
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the amount of "objective reality" they possess.13 A patently odd notion at first glance,
"objective reality" may well be one of the first contributions to phenomenology, in that it
describes a methodical distinction between things themselves and their representation to
consciousness.14
For his part, Descartes rather unhelpfully glosses objective reality as a function of
"the way objects are normally in the intellect," by contrast to the "formal reality" of an
object.15 In reading his reply to the first set of objections to the Meditations, in which his
contemporary Caterus takes issue with the very idea of objective reality, it seems like
Descartes took the notion itself to be either unproblematic or obvious.16 To augment the
notion's cogency, however, objective reality refers to the representational reality of a
thought, in the sense that the thought is both real in itself ('in' the Cartesian thinker's
mental economy) and about something possessing "formal reality." In this sense, and
looking forward, it is a prototype of Husserlian intentionality. Looking backwards,
Descartes' translators have situated the notion by reference to the scholastic terminology
that he liberally employs throughout the Meditations. As Cottingham et. al. put it,
The 'formal' reality of anything is its own intrinsic reality, while the 'objective'
reality of an idea is a function of its representational content. Thus if an idea A
13

By "transcendental reflection" I mean that Descartes, after arguing that the having of an idea, considered
in itself, cannot be false, develops a method of distinguishing thoughts themselves according to what sort of
thing they reflect or represent.
14
We shall also see in chapter 2 that Levinas rebuilds a version of such interior 'reality' in my
interpretation of his being "overwhelmed by the Other." This will involve a detailed reconstruction of what
he means by "totality" and "infinity" in microcosmic and macrocosmic senses.
15
AT VII 102.
16
Caterus essentially deflates the very idea of a thought possessing objective reality by claiming that such a
tag "adds nothing to the thing itself," i.e. the thing or external object in question. (AT VII 92-3) He then
debunks the notion of strict causality between thing and thought by insisting that our ideas of things come
about quite randomly, owing to our lack of perfect knowledge. Descartes, however, steadfastly replies that
there is, indeed, a causal relation between idea and thing (such as the idea of an intricate machine being
caused by seeing one) and that the more intricate and complex the thought the more "reality" there must be
in the cause. This, of course, leads him to believe that the thought of God has the most such "reality." (AT
VII 102-4)
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represents some object X which is F, then F-ness will be contained 'formally' in X
but 'objectively' in A." (28ff)
So, if my idea-of-a-basketball ('A') represents a basketball ('X') which is, say, round ('F'),
then 'roundness' will be really or formally contained in the ball but representationally or
objectively 'in' the idea.
Things are a little more complicated, however, as objective reality admits of
degrees; certain things are said to possess more objective reality than others. In one sense,
the image "in" the mind of an idea that has more objective reality than another means that
the referent of the former participates in a higher degree of ontological perfection. It
would be more perfect by virtue of its being about something like a primary quality, as
opposed to a secondary quality, for example. The sense here, something of an analogue to
Plato's "divided line," is that a primary quality is more real or "more in being" than a
secondary quality because secondary qualities are always parasitic on primary qualities.
Something with more objective reality, moreover, would be less prone to alteration by
virtue of its being distinguished by fewer comparable things—for example there are only
two substances (mental and physical) for Descartes, which are each primary qualities.
So, the objective reality about a "substance" as such, for example, would be greater than
the objective reality about, say, shape as such, since any shape would be a far more
contingent arrangement of reality, and would also be parasitic on substance itself. A
color, furthermore, would be parasitic on the thing with shape, and hence be even more
removed from "perfection" in being, as Descartes would say. Whereas substance per se
simply is what it is, and presupposes far less than a shape or color for its being or
ontological "perfection."

15
As Descartes puts it, "the ideas which represent substances [i.e. mental or physical
substance] amount to something more, and, so to speak, contain within themselves more
objective reality than the ideas which merely represent modes or accidents."17 And, not
surprisingly, the idea that gives him his "understanding of a supreme God…certainly has
in it more objective reality than the ideas that represent finite substances."18 Before we
see some implications of such an idea, we should bear in mind that the point here is not
so much to revive Descartes' notion of representational reality as such; rather, the
emphasis ought to be on Descartes' pioneer effort of reaching out to the Other and the
subsequent Levinasian wake that it engenders.
Keeping in mind Totality and Infinity's subtitle, "An Essay on Exteriority," we
should come to appreciate that Levinas gets a fair amount of his inspiration for the
"exterior" from Descartes. If Levinas is preoccupied with certain privileged and
fundamental personal notions of the exterior, it is Descartes who philosophically
demonstrates that there needs to be an exterior in general upon which the subject
depends, and continually needs to strive for, in order to become wiser, and, to an extent,
more ethical.
So, after having eliminated just about every possible source for a notion of radical
alterity, Descartes throws his whole weight into proving that of all his ideas, only his idea
of God or the Infinite remains as a real transcendent opening to a wholly Other and
external source. To recapitulate, by Descartes' lights he could, in principle, have created
every other kind of idea based upon his self-understanding—but how could a finite and
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limited being arrive at the idea of an infinite God? Descartes puts the argument in terms
of an if-then clause, with the implication of course that he will demonstrate the
antecedent's truth and thereby cinch the syllogism. He writes:
If the objective reality of any of my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure
the same reality does not reside in me…and hence that I cannot be its cause, it
will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but that some other thing
which is the cause of this idea also exists. (AT VII 42, my emphasis)
In a causal argument of sorts, since something cannot come from nothing, and
since his idea of the infinite strictly speaking is something, it must have for its cause
something with "at least as much reality" as the effect (his idea). And since he qua finite
being cannot engender something infinite, he concludes that the source or cause of this
idea must have as much "formal reality," the mental analogue of which is the "objective
reality" in Descartes' mind—that is, the source must be what the idea in fact represents:
God. The referent of the idea, moreover, connotes a degree of ontological perfection
(that is, it is even more perfect than a substance per se) such that Descartes believes that
nothing could be conceived as more perfect or, in his parlance, more "in being." Briefly
stated, there can be no more perfect being since this being is supremely perfect—the
"most high" as Levinas would say—or, put differently, its objective reality implies that it
is the source and guarantee of everything, and this Descartes claims to see "clearly and
distinctly."
The consequences of this discovery force Descartes to tarry with a new set of
implications, the other-regarding scope of which now awakens him (or "infects" him as
Levinas might say) to such notions as the priority of the Other and the consequent
dependence entailed by this priority. If Descartes, in Meditations One and Two, could
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live entirely off of his own thoughts, as it were, the Third Meditation's findings leave him
with both an acknowledgment of a certain debt to, as well as a kindled desire for, this
Other.
When I turn my mind's eye upon myself, I understand that I am a thing which is
incomplete and dependent on another and which aspires without limit to even
greater and better things; but I also understand at the same time that he on whom I
depend has within him all those greater things. (AT VII 51)
The aspiration described in this passage, which I argue in section C serves as a
prototype for Levinasian "Desire," stems from a preceding admission that Descartes is
essentially a finite being who realizes both that his knowledge will never reach infinity
and that he qua himself cannot guarantee his existence and future.19 For the former, rather
than seeing this limitation as a human flaw, he instead delights in the "contemplation" of
the Other, and sees a way out of the possibility of external world solipsism, and an
opening to become more complete, to "even greater and better things." For the latter, this
necessary dependence on the Other is not described as a bond of servitude, but rather as a
sort of ultimate stop or foundation of reality, one that, as with Levinas and his Other,
truth and sincerity presuppose (T&I 51, 72, passim).
It is important to note, for the sake of future claims about Levinas's
reinterpretation of Descartes' 'discovery' of the infinite exterior, that what Levinas finds
important here is not a deductively sound argument that proves something, strictly
speaking, but rather a way of conceiving the self and its limitations qua the Other as
19

Levinas expresses both this aspiration, and the seeds for what he means by "totality" and "infinity" in the
following: "The other metaphysically desired is not "other" like the bread I eat, the land in which I dwell…I
can "feed" off these realities and to a very great extent satisfy myself as though I had been lacking them.
Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor. The metaphysical
desire tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely other" (T&I 33). His distinction
between the subject's ability to fully assimilate or "totalize" something, and that which both informs and
resists the subject's full grasp, shall serve as one of the distinguishing marks of my interpretation of totality
and infinity in chapter 2.
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something of real phenomenological and ethical worth, rather than mere limitation,
frustration, or even necessary conflict, as Sartre famously asserts.
Hilary Putnam, who examines Levinas's appropriation of Descartes' God in his
article "Levinas and Judaism," rightly goes so far as to say that far from trying to "prove"
the Other's existence by way of Descartes' style of argumentation, what Levinas seizes
upon is the subject undergoing:
an experience…which might be described as an experience of a fissure, of a
confrontation with something that disrupted all [Descartes'] categories. On this
reading, Levinas is not so much proving something as acknowledging something,
acknowledging a Reality that he could not have constructed, a Reality which
proves its own existence by the very fact that its presence in my mind turns out to
be a phenomenological impossibility. (42)
Of further importance for the next chapter, in which a much more direct
confrontation with Levinas's own texts leads us to see how his thought clearly revamps
several key Cartesian problems, it must be noted that what Levinas retains from
Descartes' idea of the infinite is the formal structure of the idea, as opposed to the
purported content (for example, the Judeo-Christian God). Levinas writes, regarding the
history of philosophy, in Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity (1957), "what we find most
distinctive is the Cartesian analysis of the idea of infinity, although we shall retain only
the formal design of the structure it outlines" (PII, 8). Adriaan Peperzak, who devotes
many pages of thoughtful analysis to Descartes and Levinas's philosophical similarity,
explains Levinas's central purpose in appropriating Descartes' formal structure
concerning the idea of infinity as follows:
Descartes maintained…that the infinite is originally present in consciousness,
rejecting thereby every attempt to construct or compose its idea on the basis of
other finite ideas…Retrieving the expressions with which Descartes qualifies the
infinite, Levinas characterizes it by the terms "exterior"…or "having absolved
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itself" from the relation (i.e. from our idea of it) and "overflowing" our capacity of
thinking it. An immediate "too much" has always already awakened and oriented
human consciousness and has undermined…the full circle of reflection upon
itself…This has, then, nothing to do with the "bad infinite" of an endless series or
a quantitative or qualitative "more" or "most." (To the Other, 141)
So rather than, for example, rekindle Scholastic debates about the character of the
infinite, Peperzak ably points out that Levinas's Cartesian intention is to reawaken the
interior economy to a position where it must acknowledge certain psychological givens
(for Levinas, I would say, this includes being originally taught, presently spoken to, and
or surprised by the Other's infinite capacity to do so, as examples) as unaccountable in
terms of the self alone. The next chapter's task, by way of anticipation, is to thoroughly
explicate such notions as the "too much" and absolution to which Peperzak refers by
concretely referencing them to Levinas's examples of discourse, being "faced," loved, and
taught, among others. For now, however, it is important only to note that the notion of the
infinite borrowed from Descartes' pioneer effort toward accounting for an overflow of
consciousness is nowise related to a mathematical or "bad" infinity, but rather, as Putnam
notes, more a question of a fundamental experience ("Levinas and Judaism," 42).
One has good reason, of course, to distance oneself from the strictest of
appropriations of the letter of Descartes' argument. In addition to the well-known
allegations of circular reasoning, concerning which Descartes is perhaps rightly accused
of presupposing what is at issue (God's existence) in order to justify the clear and distinct
idea that he has of God, there is a further problem concerning his entitlement to reliably
describe God's existential attributes. In other words, even beyond the assumption that
there is a perfect symmetry of representation between the objective and formal "realities"
at issue, there is a further question about how a finite being or thinker can have access to
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the "really infinite, omnipotent, omniscient" character of such a being. Since, like
Levinas, Descartes has emphatically rejected that his idea of the Infinite is a purely
negative notion (i.e. the negation of the finite), he seems to have to justify the positive
aspects of his description—so whence his certainty about what God, exactly, is like?
Descartes seems to rely on the clarity and distinctness of his idea, but things get more
complicated, as we soon see. Levinas, for his part, will have to come to terms with a
similar problem about describing the Other.20
Part of the brilliance of Levinas's work, however, is that by situating the Other in
personal, as opposed to divine, terms, we get an account of an Other who can speak to,
teach, and love us, as examples. Levinas, furthermore, avoids some of Descartes'
problems by insisting that strictly speaking, the Other is never assertively known and
hence unthematizable. His predicate attribution concerning the Other, as opposed to
Descartes' positive labeling (the Other is, e.g., "omnipotent" and "morally perfect") is
almost entirely agnostic in its formulation—Levinas's Other is, strictly speaking,
unthematizable and unpredictable.
In chapter 2, by way of anticipation, we shall see a phenomenological account of
the way that the Levinasian self both relates, in one aspect, and does not relate to the
Other, in a different aspect. For now, I simply note that the difference between the two
thinkers regarding access to, and the description of, their respective Other precisely lies
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This is one reason for which I attribute a bivalent description of self and Other to Levinas's thought in
the next chapter. Under one aspect of the description ("totality"), the self or same situates the Other entirely
through the self's innate comprehension. In the other aspect, the self finds itself disrupted, overwhelmed, or
simply on the passive side of an experience that it did not orchestrate but that is nonetheless meaningful
("infinity"). The reasons for attributing this polyvalence to Levinas's phenomenology stem from the need to
be faithful to Levinas's actual descriptions of self and Other, and to dispel certain paradoxes in them—up to
and including the question of attributing predicates to the Other.

21
in the self's active and passive dimensions—for Descartes, the self attributes qualitative
descriptions to the Other, and these descriptions (in)famously lead Descartes to the
problems mentioned earlier. For Levinas, the self plays a more passive role in heeding the
traces of an independent agency, the passivity of which is described in detail next
chapter.
It is noteworthy that Descartes has an interesting way of reconceptualizing the
relation between himself and his Other. Descartes admits that beyond those things of
which he has a clear and distinct idea, there could be myriad attributes concerning God's
existence that would be either unattainable, or even a priori unknowable to a finite
thinker. This concession to a lack of knowledge about the infinite Other, far from being
a problem for Descartes, simply speaks to the asymmetry that the relationship implies.
As he puts the point:
It does not matter that I do not grasp the infinite, or that there are countless
additional attributes of God which I cannot in any way grasp, and perhaps even
cannot reach with my thought; for it is in the nature of infinite not to be grasped
by a finite being like myself. (AT VII 46, my emphasis)
We see more support for this acknowledged asymmetry in a rather unheralded
remark, wherein Descartes claims that although he cannot "grasp" the infinite other, he
can "understand" God or "touch" him with his thought, "just as we can touch a mountain
but not put our arms around it."21 For Levinas, this notion of "touching," I argue in the
next section, is best exhibited in his account of the "face" and, later, the "trace," and
which are arguably analogues to Descartes' "touching." For Descartes, however, it is a
question of the necessary and respectful distance that the asymmetry of the relationship
implies—the finite being cannot fully comprehend the transcendent and infinite other, yet
21
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the experience of the self's limitations, and the transcendental-phenomenological traces of
this other's presence, respectively "touches," or can be touched by, the self without being
totalized (in Levinas's sense) or "grasped."
From a different tack, it is important to remember that Descartes' finite yet unique
existence implies, to him, an existential lack; a dependence upon the exterior is now
simply regarded as an essential and not fully knowable structure upon which wisdom and
goodness are based. Because he cannot, however, "guarantee" his own existence and
future (or because, as Levinas might say, he can neither master death nor fully predict the
Other and the future) he "touches" this other precisely when he sees the possibility of a
beyond that he cannot see or lucidly master, or when he sees his own limitations that
stem from the 'traces' of this Other.
Descartes and the other person reconsidered
The Meditations seems to offer little philosophical resources for breaking out of a
solipsistic position with respect to the existence of another person as another person. The
Sixth Meditation purports to give strong arguments for an adequate resemblance between
things clearly judged and the way that they exist in external space, at least considered
ratio-mathematically, yet Descartes' own terms seem to efface the possibility of
acknowledging a human reality beyond or in addition to physical stuff—which is what he
would need, by his own terms, to distinguish a human being from a particular
configuration of "extended" substance. If Descartes is most certain about his existence as
a res cogitans, and even if, during the Sixth Meditation, he is just as certain about
external reality, then what would make him certain about another res cogitans "very
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled" with the corporeal reality that he is now
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entitled to correctly judge?22 To bluntly put the question in Descartes' own terms, how
would he know that any other configuration of res extensia is legitimately coextensive
with its own res cogitans?
Drawing upon the spadework done in his Meditations, it seems inevitable that
Descartes' epistemology and account of learning, as examples, close the door to any
robust external contribution from another person. This is because in order to make things
intelligible, the Cartesian representational model only arrives at clarity when the mind
has made a clear and distinct judgment whose criteria for judging correctly come from
ratio-mathematical structures within the mind (and/or brain) coupled with the subject's
"assent" about a judgment. Interestingly, and perhaps in the starkest of contrast to
Levinas's view of learning and justification, the lesson for Descartes is that he "is not so
much learning something new as recalling something [he] knew beforehand," that is,
something that comes solely from within the self in the guise of innate ideas.23 On this
model, the mental subject only gets his clear and distinct representation of the object,
leading to a position like the famous "wax example."
But I need to realize that the perception of the wax is neither a seeing, nor a
touching, nor an imagining. Nor has it ever been, even though it previously
seemed so; rather it is an inspection on the part of the mind alone. (AT VII 68)
Even if, as mentioned earlier, the fruits of the Sixth Meditation (and the bulk of
Descartes' writings on empirical reality, for instance, the Principles of Philosophy)
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AT VII 81. Descartes is here referring to the "union" of his own mind and body, which would seem to
have to hold true of all other people as well.
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AT VII 64. Although one may rightly claim that these innate ideas were somehow "implanted" by God,
and therefore from Descartes' Other, there still remains an important difference between this view and
Levinas's, namely that Levinas's Other, as we shall see, is patently personal and capable of speaking to the
self, for example. Interestingly, at the ontological level Levinas does, however, pattern a model of "innate
ideas" that are based on an interhuman superstructure, as we see in chapter 3.
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warrant him to be certain about properly conducted object cognition in general, there is
still the aforementioned problem about the perception of a person as such. Descartes (at
the end of the Sixth Meditation) can arguably see the Second Meditation's wax as real,
for example, but can he now see the hats and coats to which he referred in the Second
Meditation as the people to whom one should refer? In the Second Meditation, following
on the heels of the wax example, he writes:
Were I perchance to look out my window and observe men crossing the square, I
would ordinarily say that I see the men themselves just as I see the wax. But what
do I see aside from hats and clothes, which could conceal automata? Yet I judge
them to be men…grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in my
mind. (AT VII 32)
To put the problem more clearly, consider the actual Descartes, who at the end of
the Meditations now sees a particular configuration of hats and coats moving by his
window. Well, just as he now can judge the piece of wax and claim that it really exists as
an extended thing (i.e. considered by its geometrical shape and relative position), so too
can he make similar judgments about hats and coats—this seems unproblematic, given
his method and conclusions of the Meditations. From where, however, would he arrive at
the certainty of his judgment that he sees "men," even given the Sixth Meditation's
warrant about reliable object cognition? That is, by what criteria would he be able to
distinguish things from persons, when it seems that all he has access to, aside from his
own mental being, is extended substance? Or, if Descartes preferred to ask, why don't
these hats and clothes (still) conceal automata?
As mentioned, and as is now perhaps well known, the Descartes of the
Meditations seems to have no good solution to this particular question implied by the
very terms of his philosophical system. Claim as he does that souls or minds and human
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bodies are "very closely joined," it seems that a "human" body with no soul or mind is
not a person on his account; for, on his view, the essence or definition of a person
includes both a mind and a body, and all Descartes has access to is his mind and bodies in
general (and, no doubt, an idea of God). And since one of the Sixth Meditation's labors
involves proving a "real distinction" between mind and body, it seems now that there is a
real problem when it comes to appreciating another human being as a person and not
merely as a concatenation of physical matter with, say, no volition or reason, or more
importantly for Levinas, no spontaneous capacity to overwhelm the self through teaching
and learning, for example.24
If it is true that the Meditations themselves offer no viable resources to come to
terms with this seemingly intractable but nonetheless interesting problem, a look at
Discourse on Method makes us keenly aware that Descartes previously anticipates a
version of the problem. His treatment of it is on the one hand highly sophisticated, and,
on the other, trivial, as we shortly make explicit. Additionally, as we see in the next
section, I argue that his thoughts on the human capacity for meaningful speech anticipate
a Levinasian strategy that can be extracted from Totality and Infinity and, to a lesser
extent, Time and the Other.
Initially published in 1637 (and anonymously, probably due to Galileo's recent
condemnation) the Discourse itself presents a somewhat different philosophical snapshot
of Descartes than the Meditations. In addition to containing several pages of anatomical
24
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contributions on the human body, he also candidly treats of the importance of social
customs, the brevity of life, and of building a broader scientific community that would
rely heavily on experiments to confirm empirical truths, which at least implicitly
challenged the Church's authority on such matters. Interestingly for the present purposes,
Descartes takes seriously the "problem" of other minds when he confronts an aspect of
the problem by laying out criteria for distinguishing a person from an automaton, for
example.
He lays out these criteria immediately after giving an account of the nervous and
circulatory system of human beings and animals, the anatomical study of which no doubt
led him to pose the question of what distinguishes human beings from other animals, and
even other "machines." He directly admits both that one could conceive of the human
body as an organic "machine" and that one could build a machine such that it "bore a
resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as closely as possible for all practical
purposes."25 Even if such machines exist, however, "we should still have two very certain
means of recognizing that they were not real men."26
The first is that they could never use words, or put together signs, as we do in
order to declare our thoughts to others…Secondly, even though such machines
might do some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, they would
inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they were acting not through
understanding, but only from the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason
is a universal instrument which can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs
need some particular disposition for each particular action; hence it is for all
practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to
make it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes
us act. (AT VI 56-7)
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These two criteria for recognizing personhood among certain objects can be
heavily criticized for either presupposing what is at issue (that a human would necessarily
have thoughts) or for leaning too heavily on the universality of rationality without giving
a sufficient, and sufficiently independent, account of rationality. In other words, the first
point seems to presuppose that if it is really a person it is because it has thoughts (which
is what is to be proven) and is thereby not a machine. The second, moreover, seems to
assume that the person would possess rationality, which, again, presupposes what it at
issue. For our purposes, and similar to the treatment of Descartes' causal argument in the
Third Mediation, the point here is not so much to salvage the cogency of Descartes'
arguments but rather to thoroughly exhibit his philosophical overtures to the other person
in so far as it does some spadework for a subsequent Levinasian reappropriation.
From one consideration, his criteria presuppose what is at issue, and so they are
thereby indecisive. They are, from a different point of view, however, quite intuitive and
plausible. Descartes appears to give a sort of definitional (and thus perhaps trivial)
distinction between a human being and an automaton, but it is not difficult to see where
his intuition came from—modern examples are legion. As evinced in literature and film,
for example, the human type, in contrast to the sophisticated machine or android, is often
represented in one of two ways that make it stand out from such machines. Formally
distinct, these criteria do, however, share a common trait, namely the capacity to resist
complete programming, and to adapt creatively or spontaneously—whether through
"reason," or, we might add in a further Cartesian vein, through will or volition.
On the one hand, call it the "universally rational," the human being is portrayed as
capable of, say, appropriately answering a prolonged and varied series of questions,
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whereas the machine (eventually) breaks down, demonstrating its interpretative
limitation.27 On the other hand, call it the "adaptive," the human being is shown as unfettered (or less fettered) by programming and constraint, which thereby enables the
person to intuitively adapt to a new situation, or even to do the "irrational" (that is, selfsacrificial, romantic, etc.) or gratuitous thing when necessary or desirable.28 By contrast,
the machine or artificial intelligence typically is limited by such programming or
constraint and therefore cannot adapt, cannot "act on all the contingencies of life," as
Descartes puts it. In speaking of such human capacities, Descartes' important (if poorly
stated) insight is that through communicative and interrogative processes we can take a
more than physical stance on another person, and further that such a stance best shows us
something like the superfluity of meaning over rote programming, that is, over a purely
mechanical description.
It is in a similar vein that I shall argue that Levinas's intentional analyses from his
middle period attempt to describe the surfeit of meaning beyond simple calculation and
totalization, which is a human surplus (of what Levinas calls "infinity") that the
phenomenologist can describe and heed through transcendental and genealogical
argumentation. As the next chapter shows, I argue that one should extract two distinct,
but simultaneously incompatible agent perspectives that emerge out of his middle period,
one of "totality" and one of "infinity" if one prefers, and although Levinas is almost
always displayed under the auspices of the latter, chapter 2 makes the case that one needs
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to understand his agent-centered phenomenology as always a conjunction of the two;
totality and infinity.
At any rate, while a machine would be capable of "totality," or the internally
motivated ability to precomprehend the outside through autopoetical terms, it is a
distinctly different affair to be capable of "infinity," or the passive ability to allow
passage to the novel, spontaneous contribution that emanates from communication and
contact with another agency, and, more generally, being "faced."29 For Descartes, though,
these criteria lead to an important consideration of speech itself as being more than a
mechanical function when treating of human beings. He claims that even if a machine
were capable of uttering words "which correspond to bodily actions causing a change in
its organs" there would remain, nonetheless, an adaptive lacuna in its capacities.
But it is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different
arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to
whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men can do. (AT VI 56-7, my
emphasis)
In accentuating both the universality of human communication and the ubiquity of
its application, Descartes introduces an important notion towards considering the other
person's independent reality in more than "totalizing" terms. Since he rejects human
speech as a purely mechanical affair, he brings in a dimension of interiority that is
necessary to understand the difference between sounds or parroting and discourse. He
writes, first, that we "must not confuse speech with the natural movements which express
passions [i.e. sense perception] and which can be imitated by machines as well as

29

Although a "passive ability" may seem initially strange, we shall see in Chapter 2 that Levinas's agent
perspective of "infinity" is arguably best explained by such a notion, which can provisionally be described
as "heteropoetic" in that it supposes a dynamically meaningful interplay between self and other that
describes two distinct stances that the agent can take on his or her experience.
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animals."30 And even if he begs the question when he declares that machines "cannot
show that they are thinking what they are saying" (because it presupposes that humans
alone have mental thoughts) the key insight consists in recognizing an abyss of sorts
between one person and another. Each person, from a totalizing view, cannot see across
it and see the other's mind or interior life purely in terms of "extended substance," yet it is
precisely through meaning and semantic adaptation that we 'see' what we cannot see, that
we appreciate the person as distinct from the machine, precisely insofar as the person
might resist the self's programmatization or a completely totalizing perspective. With
some rehabilitation, this Cartesian insight amounts to saying that we appreciate the
person as not just physical matter to be manipulated or calculated, but also as an
independent agency that (or who) can flourish.31 To put another of my interpretative
cards on the table, Levinas's phenomenology shall provide strategic insight into such
rehabilitation, as chapter 2 makes clear.
As with previous reconstructions of Descartes' arguments about exteriority, the
infinite Other, and the other person as distinct from a totalizing point of view, the purpose
is not to rehabilitate Descartes' position as such—rather, it is to show the philosophical
debt and kinship between his and Levinas's notions so as to better elucidate and support
the latter's—to which we now turn.
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is both independent of human "totalization" and yet still purposive and autonomous.
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Levinas's Reappropriation of Descartes
This section shows the degree to which Levinas carries the Cartesian torch with
regard to the ideas of self and alterity. Although many commentators have robustly
explored the connection between God and the Other, nevertheless Levinas's
reappropriation of the Cartesian subject has not received due attention. We shall also see
several Cartesian themes and terms that are highly influential to Levinas's thought in his
middle period (1946-67) that help to inform the central ambitions of this same period.
The Levinasian self of Totality and Infinity and Time and the Other bears striking
thematic resemblances to Descartes' subject or ego in the Meditations. The robust notions
of interiority, dependence, and especially the priority of the Other must not be
underestimated in Levinas's description of the self. To be clear from the outset, though,
Levinas's characterization of the self (or Moi) is not purely that of a res cogitans,
although as we see in what follows there are many structural similarities between the two.
We are also not making the claim that Descartes' Other strictly resembles Levinas's, for
Levinas's Other, at least in his middle period, is generally a personal other, an interlocutor
or lover or enemy, and not typically a theological entity. To put another of my
interpretative cards on the table, I shall suggest that we generally understand the
Levinasian self as drawing its identity from the world and other people, and as always
orbiting around a personal, as opposed to a theological, Other. Yet (in a Hegelian move
of sorts) I would also argue that Levinas draws upon the Cartesian model in order to
depict a potential development of human being that his novel phenomenological
approach subsequently shows to be deficient in certain respects, and necessary in others.

32
It is not often mentioned, but Time and the Other, and, to a lesser extent, Totality
and Infinity, exhibit a genetic phenomenology in which the self comes to fruition through
stages. The following seeks to better explain and situate Levinas's notions of self and
Other by comparative reference to Descartes' seminal attempts to carve out their
respective conceptual space. As we shall see, Levinas often gives them a different name,
but many of his thoughts about ipseity and alterity are clearly analogous to Cartesian
ideas.
Given the previous work of this chapter, we are now in a position to recapitulate
the numerous points of similarity in order to better augment their salience and, especially,
to explain both why Levinas arguably needed to use such a launching pad to propel his
philosophical enterprise as well as why, as we see next chapter, he needed to surpass it
phenomenologically. Levinas needed to begin with Descartes' problematic because he
follows Heidegger's view that Descartes' modern conception of subjectivity has been
historically determinative for the Western worldview, and Descartes' problems
concerning the other person are, at least potentially, Levinas's problems, so to speak.
This is not to say that Levinas is ignorant of, or willfully blind to, the differing
"postmodern" or "deconstructive" Western worldviews that themselves seek to displace,
deconstruct, or in a word raze what they take to be the modern conception; as a student of
Heidegger and a teacher/colleague of Derrida, Levinas was as much au courant of such
rival views as anyone.32
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Levinas also needs to begin with Cartesian themes because he will arguably found his bivalent
phenomenology on Descartes' understanding of "totality" and "infinity," as the next chapter argues for in a
nuanced way. We will see the case for Levinas's attempt to "salvage" and rehabilitate Descartes' under
appreciated comments on the philosophical importance of conversation and discourse.
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Rather, on my reading, Levinas sees Descartes' labors as a potential step in the
development of consciousness, and the possibility is evinced by virtue of Levinas's
genetic phenomenological descriptions in Time and the Other and Totality and Infinity.
So, that which Levinas describes is not arbitrary, but actually essential to the
development of human consciousness and perception. For Levinas, Descartes' worldview
of the Meditations is not a stillborn aberration, but rather a well-developed position that
consciousness can and often does take; as well as one that it may never shed in certain
respects. From a different tack, the positive side to his appropriation of Descartes is not
limited to critique, but is actually reflected in the self's dependence upon the human
Other.33
Oddly, some recent commentary has flatly rejected the notion that the Levinasian
self develops through a series of phenomenological stages or insights. B.C. Hutchens, in
his Levinas: A Guide for the Perplexed (2004), unequivocally leads such a charge when
he writes of Levinas's description of the self, that:
In fact, he does not seem to be offering a depiction of the self that develops by
stages at all. He is isolating aspects of a self that exhibits degrees of
hypostasization while embedded in a complex social arrangement. (100)
I would agree with the positive component of Hutchen's interpretation here, because as he
goes on to show, quite accurately, that notions of justice and the "third party" (i.e. the
Other's other, and the Other considered in a general way) do indeed commit Levinas to
certain restricted descriptions of the self as becoming ethically or responsibly reified out
of its "complacency" or "arbitrariness" (Levinas's terms) in certain "complex social
arrangements." But Hutchens is wrong in his claim that the Levinasian self does not
33

This feature of Levinas's reappropriation is deeply explored in the next chapter, when we consider the
phenomenology of conversation, teaching and learning, and erotic relations.
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develop by stages "at all," because it is both the case that Levinas offers a description of
the self's maturation through stages as well as the sort Hutchens just outlined.
In Time and the Other, for example, we clearly see reference to a description of
the subject as initially individuating through "hypostasis," then eventually recognizing
the "first morality" (64) of earthly nourishments by a recognition of their (lower case)
otherness, leading to an encounter with the Other which both brings forth a sense of death
and temporality (78-9, passim), and the transcendent possibilities opened by this
encounter through erotic love and "paternity" (Part IV). And one could easily make
similar interpretations of Totality and Infinity, since one can observe the progression from
self to labor and economy, from economy to the dwelling, and from thence to "beyond
the face."34 Indeed, the notion of a self's development through stages, ethical, theoretical,
or otherwise, is arguably one of the lynchpins of Levinas's middle period, and by way of
anticipation, I intend to show how the "whole work" of Totality and Infinity "seeks only
to present the spiritual according to this Cartesian order" (T&I, 180), with the "spiritual"
arguably referring to the "interiority" of the self.
Levinas, then, critically revives and reappropriates a Cartesian thematic precisely
because it is both very much alive and highly problematic. Put differently, his re-minting
of Cartesian coins into 20th century language is sympathetic to Descartes' description of
the subject and its dependence on the Other. And rather than merely trying to eclipse or
fragment the modern self, he instead initially embraces it in order to get closer and
thereby genetically surpass it. Such a surpassing is also "genetic" in the sense that
34

Richard Cohen, for example, sees a clearly "genetic or developmental design" to Time and the Other and
a fortiori in Totality and Infinity, in which the "emergence of subjectivity…to its shattering relationship
with the alterity of the other person" marks the former, and in the latter the developmental stages are
"brought into an even closer focus" (135).
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Levinas deepens a source of intelligibility that genealogically precedes standard
interpretations of the Cartesian model of intelligibility, as well as models built after it, up
to and including Husserl. This source, clearly analogous to Descartes' idea of God, is
essentially grounded in the other person's "infinity"—the Other—and in starting with the
Other as personal, as opposed to theistic or pantheistic, Levinas arguably repays his
maître Descartes well by surpassing his thought and contributing to an understanding of
the other person that preserves his or her independent and non-egoistically formed reality.
In this vein we know that for Descartes it is problematic that another person has a
mind or interior life. I suggest that the seeds of one of Levinas's key uses of "totality" lie
hidden in plain sight in Descartes' oeuvre, for in the Fourth Meditation he describes his
relation to God qua the question of implicit perfection or imperfection as that of a
"totality" to the presumed "infinity" of the supreme exterior (God).35 In an attempt to
show that he knows himself to be imperfect, he claims that, "had God made me this way,
then I can easily understand that, considered as a totality, I would have been more perfect
than I am now" (AT VII 61, my italics). The French version, furthermore, qualifies this
sense of "totality" from the Latin version with the addition of: "as if there were only
myself in the world" (comme s'il n'y avait que moi au monde).36 We see, then, an
obvious, if unacknowledged, seed to the sense(s) of Levinas's individual meaning of
totality and infinity, as well as the implications upon subjectivity therein.
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Levinas is either highly reluctant to define, or dismissive of the importance of defining, many of his key
technical terms, and "totality" and "infinity" are not exceptions to this trend. In the next chapter we shall
see several suggestions from the secondary literature about what these terms actually mean, as well as my
own interpretation of these terms. On my interpretation, Levinas borrows a microcosmic notion (i.e. one
that relates to the self and its ability to "totalize" the external world) of "totality" from Descartes.
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Descartes. Les Méditations Métaphysiques. Paris: Bordas (1998), 60.
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The very fact that each individual has such a distinctly "interior" life, far from
being a scandal for Levinas, actually sets the stage for the possibility of ethics, as it is
only from the perspective of "a totality" that one can begin to try and account for "more
than one can contain" and acknowledge the "fissure" in being that Putnam aptly described
earlier.37
Levinas likens the totalizing aspect of the human condition of "interiority" or
"atheism" to Gyges' character in Plato's Republic (T&I 61, 90, passim). That is, the fact
that each one of us is, in a sense, always invisible to every one else constitutes a radical
asymmetry between the first and second person, as well as first and third person
perspectives. In addition, this asymmetry brings with it certain ethical implications, such
as a lack of direct reciprocity or analogy between my (ethical) expectations and the
Other's (T&I 53, and elsewhere). For Descartes, the discovery of the Other also brings
ethical implications with it, as his Other (God) now sets standards of perfection, wisdom,
and morality. The extent to which Levinas borrows from Descartes' work in this respect
is not obvious, yet we will now see the case for a starker Cartesian coloring of Levinas's
notions of self via his accounts of atheism and separation, as well as a certain
prioritization regarding the self's dependence on the Other.
Levinas's polysemical characterization of "atheism" may lead one to think of a
misnomer, as some senses of the term go against the conventional grain. When coupled
with a retrospective Cartesian understanding, however, the term regains traction, and
more importantly it sets the stage for Levinas's description of the budding stages of
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For Levinas, the paradoxical "more than can be contained" aspect of the subject's mental economy is
simply what he means by the "idea of infinity," since this "idea overflows the very thought that thinks it"
(T&I 197, and elsewhere). It is an analogue to Descartes' notion of God's infinity, and it both resists full
conceptualization and provides the self with an independent standard of evaluation.
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mature subjectivity and rationality. By "atheism," he would first have us understand the
stage of a subject's being whereby, arguably in direct analogy to Descartes' selfsustaining subject in Meditation 2, the subject comes to a realization that it needs no other
source than itself; that it can be the master of its domain—whether it be in terms of
perception, or thinking, in Descartes' precise sense, or in terms of simply being at home
with oneself ("eco-nomic" and "ipseic") in Levinas's. For Descartes, whether there be no
god (a-theism), or an evil one, the self can still lead a sort of sustained existence, with
one's 'sustenance' deriving principally from one's "egology," as Levinas would put it, or
from one's intuitive self-certainty and preexisting modes of comprehension, as Descartes
does. As Levinas explains it in Totality and Infinity:
One can call atheism this separation so complete that the separated being
maintains itself in existence all by itself, without participating in the Being from
which it is separated—eventually capable of adhering to it by belief…The soul,
the dimension of the psychic, being an accomplishment of separation, is naturally
atheistic. By atheism we understand a position prior to both the negation and the
affirmation of the divine, the breaking with participation by which the I posits
itself as the same and as I. (58)
By "maintains itself in existence all by itself," we should see a direct connection
to Descartes' self-certainty through methodical doubt (that is, even if one is ontologically
alone, or a "totality," and or methodically deceived about reality, then one exists so long
as one is thinking—whether one believes that one participates in extended being in
general). The isolated thinker of the Second Meditation feeds off of his own mind, as it
were, in the sense that thought and perception themselves are seemingly sufficient to
guarantee both the self's existence, as well as a limited version of perceptual veracity. As
Descartes puts the point,
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I know now that bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of
imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from
their being touched or seen but from their being understood; and in view of this I
know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own
mind than of anything else. (AT VII 34)
Levinas's self is also atheistic or "separated" (he generally fuses the terms
together, as on T&I 148, for instance) in that one can only welcome the Other from the
stage of being a robust and self-maintaining ego; by virtue of being a unique totality of
self-identification that remains "identical throughout all its changes, " and "recovers its
identity throughout what happens to it" (T&I 36). As the Cartesian meditator needed, at
least provisionally, to assert his identity, and his (albeit limited) existence and knowledge
prior to affirming the existence of an exterior and the Other, in a sense so too does the
Levinasian self need to maintain its separation, its unique self-hood, prior to its being
able to "welcome" the Other as such. "The atheist separation is required by the idea of
infinity" (T&I 60).
For his part, Descartes also sees the need to first individuate himself as something
unique and self-sustaining, however minimally, prior to finding his Other, and in the last
analysis, he can only "somehow touch God with [his] thought," rather than form some
kind of closed, monistic whole with God (as Spinoza would have it). In a gesture that
betrays more of a Modern understanding of the subject's capacities, Levinas, again
showing more of his Cartesian roots, maintains that "separation is produced by thought,"
(T&I 54) and that, like Descartes, the self's "inner life is not epiphenomenal," but
constitutes more of an "event in being" (T&I 240). This "production" of the self by its
unique ability to identify its own existence as if it were all that exists in the universe, and
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this characterization of a mental "event" with ontological, and not just epiphenomenal
ramifications, clearly smacks of Cartesian underpinnings.
The Levinasian chronological priority, moreover, mimics the Meditations, in that
after this stage described above the Cartesian soul will have ethical need to turn out of
itself and towards exteriority in general; that is, towards God and the world, on Descartes'
understanding. This outward orientation eventually leads to a guarantee concerning
reliable object cognition and a possibility of living beyond one's death by way of 'having'
a soul or mind as distinct from the body. For the first point, as the Fourth Meditation
suggests, if we assume that Descartes respects the bounds of will and certainty that his
supreme Other has put into play, and we assume further that the Other is supremely good
(and thereby non-deceptive, unlike an "evil genius" would be) then whatever Descartes
sees clearly really is at it seems, at least insofar as simple geometrical qualities are
concerned (Meditation Six).
For Levinas in both Totality and Infinity as well as Time and the Other, upon
mastering the stage of "interior life" and "dwelling" (which reflect a sort of self-sufficient
and auto-poetical existence, one that strictly speaking needs no true Other) "the same,"
which is in this case one's interior, one's personal "totality" or active psychic economy, is
at some point breached by "the presence of the Other." With the exceptions of "Eros"
and "Death" (via the transcendent paths they open to the same from the Other) Levinas is
not however very clear on the actual interpersonal structures that constitute this "breach
of the same." This is why in chapter 2 we shall further explore the implicit mechanisms
through which Levinas articulates more concrete instances of such interpersonal
situations, such as conversation, teaching, and learning.
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In addition to this breach of one's own totality, in which an "exterior" is "offered"
to the hitherto same," which is an exterior that the same could not presumably have
created, the subject is presented with possibilities that open it up to an empirically stable
and reliable world, in much the same way God "guarantees" all of the "treasures of
wisdom" for Descartes. Such possibilities, for Levinas, render language, object cognition
and conceptualization "objective," and they further serve to make objects in general
"common" by virtue of their being named and disseminated by the Other. That is, since
the Other introduces language and teaching, and language "conditions the functioning of
rational thought" (T&I 204) as well as "makes possible the objectivity of objects" (T&I
210), a stable and "plural" or intersubjective reality takes shape, one that was
inconceivable and/or inessential to a purely isolated subject or pure res cogitans. Such an
intersubjective "breach" of the self enables the self to reckon with the world in terms that
bring in ethical and evaluative standards. For Descartes, the Other's goodness and the
laws (in this case, of nature) that this being puts into play are rational, ethical, and now
open to the thinker who "delights in contemplation" of this Other. This leads Descartes,
who initially began in a provisionally atheistic position, to a discovery of his epistemic
and moral limitations through the Other, and subsequently, in the latter Meditations, to a
reliance upon this Other's infinite perfection for an objective and stable world.
Perhaps more importantly, with Descartes and Levinas a real measure of ethical
worth is now in play, as once the Other has been welcomed, there comes the need to be
justified in the Other's eyes (or God's standards, with Descartes), as well as the
concomitant sense of limitation, lack of perfection, and inability to cope with one's own
death—or an inability "to guarantee my existence and future" by myself, as Descartes
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might say. For Levinas, as alluded to above, it is precisely the Other who opens up
transcendent possibilities beyond one's own death, whether in the guise of "paternity"
through the "feminine" (T&O Part IV, T&I Section IV: C, "Fecundity") or in the sense
that the Other conditions the future and justifies the present (T&O 79, T&I 281-3). With
Levinas, we should add, further, that the Other's "breach of the same" conditions a
normatively intersubjective perspective on the world, self, and others. We may,
furthermore, read some Cartesian sense into Levinas's claim that, "Infinity opens the
order of the Good" (T&I 104), and the more sustained claim that, "goodness consists in
taking up a position in being such that the Other counts more than myself" (T&I 247,
passim). For when one retrospectively tarries with the Cartesian constellation of meaning
out of which many other Levinasian notions emerge, one can recognize a connection
between the dependency of self on the Other in each case, as well as the ethical horizons
that this asymmetrical relationship implies for each thinker.
As we saw, a dimension of the ethical relation for both Levinas and Descartes
consists in the limited self's dependence upon and "continuous striving for" the supreme
Other, in Descartes, and the crucial "welcoming of," or "breach by," the Other in Levinas.
In one sense, this dependence occurs by way of being overwhelmed by that which each
thinker calls "the infinite," one that the agent realizes in his own psychic economy. From
another perspective, however, this need for the Other is also prior to any particular
thought or situation on the subject's part, as, for Levinas, the subject's ability to use
language, conceptualize the world, and "represent to oneself" already presuppose or are
conditioned by the Other, as chapter 3 makes clearer (T&I 204,9). For Descartes,
although he chronologically arrives at the idea of the infinite only after he itemizes, as it
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were, his mental taxonomy in the Third Meditation, he subsequently admits that without
certain innate ideas implanted by his supreme Other, presupposing of course the Other's
existence, he would not have the conditions to philosophize and make accurate judgments
about the world in the Fourth Meditation (AT VII, 64).
This need to reach for the transcendent Other in Descartes' thought, in whom "all
the treasures of science and wisdom lie hidden" (AT VII, 53) is also, as some have noted,
a direct bridge to Levinas's notion of "Desire." Peperzak, for instance, devotes several
pages of generally good analysis on this score in his To the Other (65-8). He traces the
evolution of Levinas's thought regarding the importance of the Cartesian idea of the
infinite for Levinas's notion of desire between Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite
(1957) and Totality and Infinity (1961). He seems mistaken in his following claims,
however, namely that for Levinas, "the nucleus of the Cartesian idea of the infinite is
only the negative side of desire" because, he says, Totality and Infinity begins
chronologically prior to the "experience of the encounter with the Other," with "an
analysis of the desire for the absolute as the primary and original intention that replaces
the cogito and the freedom of the moderns" (68).
In other words, Peperzak is claiming that the positive content that one would find
in Totality and Infinity will both supplant the foundational importance of the cogito and
the default understanding of freedom inherited from the Modern period with, say, notions
of Levinasian responsibility and justice (I assume something like this to be the case, as
Peperzak does not explicitly describe what the positive component would be.) He is also
claiming that Totality and Infinity places the desire for the exterior as prior to, and hence
more important than, the actual or ontic experience with the Other. Hence he is saying
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that this gesture supplants Descartes' order whereby the Other is encountered in the Third
Meditation, and is thereby not originary. Peperzak claims, then, that the structure of
desire that precedes and enables such an encounter represents a positive change in
Levinas's appropriation of Descartes' notions of self and Other.
I would argue, though, that just as Descartes needed the innate ideas, as well as
certain other implications deriving from God's existence and character in order to be
capable of empirically discovering such an exterior in the Third Meditation, so too does
the structure of desire in Totality and Infinity embrace a similar strategy. That is, the
thought is not, as Peperzak claims, that Levinas radically prioritizes the idea of the
infinite in comparison to Descartes. The thought, rather, is that Levinas preserves or
reflects the priority as found in Descartes' thought, which thereby makes him more of a
Cartesian than acknowledged.
To clarify this point about priority, just as Descartes claims that his "perception of
the infinite, that is of God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is
myself" (AT VII 45-6), so too is Levinas claiming that the structure of desire precedes
any particular empirical encounter with the Other, but is rather originally 'implanted' by
the Other in the sense of a shared genealogical fund of meaning by way of an "originary"
teaching (as chapter 3 clarifies), or simply given to the structure of consciousness (T&I
33-4). That is, Levinas thinks that it is both the case that the Other is encountered in
empirical life and that the Other plays a formative role in the development of
consciousness. From this point of view, Peperzak's claim ought to be restricted to a logic
of substitution rather than of surpassing, as a different reading of Descartes clearly shows
that the yearning for the Other, which does not seek to fully master or comprehend it, pre-
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exists the actual encounter of the meditator's idea of infinity, just as the "breach of the
same" is in a sense preceded by the Other's traces in the self's formation, education, and
cultural inheritance.
For further support against Peperzak's interpretation, we draw on John Llewelyn
who, in his Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics (1995), argues for a related
point, namely that Descartes' (and Levinas's, by implication) metaphysical priority is
indeed more original than the self's "having" of the idea of infinity:
To learn this is to learn the lesson of the third Meditation of Descartes, that
although the truth of the cogito is first in the order of learning, the ego is not
altogether its own master; the ego is not self-taught. (125)
Returning to the first claim that Peperzak makes, it is undeniable that Levinas will
try to surpass (or bypass, rather, since Levinas's concern is not to "prove" something
about the union of mental and physical substance) some of the egological and solipsistic
notions that Descartes' philosophy entails with such interpersonal notions as
conversation, responsibility, and social justice. I will argue, however, that Levinas also
wants to maintain certain stages of the subject's development, including the cogito and
Cartesian will, as potential, and in certain respects necessary, steps in the evolution of
consciousness. Briefly put, Levinas, as is evinced in his middle period, clearly describes a
genetic maturation on the part of the self and its interaction with the world and others.
Such maturity begins existentially through hypostasis, and culminates in an ethical
maturity that leaves the self acutely aware of its need for, and responsibility to, others.
The further claim is that this structure mirrors the Cartesian self's development, and this
thereby goes against Peperzak's claim that Levinas solely seeks to "replace" such notions.
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Such notions and their related counterparts, rather, form part of the essential
stages of consciousness that the Levinasian agent can and does adopt, as we have seen in
more detail above. In Levinas's middle period, to which Peperzak refers, the Levinasian
self comes to fruition through various Cartesian stages bearing important Cartesian
analogues, and they elucidate both the terminology that Levinas employs as well as a few
of the guiding principles that are key toward understanding his thought such as, but not
restricted to: subjectivity, shared objectivity; ethical wisdom in addition to the theoretical;
a recognition of asymmetry between self and Other; and, lastly, and account of how the
same and Other interrelate, even though they are independent beings.
It is in from such a vantage point that we can re-read further sense into Levinas's
initially cryptic claim that "this whole work seeks only to present the spiritual according
to this Cartesian order, prior to the Socratic" (T&I 180). By the "Socratic order," Levinas
means an understanding of Being and existents as monistic and in principle similar,
which for him implies a complete precomprehension of each particular being through a
"Neutral" or theoretical system—this is what he means by "totality" in a macrocosmic
sense. Such an ordering technically renders each part as just a footnote to exactly one
system wherein each term is assimilated monologically. In contrast to this "monistic"
order, Levinas seeks to preserve a philosophical system wherein each term or interlocutor
maintains its uniqueness yet meaningfully relates to other radically distinct
"intelligences" or agencies. Levinas's "system" of self and Other, if one wanted to put it
that way, is patterned on the way that the Cartesian subject both relates and does not
relate to the supreme Other, and this relation depends on the purview in question.
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In this vein, he sees in Descartes' thought exactly such a prototype, since the self
and the Other are distinct in certain respects, and yet meaningfully related in others, as
we have seen. With both philosophers, additionally, the Other serves as a transcendental
condition for intelligibility and ethics. Levinas preserves a great deal more than just this
kernel of method, even going so far as to base many of his notions of subjectivity, ethics,
and objectivity on a Cartesian model. This chapter's emphasis has been placed on his
reappropriation of Descartes, yet we shall also see significant ways in which Levinas
borrows from Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty in order to further his
Cartesian reappropriation. Lastly, and as the next chapter makes explicit, the very idea of
"infinity" founding "totality" is thoroughly Cartesian. In these senses and others, then,
we ought to read Descartes' "spirit" back into the letter of Levinas's text. When we reread
Levinas's text, we can now better appreciate his "creation" of Descartes' philosophy as a
precursor to Levinas's philosophy of the human Other.
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Chapter 2:
The Case for a Dynamic Consideration of Levinas's Thought: A Dual Aspect and
Symbiotic Reading of "Totality" and "Infinity"
Abstract
The Problem: certain Levinas commentators either misunderstand the meaning of,
and the relationship between, "totality" and "infinity," or they wrongly import misleading
ethical values into the very notions. It is argued that such misinterpretations lead to errant
and or tendentious conclusions about Levinas's philosophical sources, ambitions, and
conclusions.
The Projected Solution: a more accurate reading of Totality and Infinity reveals
that totality and infinity are both essential aspects of his phenomenological description of
human being. The dynamic interplay between totality and infinity represents two sides of
a coin, as it were, and I thus argue that it is misleading to claim, for example, that totality
and infinity are necessarily antagonistic or fratricidal. It is furthermore inaccurate, for the
same reason, to claim that Levinas attempts to supplant totality so as to champion infinity
in its stead. Descartes' philosophy genealogically leads the way, moreover, for an
accurate situation of Levinas's thoughts about totality and infinity. We also see (against
the grain of recent scholarship) that Levinas significantly departs from Cartesian thought
by regrounding infinity on the personal, and not divine, Other.
Introduction: The Problem and its Topography
This chapter defends my (initially) odd assertion that the most crucial word in the
title of Levinas's magnum opus is "and." The point of this assertion is to highlight the
pivotal importance of understanding totality and infinity as equally important aspects in
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Levinas's phenomenology. Levinas's thought is often detrimentally portrayed, however,
under the auspices of an apparent dilemma: either one privileges the "totality" aspect—
for instance, his critique of reason and the self's agency; or, one privileges the "infinity"
aspect of his thought—for instance, his philosophical consideration of alterity and the
transcendent Other. It is regrettable that certain commentators, whom we soon consider,
tend to read his middle period in a way that leaves little-to-no room for an interpretation
of his thought as necessarily hinging on a dynamic and equally important interplay
between totality and infinity.
When commentators characterize totality and infinity as essentially antagonistic,
it leads to a mistaken view of how Levinas really understands these terms, as well as their
interrelation. They ought to be understood as complementary, yet they are often
described in a way that pits them against each other in a misguidedly hostile sense. Such
a misreading of his most crucial technical terms leads to an inaccurate depiction of
Levinas's important philosophical ambitions. His accounts of subjective and
intersubjective experience, for example, get falsely distorted via facile caricatures that are
based on interpretations that neglect this dual and dynamic aspect of his thought. His
philosophical commitment to truth, language, and social justice, moreover, can be
erroneously interpreted as hostile to rationality and progress if one is not careful to
accurately situate and balance the roles that totality and infinity play.
Richard Wolin leads this misguided charge when he claims that adopting
Levinas's thought amounts to a harmful "denigration of cognition or knowledge," as well
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as an equally caustic denigration of "intersubjective communication."38 His insight is that
Levinas falls into a camp of suspect philosophers who "vilify" theoretical reason, and
favor instead "quasi-mystical experiences" [read "infinity"] upon which to ground their
respective philosophical systems. Wolin argues, furthermore, that Levinas actually
champions anti-rational and anti-progressive positions because of the way he understands
"totality" and "infinity."
The binary opposition between "totality" and "infinity" that governs [Levinas's]
work makes it nearly impossible to conceptualize meaningful intersubjectivity.
(241, my italics)
Since, given the limitations of creaturely existence, we can never satisfy the
Other's claims, at issue is a relationship of "infinity" or "transcendence."
Theoretical reason, conversely, aims at a type of totalizing comprehension—an
essay at finite closure—that Levinas belittles as "totality." Thus the animating
antithesis of his work: totality versus infinity. (230, my italics)
Wolin's polemically sweeping brushstrokes consistently paint Levinas into a
corner where "totality" is associated with "predatory" and "pernicious" intentions,
"excrescences and misdeeds," and the "subjugation" and "domination" of individuals, to
name but a few examples from his caricature.39 "Infinity," conversely, is said to be
divinely "superior" in Levinas's eyes; precisely through such a misguided preference for
the latter over the former, Levinas's thought allegedly amounts to a naïve attack on
theoretical reason, communication, and important social and democratic institutions.40
Wolin's polemic will be the object of much analysis and criticism in section C, since it
represents the most consistent and virulent Levinasian caricature on this issue of
arbitrarily classifying, and then implicating, totality versus infinity. I shall carefully
38
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make the contrasting case, then, that such characterizations of Levinas's thought rest on a
mistaken (yet pervasive) view of his philosophy—namely, the mistaken view that
Levinas seeks to eradicate essentially pernicious totality so as to champion infinity in its
place.
A sympathetic Levinasian might retort to such a caricature by claiming, for
instance, that Levinas actually defends such claims as "reason makes human society
possible" (T&I 119); additionally, numerous passages can be pointed out that precisely
ennoble intersubjective communication and social responsibility. To simply reply quid
pro quo against a radical polemic like Wolin's, however, would be to ineffectively
encourage "the mere displacement of pawns in an interminable game," as Derrida
cautions us in a different, but no less exasperating, context.41 We shall instead get to the
radix of such misguided polemics so as to examine the general misunderstanding upon
which such caricatures rest.
I will also address a similar problem that usually arises from less polemical (but
no less misleading) sources. The allegation, in a nutshell, is that Levinas's philosophical
position needs recourse to "quasi-philosophical" sources in order to justify itself. These
sources are alternately registered as "theological" or "religious" (for example, Wolin, and
Alain Badiou—albeit for different reasons), literary, for instance, "Russian Literature"
(Wolin), and sometimes even "quasi-mystical" (Wolin and Moran, for instance). These
allegedly necessary supplemental sources relate, moreover, to how the commentator in
question understands "infinity," "totality," and their (lack of) conjunction.
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In addition to frequently misunderstanding aspects of these terms and their
interrelation, commentators draw upon them to expound a (pseudo-)Levinasian account
that ultimately needs a quasi-philosophical supplement. Such supplements are "quasiphilosophical" in the sense that they kill off philosophical possibilities within the text by
insisting, instead, upon the necessity of something other than the resources of his
phenomenological and philosophical argumentation. Levinas, under such scrutiny, would
"really" be: a crypto- or negative theologist; a misguided proto-multiculturalist; or simply
a failed mystic, to name some characteristic examples. These ad hoc supplements
needlessly betray the letter of Levinas's own text and philosophical ambition, however,
and thereby arbitrarily supplant, more than support, or truly criticize, his work.
The point in demonstrating that we do not need to view Levinas in these quasiphilosophical ways is not to denigrate other disciplinary approaches to understanding
Levinas per se; it is, rather, to criticize a growing and misleading trend of thinkers—pro
and contra Levinas—who argue that such supplementation is necessary to interpret his
philosophy.
Dermot Moran, for instance, claims that Levinas's phenomenological notions are
"never systematically explicated by him," and Levinas therefore needs recourse to a
brand of quasi-philosophical supplementation, as the following passage reveals.
His style is to make assertions, followed by further assertions, without any
attempt to justify them, other than through some kind of appeal to deeply human,
perhaps even mystical, intuitions. (321-2)
Such appeals to "deeply human" or "mystical" experience that allegedly undergird
Levinas's thought are common, even among otherwise masterful interpreters of the
phenomenological tradition like Moran. These mistaken appeals, as we shall see in
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detail, owe their origin to a neglect of the Cartesian perspective that informs Levinas's
thought, on the one hand, and to a misreading of what totality and infinity actually mean,
on the other. Levinas does not help his own case in such matters, as it were, to the extent
that his language is often "hyperbolic" and or "obscurantist," as myriad commentators
have observed. When we will have situated Levinas's thoughts on totality and infinity
within a Cartesian framework, however, his thoughts about the complementary
importance of these crucial terms will thereby become clearer, as well as clearly resistant
to the pervasive caricatures that would render them as essentially antagonistic or nonphilosophical.
Levinas's departure from Cartesian thought also paves the way for a more faithful
reading of what he means by "totality" and "infinity," since his phenomenology resituates
the terms of the importance of self and other(s), and because it stems from the personal,
and not divine Other. This phenomenological shift from the divine to the personal
arguably highlights Levinas's most brilliant philosophical move, yet contemporary
scholars of all stripes still neglect this transition and insist, instead, that Levinas really
needs certain "quasi-mystical" or (quasi-philosophical) "religious" supplements.
Alain Badiou, who is a contemporary spearhead of those who read Levinas as a
quasi-philosopher, claims that sitting at Levinas's philosophical table amounts to being
served a "dog's dinner" (de la bouillie pour les chats) precisely because Levinas
ultimately needs the dubious supplement of an "ineffable God," and perhaps "Jewish
Law," in order to "justify" his philosophy.42 Badiou's analysis, although it is quite
respectful of Levinas's "exemplary confrontation" with the thought of Husserl and
42
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Heidegger, nevertheless attempts to crucify Levinas's thought on the assumption that
without God ("who does not exist"), Levinas leaves us with "a pious discourse without
piety."43 We shall see, however, that Levinas's Other need not, and should not, be referred
to the Judeo-Christian God—this will require reconstructing a faithful dynamic between
totality and infinity via a temporary return to (and then salient departure from)
Cartesianism.44
A similar problem emerges when we consult the scholarship on the extent to
which Levinas is a transcendental, or, an empirical philosopher. The letter of much
scholarship implies an exclusive disjunction between the two possibilities, whereas we
shall see that an authentic appreciation of his thought hinges on accepting that he is both
an empirical and a transcendental philosopher. This duality, moreover, arises from the
cultivation of an accurate reading of totality and infinity as both empirical and
transcendental in varying respects.
There is much debate, for instance, about whether Levinas's notion of "the Other"
actually refers to an empirical person or a transcendent signifier. According to William
Large, Simon Critchley, for example, favors the former, while Edith Wyschogrod favors
the latter, since she (like Badiou and Wolin, albeit at cross-purposes) situates the Other as
something "divine." Some scholars have gone as far as to sketch interesting notions of
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"trauma," as well as the unconscious, in order to situate the Other in a unique topos.45 On
my reading, however, the Other is best understood through an interpersonal
phenomenology that shows both that the Other is empirical, in one distinct sense, and
transcendental in another sense. This interpretation, as we shall make explicit, is
consistent with Levinas's text, and it owes its roots both to a Cartesian-Levinasian
understanding, as well as to a dynamic and conjoined reading of totality and infinity. I
shall also argue that my interpretation of his two key technical terms importantly dispels
apparent contradictions and paradoxes in the language of many of Levinas's claims.
The Projected Resolution
This chapter will elucidate the agent or self's perspective in Levinas's middle
period that clarifies how he uses and contextualizes these seemingly problematic notions
of "totality" and "infinity." This will involve a more carefully nuanced and welldocumented reading of Levinas's use of "totality" and "infinity," as well as certain
technical terms like the "face," "Other," "the same," and "desire," which are deeply
interrelated with infinity and totality. The choice of starting with the agent perspective is
not arbitrary, but instead it seeks to remain faithful both to Levinas's Cartesian roots, as
well as to one of the chief ambitions of his middle period: namely, a "defense of
subjectivity," as he emphatically puts it in the first-person, that shows how "alterity is
only possible starting from me" (T&I 40).
The first task is to clarify these technical terms and then demonstrate their
essentially tandem importance in Levinas's thought. To better understand them, we shall
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draw upon our previous spadework, which exhumed radical notions of totality and
infinity in Descartes' corpus, as well as draw upon our interpretation of a Cartesian
underpinning to Levinas's interpersonal phenomenology (which we saw in the latter half
of Chapter 1, Descartes and the other person reconsidered). The task thereafter is to
show that Levinas distinctively bolsters these terms in a unique metaphysical and
phenomenological way, which thereby surpasses Cartesian thought. We shall also
deconstruct and criticize certain misguided caricatures of Levinas scholarship regarding
what is meant by "totality," "infinity," and the very idea of their conjunction.
By way of a final introductory caveat, we should note that such philosophers as
Colin Davis have commented on certain aspects of the necessity of reading the
conjunction of "Totality and Infinity" into Levinas's thought. Davis remarks, for instance,
in his noteworthy Levinas: An Introduction, that what Levinas calls "the Same and the
Other" often maps on to Levinas's understanding of totality and infinity, and he deftly
points out that a denigration of either term goes against the grain of Levinas's letter and
intentions.
Levinas's book is called Totality and Infinity, not "Totality or Infinity." To
privilege the Other rather than the Same would end up reproducing the totality
thinking from which Levinas is trying to escape: it would lead to the invasion of
the Same by the Other, so ultimately suppressing one of the terms. (41)
Davis's insight is spot on, then, to the extent that it stresses the need to read totality and
infinity as essentially conjoined.46 His thought is also important since it presumably
undercuts such a misreading as Wolin's, as it indicates that Levinas does not champion a
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suppression of one notion to the other's benefit. Since Davis's study is essentially
introductory in scope, however, it does not explore some of the robust possibilities of the
conjunction between totality and infinity that our interpretation unfolds below. Our work
will flesh out the skeleton of the phenomenological possibilities that are indicated by the
insights of commentators like Davis.
The Tandem and Coequal Importance of Totality and Infinity
Situating the very notions of totality and infinity. Levinas rarely gives
straightforward definitions for most of his key technical terms, and "totality" and
"infinity" are not exceptions to this trend. Levinas only conjointly discusses totality and
infinity in one passage in the text, and his glosses on what they mean individually are
often nebulous. We will, of course, draw upon the secondary literature to better
understand these notions, although in certain cases the literature will misleadingly
indicate the arbitrary importation of values that our interpretation resists, and then
criticizes. My interpretation strictly maintains that "infinity" and "totality" are best
understood as working in tandem, and further that they have a coequal worth in Levinas's
philosophy. Levinas does tend to focus on a critique of "totality," but this is because he
thinks that this aspect (as opposed to the infinity aspect) of human endeavor has received
all the attention, as it were. That is, his critique is designed to accurately situate and
balance the role of totality and infinity, and thus not to pit them against each other tout
court so as to "champion divine infinity" and eliminate "pernicious" totality, as Wolin
puts it.47
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I argue that a better understanding of these notions consists in identifying both a
microcosmic and macrocosmic sense, and that Descartes' philosophy is as guiding light
for the microcosmic sense of "totality" and "infinity." In the microcosmic sense of totality
(as opposed to an ontology, which would be a macrocosmic sense of "totality") it is the
self that is capable of "totalizing," that is, capable of adopting a stance on "external"
reality that attempts to subsume everything by its own lights. Levinas's usage supports
this reading, since "to totalize" involves imposing "more of the Same," and both the self
and an ontological system can be "the Same" in his vernacular, depending upon whether
he is referring to a particular agent, or a particular ontology or worldview.
In the microcosmic aspect of totality, the self can view everything or anything as
a pre-comprehended extension of its innate rational capacity. In different terms, the self
in this aspect attempts to assimilate everything as similar to its own intelligible nature.
Levinas suggests this sense of totality in the following passage (and elsewhere), where he
is discussing "a question of what in Cartesian terminology becomes the clear and distinct
idea"; his analysis here also extends to "Husserl's thesis of the primacy of the objectifying
act," where the "object of consciousness, while distinct from consciousness, is as it were
a product of consciousness" (T&I, 123).
In clarity the object which is first exterior is given, that is, delivered over to him
who encounters it as though it had been entirely determined by him. In clarity the
exterior being presents itself as the work of the thought that receives it.
Intelligibility, characterized by clarity, is a total adequation of the thinker with
what is thought…in which the object's resistance as an exterior being vanishes.
(T&I, 123-4, my boldface)
It is important to highlight both that Levinas is speaking about an individual or
self, and that a certain way of looking at the world ("total adequation") has the
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consequence of overlooking an "object's" perspectival resistance qua its possible
independence or "exteriority" to the same self's lucid comprehension. This resistance is
thus importantly not a value-laden resistance, as some commentators interpret it below. In
addition, totalizing perspectives are essential to complete the basic existential structure of
many key Levinasian interpersonal situations, and hence we can appreciate a preliminary
indication of how "totality's" function is not intrinsically "pernicious" and "to be
denigrated," as Wolin would have one believe (see Chapter 2, Conversation, Teaching
and Learning, and Eros and the Caress).
To elaborate totality's nature in a more robust fashion, "totality," and its
variations, "to totalize," "totalizing," etc., ought to be provisionally understood as aspects
of what rational beings do in order to arrive at a clear and distinct conception of things. If
such a view tends to overlook "the unexpected," it is not necessarily a fault in the view
itself: construction, scientific research, agriculture—in a word, many fundaments of
human existence—all tend to operate more or less effectively, and importantly, with such
totalizing hypotheses. They hold, implicitly or explicitly, that the world is just so…that
X, Y, and Z will be required…at this time exactly…etc. In different terms, the human
need to reckon with, chart, and make plans about the world and others generally involves
features of totality. The totalizing aspect is thus intimately related to a static and stable
organization of reality. From a certain standpoint, then, to totalize is simply a feature of
being a rational agent.
A "totality" (in a macrocosmic sense) can also refer to a metaphysical or
ontological framework that attempts to subsume reality in toto under conceptual
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categories.48 The general run of modern physics would also represent a totalizing
perspective insofar as its claims extend to "everything" about the universe. When
considered in themselves, however, such views do not connote anything pernicious or
unethical. Pace commentators like Wolin, we shall see that Levinasian totality is actually
an important aspect of the human situation, and not rather some pernicious aspect that
Levinas seeks to "vilify," as he puts it, and then jettison.
This is because Levinas actually situates totality's function within a wide array of
possibilities whose scope can foster any number of activities, many of which are
thoroughly ethical, moreover. We shall see many examples of important intersubjective
situations below, in which we examine the structure of conversation, teaching, and love,
all of which importantly require aspects of totality to complete their structure. An
accurate reading of Levinas reveals, then, that totality, like infinity, is just plain pivotal
toward understanding his essential phenomenology. Like the more abstract cases
mentioned in the previous paragraph, furthermore, totality's function in interpersonal
situations is more authentically human than any sort of ethical aberration.
"Infinity," alternately, connotes a fund of meaning or potential that "overflows"
the self (or system) in Levinas's idiom, since it leaves the self surprised and receptive to
contributions it did not anticipate or reckon with. The perspectives that show up in the
infinity aspect are presumably not salient from a totalizing perspective, or at least not
simultaneously salient from the agent's perspective. Something's or someone's capacity
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for infinity thereby represents the unforeseen or unpredictable aspect of our cognitive
attempts to understand and predict them. Infinity gets us to add ellipses, as it were, on to
things and people as we realize that their independent reality is not wholly reducible to
our individual or collective understanding. It also suggests an activity, or curious
remainder, that orbits the periphery of our conceptual horizon. In this aspect, we often
find ourselves receptive to, or informed by, such phenomena, rather than merely actively
and lucidly grasping them.
We can also importantly see, however, that the "general run of modern physics"
mentioned above arguably partakes in a macrocosmic sense of infinity, if we put the
accent on the more speculative claims that it makes about, for instance, empirically
unverifiable "dark matter," "black holes," or unobservable particles that nonetheless are
argued to contribute to the "totalizeable" reality with which modern physics
predominately operates.
Infinity roughly resembles, on a different scale, Heidegger's Being-as-such,
especially insofar as it suggests a source of intelligibility that is presumably infinite, on
the one hand, and it is only accessible in piecemeal fashion, and with the proper
attunement, on the other. Infinity, furthermore, both reveals and conceals itself in the
sense that we become aware that we did not know or expect certain things, yet we
presumably cannot master the unpredictable or unexpected as such. Levinas grounds
infinity on the "infinite" and personal Other, as opposed to what he calls "impersonal"
Being, but the points of similarity remain concerning an aspect of reality that constantly
eludes our total grasp. With the proper attunement, however, this aspect can also inform
us in unpredictable but important ways. Levinas's account of infinity normally confines

61
itself to interpersonal situations, moreover, whose dynamic scope implies aspects of both
infinity and totality, as we see in Chapter 2, "Totality" and "Infinity": Passing the Torch
from Descartes to Levinas and Conversation.
Totality and infinity, then, generally refer to the dynamic structure of reality
within which human beings comport themselves in matters ranging from the everyday to
the most abstract theoretical and metaphysical contemplation. We, as purposive agents,
need to plan on, and reckon with, a stable conception of the world—this often leads us to
a totalizing perspective on things. We also find ourselves shocked, surprised, or informed
by what we could not ourselves account for or create—this leads us to a recognition of
the indefinite, uncertain, and "infinite" character of reality. Infinity and totality, strictly
speaking, are themselves value-neutral, and it is hence arbitrary to associate an ethical
preference to the one over the other simply qua their activity. We will analyze the terms
and their interrelation in Levinas's more precise sense in the next section, but for now it is
important to keep in mind that just as it would be grossly misleading to call Kant's
conceptual categories "worse than" or "threatening of" intuition, so too is it misleading to
designate totality as ethically inferior than infinity.
Many commentators, however, situate Levinas's thoughts about infinity and
totality within a misleadingly value-laden framework. We saw that Richard Wolin holds
the most egregiously distorted of these views, but it is important to point out that even
sympathetic Levinasians can overstate or inappropriately contextualize the relationship
between totality and infinity. B.C. Hutchens, whose analysis of Levinas's thought is
usually excellent, nevertheless situates the relationship between totality and infinity as
one of hostility, with a clear aggressor and victim, as it were. This largely stems from his
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operating definitions, which unnecessarily import values into the dynamic functioning of
the terms:
'Totality' is the term used to describe the Western rationality's enormous project to
attain a total synthesis of knowledge under rational themes, to 'reduce the other to
the same'…'Infinity' is the multifaceted term used to suggest the resistance that
things pose to totalization by virtue of their being more than what they simply are.
There is an irresolvable conflict here: totality is always threatening to reduce the
other to the same, and infinite [sic] is always the other's resistance to this threat.
(56-7, my italics)
Hutchens seems committed to the view, held by other Levinasians as well, that
totality is somehow versus infinity in senses that connote hostility or rapacity, rather than
one of two sides to a metaphysical coin, as it were.49 Such definitions regrettably leave
ample room for an interpretation of totality as imperialistic and predatory, à la Wolin.50
The language in which such passages are couched suggests a martial logic in general, and
a sort of metaphysically originary David versus Goliath in particular. Such
characterizations can easily lend themselves, additionally, to an ethically loaded binary
evaluation of Good (infinity) vs. Bad (totality), or Threat/Victim, Hegemony/Resistance,
and many other misleading tags. I argue that this misreading derives, at least to a large
extent, from a lack of due attention to the formative role that Descartes' philosophy has
on Levinas's phenomenology, wherein a totality is always in a strict, and sometimes even
ethical, rapport with infinity.
This is not to say that Hutchen's understanding of the terms (and his general
analysis of them) is wholly inaccurate; it is to say, though, that there is something wrong
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with reading preferences and evaluative criteria into Levinas's description of human
reality. In other words, Levinas's phenomenological ontology of important interpersonal
situations can be dubiously lent to political or moral agendas that ignore Levinas's robust
philosophical claims and, instead, latch on to a few misleading caricatures. And Wolin's
caricature is not the least of Levinas's worries, so to speak. Alain Badiou, for instance
(and quite keenly in this context) has pointed out that Levinas is often falsely portrayed
as the "father" of such self-defeating slogans as the "recognition of the other," "the right
to difference," as well as the cloying "contemporary catechism of good will with regard
to others."51
Badiou does not explain this phenomenon's genealogy, but the reason behind such
dubious paternity arguably comes from a misreading of "totality," "infinity," "the Other,"
and related accounts that buy in to versions of the loaded binary caricatures that we
recently saw. "Totality" would be mistakenly transformed into "totalitarian," for example,
or the other's "infinity" would mistakenly imply some sort of angelic innocence that is
always on the verge of being tarnished by a "threatening" totality.
It is our contention, and in the starkest of contrast to the aforementioned
caricatures, that totality and infinity are originally two aspects of (or perspectives that we
take on) the world, and importing certain moral judgments and perspectives into them
yields a distorted view. Levinas's actual misgivings about totality regard the scope and
attitude of the "totalizer" or totality in question, and hence do not concern totality per se,
as we will clearly see. His point in critiquing totality is similar, moreover, to Kant's
critique of reason, especially insofar as the purpose is to show certain limitations, and
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not, rather, to lend support to misology, as Wolin would have it. To illustrate Levinas's
proper ambition by a further analogy: if it is accurate that Husserl's main preparatory task
is to critique and resituate the allegedly foundational character of the "natural attitude,"
we may say that Levinas's task is to critique and resituate the allegedly foundational
character of the totalizing attitude. This task can be genealogically traced back further
than Husserl, however, since its roots begin with Levinas's appropriation of Descartes, to
which we now turn.
A Re-Cartesianized reading of Totality, Infinity, and Their Conjunction
Descartes' thoughts about the self and its foundation serve as the ground upon
which Levinas gets his key inspiration for the very idea of an "infinity" founding a
"totality." We have already seen a few different aspects of what Descartes means by a
"totality" (Ch. 1). In addition to the somewhat vague characterization, in the Latin
version's translation, of a unique thinking entity that questions its ontological "perfection"
(AT VII, 61), it also conveys, in the French version's addition (literally) "as if there were
no one but me in the world" (comme s'il n'y avait que moi au monde).52 These aspects
do a lot of work toward understanding Levinas's use of them; namely, a potentially closed
system in the whole, on the one hand, and a potentially isolated individual, on the other.
For Descartes and Levinas, a totality implies both a robust and systematic
principle of autopoetical assertion, as well as a specific individual who can relate to the
world through his or her own innate terms so as to arrive at a clear and distinct
conception of it. So, Levinas alternately harbors an understanding of totality that
sometimes refers to an individual's autopoetical capacities (which he often calls the
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"imposing more of the same"), and sometimes to a system's selfsame capacities
("totality," sometimes "the Same"). Levinas's slippage into these different uses of
"totality" and "same" can seem arbitrary, then, without a Cartesian background. Levinas
describes various situations, for example, where sometimes a rational agent, and
sometimes an ontology (for instance, or simply any total metaphysical description), can
have a "totalizing" perspective, or can impose "more of the same" (that is, impose the
ability to assimilate everything as similar to one's own innate nature).
For Levinas and Descartes a "totality" also implies a lack, however. The Cartesian
lack is revealed, as we saw last chapter, by way of his argument that purports to discover
God's existence and "infinite" nature. Descartes' idea of infinity comes from a
comparison between his own nature and God's presumed nature, and the analysis of these
"data" yields at least two distinct beings—God, the superior, and Descartes, the inferior.
Levinas, in a transformative gesture, situates his "infinite" as coming from an "Idea" that
is born in "commerce" between people. Levinas's notion of the Other importantly differs
from Descartes' in at least two different ways, though. First, Levinas's primary data
concern analyses of interpersonal, and not theological, situations: conversation, teaching
and learning, and erotic relations, to name some examples. Pace certain commentators,
then, Levinas' middle period is a thoroughly human matter, as we soon see in more detail
(see Chapter 2, Conversation, Teaching and Learning, and Eros and the Caress,).
Second, Levinas's Other (that is, in the infinity aspect) ought to be
phenomenologically situated as more of an organizing activity than an entity. Descartes
infamously claims, in abstract, that God is the kind of being who bears the predicates X,
Y, and Z. Critics, however, famously retort that God's character may be P, Q, and W, for
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all one knows, since human nature is not commensurate with something like God's.
Descartes' analysis, under such scrutiny, commits a fallacy of attribution, since for all he
really knows the supremely infinite being may have myriad unknown or unknowable
attributes. Levinas's understanding of alterity and the "infinite Other," however, more
accurately resembles Kant's notion of an organizing activity, because it is a limit to what
conceptualization cannot grasp, but a limit that the self can regress upon, and heed.53
Infinity enables a change in the self's perspective as a totality, as the analyses below
describe.
More precisely, Levinas's Other and its "negative" predicates ("alterity,"
"otherness," etc.) need to be understood through a passive faculty within the self—this
faculty should be understood as a capacity for "infinity." The self's receptive faculty,
then, is capable of being overwhelmed in meaningful ways, and its "catalyst" for change
is primarily triggered in interpersonal situations by way of the "Other," or sometimes "the
[Other's] face." It is equally important, however, to attribute an active faculty to the same
agent, one that appropriates, grasps, or, in a word, "totalizes" the novel contribution with
which it finds itself confronted.
This is importantly similar to Descartes' situation, namely when he actively finds
traces within himself of what he could not account for; yet we should understand Levinas
as saying that this totality-infinity structure is one of the fundaments of experience tout
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court.54 We should further understand that what the Levinasian self finds is not a trace of
God; the self, rather, finds itself meaningfully changed in such interpersonal situations,
whose structure always indicates another human being. The scope of this totality-infinity
structure also encompasses theoretical and metaphysical perspectives, such as claims
about object-cognition, and a rejection of epistemic closure. For now, though, we will
stress the importance of the first-person perspective in which the self comes to a
realization of that which "overflows" its capacity.
Levinas, following Descartes' lead, locates this totality-infinity structure in what
he calls the "idea of Infinity." In chapter 1, we saw that Descartes realized that his idea of
the Other led him to a self-critical position upon which he recognized there are things of
which he cannot be the author. Descartes thereafter concludes that this lack of
"perfection" implies both that a supreme Other exists, and that the pursuit of knowledge
and ethical wisdom could only be furthered through some sort of "striving" for this Other.
Levinas, as many commentators have pointed out, preserves merely the form of this
argument and not the content.55 It is not generally acknowledged, however, that Levinas
also draws upon the necessity of "totality."
Totality and Infinity and Time and the Other emphasize the need to understand the
agent as one who is quite capable of appropriating, grasping, incorporating, and
rationalizing things in the world through preestablished inner criteria and preferences
(i.e., through a totalizing perspective of "the same"). The Levinasian agent, in a word,
often totalizes what it finds; whether in its aspect of categorizing, and theorizing about,
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the world; or, in its intentional aspect of "being able to represent things to oneself." The
self, moreover, often needs to be a totalizing agent so as to be lucidly responsive to
others, as well as appropriative of its environment. As we see below, the ability to totalize
helps to render the intersubjective world thematically stable and common to interlocutors,
teachers, and lovers, for instance.
The Levinasian agent, under this aspect, is interestingly much closer to the
Cartesian than is generally acknowledged. For the Cartesian agent initially seeks, as we
saw in chapter 1, to totalize reality; whether in the guise of its own innate structures, or
by considering "extended" stuff, the Cartesian project is the dawn, and perhaps a priori
failure, of such a purely totalizing enterprise. It is not mentioned enough, however, that
what the Cartesian agent actually discovers is that he is a limited, dependent creature that
needs the "infinite" to "guarantee" the very reality that he is rationally subsuming within
a clear conceptual system. Descartes, according to the letter of his text, does not merely
discover something new and then totalize it as if it were some trivial ontic footnote—his
infinite Other, rather, is recognized to be the ground or anchor of being able to totalize.56
The infinite Other for both Descartes and Levinas, then, conditions the capacity for
totality, and hence does not "belittle" or "vilify" it.
The content that Levinas substitutes for Descartes' Other is the other person, in
one sense, and an anthropologically genealogical structure of human being in another (I
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argue for the latter interpretation in chapter 3).57 Levinas is not so much interested in the
problem of being alone but rather in the phenomenological significations that "face-toface" relations entail—both for the agent, as well as for social institutions. Levinas begins
his genetic phenomenology with the agent as already embodied in the world, and he tries
to account for this agent's capacities through his reappropriation of the "Idea of infinity."
This reappropriation is both more a matter of human beings, as opposed to a supreme
deity, as well as more global than Descartes' idea. The Levinasian idea of infinity both
"moves consciousness," and presupposes the "individual and the personal" (T&I 27, 218).
It is both "experience par excellence," and "produced in the opposition of conversation"
(T&I 196, 197).
The essentially interpersonal character of Levinasian infinity cannot be
overstated. It is important both because it clarifies Levinas's transformation of Descartes'
insight, and it gives clear support against some of the "quasi-philosophical supplement"
detractors whom we considered above, and to whom we shall return in the last section.
Levinas unambiguously states the anthropological essence of his philosophical
enterprise, and he contrasts it in the starkest of terms with the theological. He qualifies
this essentially human dimension of our relationship with the Other's infinity in arguably
the most pivotal passage of Totality and Infinity, and certainly one of the most
inspirational for this dissertation. A close analysis of his language and conclusion is
essential if we are to appreciate the shift away from theology as a ground, and toward an
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ontological anthropological phenomenology. Since the passage is lengthy, we shall
analyze it in two parts.
The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face [the face of the
human other], in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in
which God is revealed. It is our relations with men, which describe a field of
research hardly glimpsed at (where more often than not we confine ourselves to a
few formal categories whose content would be but "psychology"), that give to
theological concepts the sole signification they admit of. The establishing of this
primacy of the ethical, that is, of the relationship of man to man—signification,
teaching, and justice—a primacy of an irreducible structure upon which all other
structures rest…is one of the objectives of the present work. (79, my italics and
boldface)
Some may interpret the first sentence as an indication of God's supreme or
foundational character, and this would be highly problematic, as we saw with Descartes,
and simply inaccurate. The tempting thought is that one somehow "accesses" God (i.e.
the foundational Judeo-Christian God) through the human Other's "face" (the means for
such access). Richard Wolin claims, for example (and without any direct textual support
for his claim) that for Levinas "the Other's absolute alterity—the fact that the Other
resists appropriation or assimilation by the same or ego—is patterned after the Almighty's
absolute alterity."58 A closer analysis of this passage helps to dispel such a reading.
For Levinas clearly states that "ethics" is what is uniquely foundational, that is, an
essentially anthropological relationship ("man to man") that involves interpersonal
structures ("signification, teaching, and justice"). This chapter and the next, by way of
anticipation, attempt to fill-in the lacuna to which Levinas refers in this passage, namely,
"a field of research hardly glimpsed at." For now, however, it is important to point out
that intersubjectively human structures subtend, or are conditions for, theological (and
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presumably any) structures. The "height" referred to in the first sentence is precisely a
human category for idealizing human infinity to the highest of degrees—if one calls this
"God," then so be it. It is mistaken, though, to claim that Levinas needs "God" in the first
sense described in order to ground his phenomenology. Levinas learns this from
Descartes' error, as it were, and an analysis of the sentences that immediately follow
further reifies this deliberate rerouting of the divine into the interpersonal.
Metaphysics is enacted in ethical relations. Without the signification they draw
from ethics theological concepts remain empty and formal frameworks. The role
that Kant attributed to sensible experience in the domain of the understanding
belongs in metaphysics to interhuman relations. The ethical relation is defined, in
contrast with every relation with the sacred, by excluding every signification it
would take on unbeknown to him who maintains that relation… Everything that
cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation represents not the superior form but
the forever primitive form of religion. (79, my boldface)
"Metaphysics," which Levinas glosses as "an aspiration towards radical
exteriority" (T&I 29, 42), simply takes place ("is enacted") in an originally intersubjective
arena. As opposed to merely striving for an "empty and formal" theological notion with
no real content, as Descartes putatively did, Levinas insists, rather, that interhuman
("ethical") relations imbue "metaphysics" with real content; further, this is analogous to
Kant's insistence on the coeval primacy of intuition ("sensible experience") and logical
form ("the understanding") in the sense that the self's capacity for totality (that is, the
conceptual form) and the human Other's "noumenal" infinity (that is, the novel and
indefinite intuitive content) are needed to understand this structure. Our originary relation
with the radical exteriority ("infinity") of other people and reality, then, need not bend
knee to a mysterious yonder (God, for example), but can precisely be experienced from
the agent perspective by virtue of recognizing novel and meaningful contributions from
the Other's "exteriority."
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So Levinas furthers Descartes' search for the "exterior" by grounding infinity in
phenomenologically human, and not abstractly theological terms. This means that totality
and infinity are clearly understood in interpersonal Levinasian terms, as we see in much
more detail below. This also means, as we see in chapter 3, that Levinas's more
speculative or theoretical arguments have as their telos the establishment of an
anthropologico-ontological genealogy that claims to be more basic than any other
structure. For now, though, we should return to the similarities between Levinas and
Descartes, since they shed further light on how totality and infinity relate in interpersonal
terms.
The Levinasian idea of infinity, like Descartes,' requires "atheistic separation,"
that is, a being who is capable of withdrawing into itself and asserting its representations
of "external" reality. The agent in this aspect maintains a distance from reality from
which it actively judges things and others through innate conceptual structures. We note
this stance as a chief mark of the "totality, or totalizing, aspect." Both thinkers would
agree, from a different perspective, moreover, that the self also encounters meaningful
contributions that it "cannot account for it by [it]self" (T&I 60, 267). We shall call this
the "infinity aspect." These two aspects of lucid agency and overwhelming receptivity,
generally speaking, shall inform our interpretation of Levinasian totality and infinity.
Levinas's description of "totality" and "infinity" can lead to a seeming paradox,
for two reasons. First, he characterizes the agent's experiential relations of these two
distinct things as happening "at the same time," or as the "door" to them being "at the
same time closed and open," and second (and even more paradoxically) the relation
between the same and Other is "both present and still to come" (T&I, 149, 148, 225).
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This "idea of infinity" is governed by a seemingly paradoxical structure, that of a "more
within the less," as Levinas often puts it, and without recourse to our dynamic
interpretation of them beginning in Chapter 2 Conversation, totality and infinity, and their
related terms "same" and the "Other," will often seem incoherent or paradoxical. What he
really means, by way of anticipation, is that under one aspect, infinity happens, and under
another, totality happens. These aspects interrelate in the "immediacy" of what Levinas
calls the "face-to-face," that is, in the dynamic proximity of self and Other.
To sketch a preliminary illustration of the totality-infinity aspects just described,
we can see that they refer to the phenomenological organization of (originally
intersubjective) experience. I, or Jack, or Jane, often find ourselves overwhelmed,
shamed, informed, refused, etc., by others. One aspect of such phenomena is that the self
finds itself altered, as it were, and Levinas dubs the "source" of such interpersonal
alterity the "infinity" that we receive from the Other. This alteration, furthermore, relates
to the Cartesian notion of what the lucid self cannot account for qua itself, but
nonetheless recognizes as placed "within" itself from the "exterior." In the second aspect,
the self actively grasps, interprets, denies, doubts, affirms, etc., the novel contribution it
has "received" or "been taught," in Levinas's idiom. It is most important, though, that we
see these functions as necessarily tandem and dynamic. What the self totalizes is often
parasitic on its being altered by what Levinas calls the infinite, and without an active
capacity to totalize, the self simply could not assert itself—that is, it could not be lucid,
organizing, or discursively reciprocating.
If we do not see these aspects as essentially interrelated, one might be led, first, to
misconstrue what they mean in interpersonal analyses. Second, one might be naively
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tempted to privilege the one over the other in some hierarchical or preferential sense—
inexactly implying, for example, that the one is set out to eradicate the other. We are
provisionally ready, then, to advance the seemingly strange assertion that puts Levinas
much closer to Kant than one normally thinks: for Levinas, infinity without totality would
become blind, and totality without infinity would become empty.
With this sketch of the conjunction between totality and infinity in mind, it is
important that we now turn to Levinas's text in order to ramify, and of course justify, the
central claims. The first claim is that Levinas's notions of totality and infinity should be
understood as his dual and complementary view of experience. This experience and its
conditions are originally intersubjective, and they are clearly seen in conversation,
teaching, and erotic relations. Analyzing totality and infinity in these ways, moreover,
dispels the paradoxical character of many of Levinas's claims because it situates
seemingly contradictory claims as merely two interrelated aspects of interpersonal
phenomena—hence our phenomenological approach also helps to dispel the tendentious
accusations that Levinas's claims are inchoate, "infuriatingly sloppy," or simply "virtually
impossible" to understand, as Moran and Wolin respectively state. The manner in which
we should understand totality and infinity in speculative and ontological senses, which
also supposes a two-fold understanding, is rigorously explored in the next chapter.
Second, given that these notions are complementary, tandem, and coeval, they are
not "opposed" in any necessarily vitriolic sense, as Wolin and others would have it.
Third, this situation of Levinas's thought in a post-Cartesian background, when coupled
with his interpersonal phenomenology, yields interesting and provocative ethical
consequences. These include, but are not exhausted by: his critique of narcissism, his
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account of ontological debt, and a novel way of conceptualizing altruism and social
justice.
"Totality" and "Infinity": Passing the Torch from Descartes to Levinas
Levinas's description of the self as being overwhelmed in interpersonal situations
forms the demarche of Totality and Infinity. These descriptions range from such
mundane activities as conversation and teaching, to the more abstract activities of
consciousness and intentionality. In each case, however, the description is designed to
expose and diagnose the seemingly paradoxical structure of "a more within the less," as
he puts it, or "the idea of infinity." This structure, which is genealogically linked to
Descartes' (the lesser's) idea of God (the greater), is evinced phenomenologically through
analyses of the dynamic character of the activity in question—conversation, teaching, and
erotic relations, to name some activities. This dynamic, generally speaking, includes a
source of "exteriority" (the infinity aspect) and an appropriating self or agency—both
aspects, moreover, are necessary to enable or condition the full scope of the structure's
possibility.
The totality-infinity structure exhibits, furthermore, a coequal blend of agency and
receptivity. The "welcome of the Other," which is Levinas's most general gloss on an
individual's encounter with someone who "overflows" the self in interpersonal ways,
"expresses a simultaneity of activity and passivity" (T&I 89). We ought to read both an
active and passive component as simply built in to the very structure of such experience,
rather than, say, dismiss the passage as hyperbolic. This reading, then, amounts to saying
that the agent's perspective on the experience implies a Gestalt-switch possibility; under
the "infinity" aspect the self is enduring a transformative experience that it did not
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assume, and under the "totality" aspect the self is seizing and appropriating this
experience. The further claim is that these two aspects, although simultaneously
incompatible from the agent's perspective, can nonetheless transpire at any given moment
within the ontic field in question, as the phenomenological study below reveals.
The self's actual phenomenological attunement will, however, play a big role in
which aspect counts as salient from the agent perspective. One often finds oneself, in a
manner akin to Descartes' meditator in the Second Meditation, privileging the totalizing
aspect—in such cases reality simply appears as an extension or translation of our
(precomprehended) conception of things. One also finds oneself, however, largely
overwhelmed, shocked, or simply not in control of the novel contribution received from
the infinity aspect. Levinas seems to imply, however, that one may never see things
under the aspect of infinity, although such a person would be incapable of what he means
by "ethics." Just as Descartes could have interpreted reality entirely from a totalizing
perspective (even if by the letter of his Meditations he would thereby have missed, from
the first-person perspective, an important feature of reality), so too can an agent, under
Levinas's description, potentially never see things and others under the aspect of
infinity.59
We will now segue into an applied study that is designed to flesh out this sketch.
Since the structure is ambivalent (or simply symbiotic, co-dependent, and essentially
intertwined) in its scope and application, we will be well served to see it at work in more
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precise cases. These are divided, then, into three sections: conversation; teaching; and
erotic relations.
Conversation
When Levinas analyzes the structure of conversation he emphasizes the self's
dependence on the Other for a necessary semantic contribution. The point in doing so is
not to ontically "belittle" the self or to "encourage an attitude of submissive adulation"
toward the Other, as Wolin would have it, but rather to point out an aspect of the self's
ontological dependence on a source of intelligibility (the Other's "infinity") that it cannot
account for by itself.60 Part of this indication, however, also points to the self's need to
lucidly organize, and contribute to the conversation or activity in question. This
structure, then, importantly requires aspects of both infinity and totality. An important
kernel of this structure, moreover, arguably comes from Descartes' thoughts about the
appreciation of a person as distinct from a machine.
Chapter 1 studied the unheralded but nonetheless important Cartesian insight
concerning the appreciation of the other person as such qua the capacity for speech and
conversation. John Llewelyn, in his Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics (1995), rightly
points out that Levinas's appropriation of Descartes is not merely limited to critique.
Llewelyn's following reflections on Descartes, although they are a segue to a point that
touches on Levinas's later period (Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence), nonetheless
strike the right chord in situating the phenomenological importance of simple
conversation.
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It is worth recalling that when Princess Elizabeth asks Descartes to explain more
clearly to her the union of the body and the soul, he begs her not to ask for a
philosophical explanation of this and assures her that she will best understand the
connection through taking part in conversation. (146, my italics)
Descartes' "non-philosophical" explanation can certainly seem exasperating,
especially to the likes of Princess Elizabeth, whom we know to have been keenly astute
in philosophical matters. Descartes' thoughts on language and the subsequent Levinasian
appropriation that they engender, however, provide the seeds for a first-person account of
totality and infinity.
Descartes, then, actually paves the way for the interpersonal totality-infinity
structure that we are establishing as pivotal to Levinas's phenomenology. Recall that
Descartes' insight (chapter 1) into the difference between understanding a person as
linguistically distinct from a "machine" (which, in principle, "perfectly resembled a
person according to the disposition of its organs") hinged upon his insistence that only a
person would be able to "act on all of the contingencies of life" (AT VI 56-7). His
answer implies, in a gesture that anticipates the Turing test, and films like Blade Runner,
that the machine's limited programming and parts would be unable to adequately respond
to the indefinite vicissitudes implied in sustained conversation. A person, by contrast,
would not have such an adaptive lacuna in his or her responsiveness because of the
universality of reason's application. As Descartes puts the point,
It is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements
of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in
its presence, as the dullest of men can do. (AT VI 56-7, my emphasis)
Descartes' "philosophical explanation," which he later "begs" Princess Elizabeth
not to hear, begs the question, as we saw in chapter 1, and Elizabeth keenly suspects this
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in her correspondences. The formal argument presupposes what is at issue, since his
assumptions state that only a human would have a soul (i.e. mental substance) out of
which it would communicate—this, however, is what is supposed to be proved.
Machines, further, only have extended parts, which are a priori incapable of "reason" on
Descartes' assumptions. So, if the "philosophical" explanation of the mind-body
conjunction (and the linguistic implication that follows from it) is unsound, how, then,
will Elizabeth "profit" from "taking part in conversation?"
Descartes, on our retroactive Levinasian interpretation, is pointing out to
Elizabeth that there is something important and privileged in interpersonal, face-to-face
situations. Descartes knows both that he can take a totalizing stance on "extended" reality
and that he can appreciate meaningful contributions from beyond a consideration of
himself "as a totality" ("as if there were no one but [him] in the world"). This dual stance
is intersubjectively deepened, moreover, in his insight concerning a machine's semantic
limitation vis-à-vis the person's. He might assume, of course, that the sophisticated
machine and the person are "totalizingly" identical simply qua a possible enumeration of
their respective extended parts. Matters are quite different, however, from a
consideration of the self's being meaningfully overwhelmed in conversation.
This is because such features of conversation as the dynamic give-and-take of
sincerity and guardedness, or the moment-to-moment need to vigilantly attend to the
interlocutor's expression, tone, utterance, and myriad other contingencies can all
contribute to a responsive dislocation of the self. Such features, then, argue for a stance
on things beyond that of the lucid subject who innately pre-comprehends a fixed reality
(that is, one who adopts a totalizing perspective). These interpersonal features of
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conversation, rather, require a dynamic structure of lucid comprehension and
meaningfully intersubjective receptivity; in other words, they are precursors to Levinas's
totality and infinity, as we soon see in detail.
One can get the impression while reading the Meditations, however, that the
universe is comprised of exactly two beings—Descartes and God. The Meditations, then,
seem to offer no resources for a consideration of important interpersonal structures. We
can gather, however, from Descartes' writings in Discourse on Method, and more
pertinently in his actual correspondence with Elizabeth, that he has a modicum of
awareness regarding an important person-to-person perspective that includes a receptive,
as well as an active, faculty. This perspective does not solve the "philosophical" problem
of how the mind and body are "conjoined" (or, as Derrida might say, the problem of how
Descartes' reification of two mutually exclusive substances deconstructs itself) yet such a
perspective still sheds a sort of proto-phenomenological light on the dual and reciprocal
nature of conversation.
This change of perspective importantly suggests an "infinite" aspect in addition to
a purely totalizing aspect. Levinas preserves, moreover, the spirit of such a gesture in his
appropriations of Cartesian thought.61 His analyses of the "face" and "discourse,"
however, clearly surpass Cartesian thought by virtue of his phenomenological strategy
and exposition of the totality-infinity structure. Levinas, in addition to rerouting the
divine into the personal, also resituates the very terms of phenomenological intersubjectivity.
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In doing so, Levinas describes "the face" (le visage) as the immediate site of
discourse and conversation.62 The face, in one sense, is a technical term for a diachronic
nexus of meaning that gets negotiated between two people, and this diachronic aspect
shall inform our interpretation of totality and infinity. Since Levinas makes many of his
claims from the agent's perspective, the face usually refers to the Other's face; that is, her
or him to whom one speaks, for example. In a basic sense, the face simply refers to the
always unfolding, as opposed to static aspect of our encounters with others (this is an
important part of what is meant by "diachronic"). It is also worth noting that the face
need not refer to the other person's actual face, for Levinas's description extends to
physical gesture of all sorts, given that it takes place in an interpersonal situation.63
When Levinas says that the "face undoes the form it presents at each instant"
(T&I 66), we should understand the phenomenology through our totality-infinity
structure. As Descartes suggests, and Levinas makes explicit, we often find ourselves in
conversation with an interlocutor whose attempts at signification both inform and resist
our grasp. We think we understand Jim's point—"Aha!"—only to find that he meant
something else; or, we think that Susan's forthcoming utterance is obviously going to
amount to X, but it in fact, and to our surprise, it amounts to Y.
We often maintain, then, an interlocutory give-and-take in which the phenomena
are marked by punctuations of lucidity and surprise, and clearly assessed criticism and
stunned appreciation, to give some potential candidates of the distinguishing marks.
These marks refer, alternately, to the totality-infinity structure—under one aspect, the self

62
63

"The manifestation of the face is already discourse" (T&I 66).
"The whole body can express as the face" (T&I 262).

82
clearly sees the data, and under the other aspect, the self recognizes its receptive position
with respect to the Other's contribution. The face, then, can immediately evince or signify
this ambivalent structure—that is, it "undoes the form it presents at each instant" during a
conversation, for example.
Levinas further qualifies this dynamic structure of the face's activity in terms that
seem eccentric, especially without recourse to an interpersonal dual aspect view. He
writes in this vein that "in the face's epiphany, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total
resistance to the grasp" (197). The other's face being "sensible" and "graspable,"
however, hooks up with the totality aspect—suppose that I see clearly what is being said
by the other person, I get the point, etc. But suddenly she says that she was "clearly
kidding," or that what I took her to mean by P was actually Q—"Were you not paying
attention?" she might ask. In such cases the other's "face" turns into "total resistance" to
my grasp while the conversation is transpiring.64
The face's dynamic structure is evinced in far more subtle ways, however, since
the face also attests to the nigh-imperceptible changes and contortions that take place
within instants of conversations.65 As Jack is about to laugh convivially at what Bob is
saying he notices a malicious gleam in the latter's eye, which importantly re-routes Jack's
laughter into…something nebulous, at first, which Jack must assimilate, and then perhaps
channel into lucid irony or scorn, for instance. Jack's initially clear and distinct appraisal,
64
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my italics).
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then, gets precisely altered by Bob's infinity, as it were, and this takes place in the blink
of an eye. Discourse qua the face is thereby susceptible to this dynamic structure at more
or less obvious purviews that signal an "exterior," or simply "other," source.66
This structure's dynamism importantly attests to a "distance" between self and
interlocutor that is properly speaking not merely a spatial distance that refers to
"extended" reality. To this extent the letter of Levinas's phenomenology most clearly
surpasses the letter of Cartesian thought, for Levinas resituates the dynamic between self
and other into one of "separation" and "exteriority" that begins with the possibility of
being disrupted and informed by others, and does not merely begin with extended stuff
the nature of which we must somehow reconcile with non-extended souls.
An important part of the meaning of self-and-Other is the "signification" revealed
through the totality-infinity structure that we see while analyzing conversation, for
instance. "Signification," through such activities as conversation, "is preeminently the
presence of exteriority" (T&I 66).67 Following our interpretation, then, the "Other's
presence is heard as language" in the infinity aspect, and not rather thematically seen in a
totalizing aspect, nor seen in Cartesian ratio-mathematical space, for that matter (T&I
297). Levinas's relevant criteria for the importance of appreciating the other person as
"exterior," in addition to considerations of spatial contiguity (which is a part of our
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totality aspect's activity), take into consideration the unpredictable vicissitudes inherent in
language and communication—for example, in such interpersonal cases as we just
examined. These latter cases reflect an aspect of infinity insofar as they show the self's
disruption and dependence upon such "exterior" or "separated" beings.
The essentially conjoined (and, in a sense, ambivalent) totality-infinity structure
thus signifies a consideration of the "exterior" being as both a transcendental activity and
as a concrete, extended object. That is to say that in the aspect of infinity, the self more or
less passively recognizes changes, disruptions, or "alterity's" alterations of the self, in
Levinas's vernacular. The infinity aspect points more toward an external agency than to
any particular extended thing or person. Levinas, then, inverts Kant's famous move of
treating the transcendental "I" as an activity and not a substance—in the infinity aspect it
is the Other who is best understood as a transcendental activity, as opposed to an object
or substance. Totality's perspective, by contrast, cannot but situate the Other as a
concrete person at such and such a distance, within a certain relational relativity to the
self, having predicates A-Z, etc.
Levinas suggests this two-fold perspective when he describes aspects of the hold
and the resistance that the self has with regard to the other person considered in
conversation:
Language is a relation between separated terms. To the one the other can indeed
present himself as a theme, but his presence is not reabsorbed in his status as a
theme. The word that bears on the Other as a theme seems to contain the Other.
But already it is said to the Other, who, as interlocutor, has quit the theme that
encompassed him, and upsurges inevitably behind the said. (T&I 195, my italics)
The first sentence fleshes out the (not merely spatial) separation between self and
Other in conversation, and it is important to read a dual aspect into his description. We
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see, on the one hand, that it is "indeed" possible for the self to view the other as a
"theme," which is Levinas's multifaceted term for an object of representation68 (that is, as
considered through a totalizing aspect).69 This particular view of the other, however, does
not fully contain or "reabsorb" the other person considered through the infinity aspect.
The self's totalizing stance initially "seems" to "contain" the other, that is, it appears to
clearly hold and comprehend the Other, but in the infinity aspect the Other's agency
contributes to something novel that surprises or disrupts the self's timing and grasp. This
is to say that the Other "quits the theme" through which the self initially represented him
or her. When considered as a transcendental activity (or, as an aspect of infinity), the
Other as interlocutor "upsurges behind" what was previously "said," and thereby
maintains an ungraspable but acknowledged presence, as it were; or better yet, s/he
maintains an activity that the self cannot fully register but nonetheless reacts to. This
upsurge, then, is Levinas's description of an agency that operates "behind" or beyond the
self's totalizing sphere of representation.70
The Levinasian self can thus adopt an empirical perspective on things that is
consistent with a Cartesian agent as a "totality," on the one hand. This aspect or drive
requires, generally speaking, a fixed conception of reality that precomprehends its
objects, and in doing so it determines which objects are to count as salient ahead of time.
68

Cf. Totality and Infinity 99, 96, and elsewhere. To thematize can mean, for instance, to have a distinct
representation of something, but also to render something into a sentence or some kind of objective
linguistic or cognitive unit.
69
Levinas's translator likely uses the lower case "other" here because Levinas uses "autre," and not "autrui"
in this sentence of the passage. I argue that Levinas uses the lower case other precisely to make the point
that it is only through the self's totalizing aspect that the other is "absorbed"—the Other, qua its infinity,
remains intact and "out of reach" from totality's perspective.
70
In the infinity aspect, then, "no concept can lay hold of exteriority" (T&I 295) and the Other is
"refractory to categories" (T&I 40). "To think the infinite, the transcendent, and the Stranger is hence not to
think an object" (49). In the totality aspect, however, the self precisely thematizes and conceptualizes the
other person as an extended object in a fixed world.
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Objects (and people considered objectively) under this aspect's scrutiny seem to "offer no
resistance," as Levinas puts it—that is, they never seem to "upsurge behind the
[totalizer's] theme," as we saw. We have dubbed this the "totality" aspect. The same
self, on the other hand, can be perfectly hospitable to a different aspect that relates to the
same situation in question. This aspect or drive is attuned, neither a-rationally nor
irrationally, but phenomenologically, to the margins of experience that resist our grasp, or
that are seen only in their elusive aspect.71 Salient "objects" refer, in this aspect, to novel
and meaningful transformations that occur primarily through the unpredictably rhythmic
cadence of language and expression, on Levinas's view.
In interpersonal situations like conversation the self can also "receive from the
Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity"
(T&I 51). That is, an attunement to the infinity aspect can precisely inform the self in
novel ways. In receptively appreciating the initially shocking "overflow" of meaning that
comes from the Other's "exterior," the agent can then appropriate this donation so as to
truly learn something other than what it already knew or perceived. The significance of
this reception, which Levinas calls an originary "teaching" that comes from the Other,
will be the object of the next section. We can see, however, that an analysis of the
structure of conversation reflects this seemingly paradoxical character of a self who
receives something "beyond" its own capacity—in this sense the self can "think more
than it thinks," to use Levinas's recurring, and initially strange expression.
71

We have seen descriptions of intersubjective situations that attest to a possible attunement to this
structure. Candidates for "objects" that speculatively count as salient in this category include the following:
black holes and so-called "dark matter;" sub-atomic particles, which in one aspect resist static
conceptualization when one accounts for their activity and interaction; the universe's alleged "infinity;" and
no doubt a host of other candidates.
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The structure of a "more within the less" or the "idea of infinity" additionally
suggests, then, an ambivalent (or symbiotic, mutually interdependent) fund of meaning
whose potential admits of two distinctly possible but simultaneously incompatible
interpretative stances from the agent perspective—either the totality aspect, or the infinity
aspect. The aspects themselves, when considered through their ontological activity,
however, can function at the same time in the Gestalt-switch sense that was mentioned.
At any given time in interpersonal experiences, the agent can experience the situation
through the one aspect or the other, depending on the agent's attunement—hence a further
reason for Levinas's strange insistence that these seemingly incompatible aspects can
function "at the same time." What he means on our interpretation, however, is that the
structure is precisely ambivalent in the senses we have illustrated.72
Teaching and Learning
Levinas's analyses of teaching and learning are similar in intention to those of
conversation. They demonstrate that the ability to learn exhibits this structure of a "more
within the less," with "the more" referring to the radical exteriority of the Other's
teaching, and "the less" to the self and its passive ability to learn. Learning is most
basically a learning-from the Other and hence the Other's meaningful contribution
"overflows the same" to the extent that the self "receives from the Other beyond the
capacity of the I," as we also saw, in different respects, with conversation. Teaching,
then, reflects this totality-infinity structure as well. "Teaching comes from the exterior
and brings me more than I can contain" (T&I 51). The self must, however, reciprocally
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To deepen the Gestalt analogy, in one aspect the agent can see the "duck," as it were, and in another
aspect, the "rabbit." We should stress, though, that the agent does not clearly see in the infinity aspect, but
rather "sees" that he does not see, or "sees" that he has been altered.
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and assertively thematize the novel content it has "received" in order to truly appropriate
and understand it, or else the teaching would be stillborn. "Teaching…is a thematization
of phenomena" (99).
There have been numerous debates in the history of philosophy regarding how,
exactly, the self learns. From Plato to Locke, and Locke to Levinas, the question arises
concerning the fit between content "learned" and its packaging, sender, and recipient, as
it were. On one interpretation, Plato favors the "pre-packaged" version wherein the self is
its own recipient to the extent that it recollects something that was fundamentally innate.
Locke's account states, by contrast, that learning must come entirely from sense data,
which amounts to an anonymously empirical "delivery" wherein the recipient receives the
content as already packaged from the outside. Levinas's view, on my interpretation,
suggests both a personal external sender who delivers the content, and a process of
internalization on the part of the recipient that assimilates the content as one's own.
Levinas's language on the subject, furthermore, lends support to our ambivalent,
symbiotic totality-infinity structure. It is, first, clearly against a purely nativist account of
learning; second, when coupled with his above remarks about how the self "receives" a
teaching, we can see the need for reading tandem aspects into his verbiage.
Teaching does not simply transmit an abstract and general content already
common to me and the Other. It does not merely assume an after all subsidiary
function of being midwife to a mind already pregnant with its fruit. (98, my
italics)
Teaching is a way for the truth to be produced such that it is not my work, such
that I could not derive it from myself. (295, my italics)
Teaching, the end of equivocation or confusion, is a thematization of phenomena.
(99, my italics)
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The teaching structure reflects, as the second citation makes clear, both Descartes'
and Levinas's idea of infinity insofar as the self comes to appreciate and depend upon
something it could not itself account for in terms of the teaching's origin. Levinas's
description of this origin indicates an interpersonal source that enables the self to acquire
intersubjective norms and standards. His account of teaching also highlights, as the third
citation indicates, the need for the self to lucidly see the "teaching" within its own
economy, since the "phenomena" received need to be "thematized," which, as we saw, is
totality's proper activity. The structure becomes distinctly Levinasian, moreover, when
we stress the personal character of the teacher, as opposed to the impersonal nature of
sense data or ideal recollection (or of God, in Descartes' case).
The ambivalent character of "not simply" and "not merely" thus attest to the need
for both a personal teacher's "external" activity as well as a totalizing aspect on the
teaching that can render it intersubjectively stable or "common," as the first passage
suggests.73 The "production" of "truth" in the account of teaching and learning signifies,
then, "not merely" a need for a clear grasp of "abstract and general content," but also
something that the self cannot "derive" from itself.74
Teaching, and the dynamic structure that it entails, furthermore, opens-up an
interesting view on traditional philosophical problematics. He writes, for example, that
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The next chapter's work details how the Other, considered ontologically, renders the world "common,"
that is, conditions normativity and intersubjective evaluation.
74
Levinas's verbiage can seem to imply, however, that the self's dependence upon the Other's teaching
leads to an "attitude of submissive adulation," as Wolin puts it in his article, "Heidegger Made Kosher."
For Levinas writes, for instance, "teaching is a discourse in which the master can bring to the student what
the student does not know" (T&I 180, my italics). Levinas's invocation of such "mastery" is legion, but
what he really means is simply that the Other serves as a condition that enables the process of learning. As
we saw with the Other's necessity in the structure of conversation, Levinas's point is ontological and not
"belittlingly" ontic, as Wolin puts it.
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the "contradiction between the free interiority and the exteriority that should limit it is
reconciled in the man open to teaching" (T&I 180, my italics). Levinas's language here is
at its boldest insofar as it flirts with over-hastily melding numerous problems in the
history of philosophy: free will and determinism; metaphysical dualism; and an account
of knowledge acquisition to boot. What Levinas means, however, is that two aspects
weigh-in on the structure of teaching and learning. The teacher qua the face brings the
self something novel and initially overwhelming—it brings the self, as we have seen,
"more than it can contain" hitherto as a totality. This aspect is "limiting," however, in the
sense that the self is passive, receptive, or simply reactive to the Other's meaningful
activity. In the other aspect, though, the self qua its "interiority" is "free" to lucidly
totalize (that is, one can lucidly appropriate and assimilate) the teaching. As appropriated,
the potential of the structure thereby becomes realized.
The totality-infinity structure, then, precisely "reconciles" seemingly antagonistic
or incompatible perspectives because it points to "not merely" the one or the other, but
rather to both, as equally necessary constituents of the experience's potential. It is also
important to highlight, as we saw when we analyzed conversation, moreover, that the two
aspect of the structure are equally important in order to make sense of the situation. If this
structure is now clearer, we will turn to Levinas's analyses of erotic situations in order to
further develop the importance of both aspects in his thought.
Eros and the Caress
Time and the Other anticipates a key gesture in Totality and Infinity, namely that
the "pathos of love consists in an insurmountable duality of beings" (T&O, 86). The
invocation of this "duality" informs our dual aspect interpretation of totality and infinity,
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since Totality and Infinity's analyses of interpersonal erotic situations, like those of
conversation and teaching, aim to reveal two distinct and important perspectives on the
same situation in question. Levinas's descriptions of erotic situations emphasize, for
example, both the blend of the self's totalizing need for gratification and the always
elusive desire for transcendence that accompanies it. They also show that the self's effort
to erotically "totalize" the beloved can be coupled with the lover's "caress," which
intentionally "seeks," or "forages for," that which it cannot account for by itself.
In this vein, Levinas speaks in the following passage of the seeming paradox
between the self's need be completely satisfied (as a totality) and its awareness of
something it cannot fully possess (the desire for the Other's always elusive infinity):
The possibility of the Other appearing as an object of need while retaining his
alterity, or again, the possibility of enjoying the Other, of placing oneself at the
same time beneath and beyond discourse—this position with regard to the
interlocutor which at the same time reaches him and goes beyond him, this
simultaneity of need and desire, of concupiscence and transcendence, tangency of
the avowable and unavowable, constitutes the originality of the erotic, which, in
this sense, is the equivocal par excellence. (255, my boldface)
"The equivocal," literally of equal voices or callings, clearly maps onto our interpretation
of totality and infinity as an essentially ambivalent and symbiotic structure. For this
passage highlights the possibility of seemingly antagonistic or incompatible forces that
are in fact merely two aspects of the experience. In our Gestalt-switch dynamic, the
Other can be appreciated as both an object of gratification and as an un-totalizable
activity who is "refractory" to the self's autonomous grasp; or, as both a warm, desirable
body that satisfies the self and a source of unreachable surprise, refusal, or
encouragement. These contrasting aspects reflect Levinas's distinction between "need"
and "desire," moreover, in that the former "consumes" and sates its object (rendering it
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merely other, like nourishment, for instance), whereas the latter is attuned to the Other's
infinity and thereby recognizes a source that it cannot lucidly master or fully assimilate. 75
We should also notice that the "equivocal par excellence" character of the lover's
attunement is neither a prioritizing of one aspect over the other, nor is it an exclusive
disjunction—it is, rather, the "originality" of the erotic structure, that is, the most basic
potential of the structure. It states, then, that both are important aspects of the erotic
situation in question. Within a discrete interval ("at the same time") therefore, the Other
can have both an empirical and a transcendental function. Put differently, the erotic
phenomena in question admit of two distinct perspectives that suggest differing, but
nonetheless equally important, attunements. His language on the subject is quite clear,
and it does not say, or even hint, that one of the two aspects is to be eliminated in some
kind of preferential sense.
Levinas's analyses of the "caress" provide us with good grist for the dual-aspect,
ambivalent mill as well. For in the span of two sentences he writes (in paradoxically
Levinasian fashion) that the "caress, like contact, is sensibility," and that the caress
"transcends the sensible" (T&I 257). An important part of what he means in such
passages, though, is that from the agent perspective two distinct things can take place.
Jim, for example, desires his girlfriend Sandy's person and presence. When they
are next together he finds himself possessively reaching out for her and rather arbitrarily
finds his hand caressing her shoulder, where it meets the neck, say. To enable this action,
let us say that Jim needed some kind of spatial representation of the situation, for
instance, as well as physical "contact" and "sensibility" and such. But what is it that Jim
75

T&I 33, for example.
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is really seeking? Is it merely the possessive feel of Sandy's trapezius muscle and the soft,
warm skin that houses it? Is it simply a calculated ruse, moreover, that aims at weakening
Sandy's prudent defenses so as to later satisfy Jim's lucid and precomprehended
ambition?
Not necessarily, and perhaps not at all. In addition to sensible contact and its lucid
precomprehension, then, the lover's caress may also "transcend the sensible." This is so
because the aforementioned "duality of beings" description can contribute to Jim's
attunement in this situation. This other kind of attunement recognizes an abyss of sorts
between self and Other, and it desires, in Levinas's sense, a being or activity of a different
register than the self's lucid anticipation, as the next few paragraphs illustrate.76
During the span in which Jim is reaching for Sandy (as an object in his theme),
then, he might also be aiming for something elusive and still to come, that is, the Other's
unpredictably futural activity, which is of an order that Jim cannot fully anticipate—"the
caress seeks what is not yet" (T&I 258). He might be intending, further, to be evaluated in
unpredictably revealing terms—"You really think I'm that kind of person? Interesting…I
never saw it that way…" He may also simply realize that what he is "reaching" for, as he
is reaching and Sandy makes him laugh, is unanticipated but nonetheless desired—the
caress, then, "is not an intentionality of disclosure but of search: a movement unto the
invisible," that is, this kind of stance on another agency is refractory to pure anticipation
(258). In all of these latter aspects, furthermore, Jim's attunement reveals an
intentionality of the voluptuous that does not seek to return to its point of origin (that is, it
76

This attunement may desire, furthermore, a surprising change that may or may not be pleasant to the
self—how can one truly know, since that which is desired is precisely the activity of a "separated" and
"exterior" being (in the infinity aspect)?
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is not a movement back to what Levinas calls "the same"). It seeks a repetition with a real
difference, and a (temporary) breach of its lucid self-conception. In a sense, then, the
caress's infinity aspect plays Dionysus to the totality aspect's Apollo.
In one possible aspect, Sandy's shoulder offers no Levinasian "resistance" to Jim's
grasp, that is, it may only appear, say, as a calculated object that fits in with Jim's clear
intention and design—this, importantly, is what Levinas (and numerous partners the
world over, we might add) would call "more of the same." In another possible aspect,
however, that which Jim "seeks" (or "forages" about for, as Levinas also puts it) is neither
any particular thing about Sandy's body, at that time or any other, nor is it necessarily any
precalculated intention whose anticipation is clear; the seeking, rather, is for what
Levinas calls "the invisible"—that is, the self's desire for something truly Other,
something that "transcends the sensible" and freshly informs or critiques the self.
We may say, then, that in the totality aspect, Jim can indeed lucidly caress Sandy.
In the infinity aspect, we say, however, that Jim can "aim" at a part of Sandy that he
cannot fully predict or control—that is, he can appreciate her as a source of alterity.
These aspects are quite compatible and equally important within the same situation,
moreover, as we saw with the "equivocal" point above, even if they are not
simultaneously compatible. When we consider the aspects in tandem, they most basically
complete the erotic relation rather than compete with each other, since clearly both can
coexist in the same person, and in the same situation. Jim can thereby "need" and
"desire" a future with Sandy, and it is both the future with which he clearly reckons, in
one sense, and an interpersonal future that he cannot totally predict, but nevertheless
desires as such, in another sense.
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In different terms, it is significant that Jim be capable of both attunements, since
this dual capacity would fulfill the relation's existential potential. To eliminate one or the
other aspect would therefore be to the detriment of the structure's meaning. Without a
totalizing aspect to the relation, Jim would be conceptually blind to important features,
and he thereby might merely "search" and "forage" for some mysterious yonder—that is,
he might become one of those poets who merely, and passively wait (no doubt in vain)
for the "ethereal" and "eternal" feminine. To put the point differently, he might literally
have no idea of whom it is that he really wants. Without the infinity aspect, however,
Jim's attunement would be auto-affective and auto-poetical—"more of the same," or,
quite simply narcissistic in more common terms. Erotic relations, like conversation and
teaching, then, admit of a diachronic and ambivalent interpretation whose duality is
basically complementary.
If the erotic component of the dual aspect totality-infinity structure is now clearer,
we should turn our attention to a recapitulation of totality, infinity, and their tandem
function as it has been evinced by our interpretation. Our analysis of the totality-infinity
structure in general has indicated that totality and infinity are simply interpretations of
varying aspects within Levinasian interpersonal phenomenology. Our initial assertion that
the aspects themselves are essentially complementary (rather than antagonistic) has been
vindicated to the extent that we have seen such descriptions at work in the analyses of
conversation, teaching, and erotic relations.
The next chapter's work, by way of anticipation, more thoroughly elucidates the
ontological and metaphysical totality-infinity structure of Levinas's phenomenology. For
now, though, we will critically return to Wolin's interpretation of "totality" and "infinity"
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that seeks to drive a harmful wedge between the two, especially since we now have the
phenomenological wherewithal to get to the radix of the debate concerning "and" or
"versus."
A Levinasian Defense Against Wolinesque Totality Versus Infinity
Richard Wolin's account of totality and infinity fails to be persuasive for at least
two reasons. First, it uses loaded language to misrepresent what infinity and totality
really mean, and hence it mistakenly attributes activities and evaluative standards that do
not pertain to their essential function. Wolin's interpretation of totality and infinity is
thus specious, as we soon see. Second, Wolin's suggestions that one should look for the
genesis of Levinas's key technical terms in such non-philosophical arenas as, for instance,
"divinely ordained ethical precepts," or religious parables patterned on "credo, quia
absurdum" ["I believe it because it is absurd"] are tendentious at their roots, and tedious
by virtue of their thematic repetition.77 The polemic's initially jocular character,
moreover, becomes distastefully and overwhelmingly shadowed by the misleading spin it
puts on Levinas's important philosophical ambitions. Our critique of Wolin's claims will
therefore expose both the misunderstanding of totality and infinity at work in his account,
as well as the misleading reading of Levinas's "theological" origins concerning these
notions. The exposition's conclusion will serve as a segue to other significant misreadings
of totality, infinity, and the philosophical stakes of Levinas's work.
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Wolin, "Levinas and Heidegger," 228, 229. Wolin frequently suggests, moreover, and with a slipperyslope logic, that Levinas's thought is always on the brink of some extreme position that risks throwing the
baby out with the bathwater, as it were. To give but two examples: he says that Levinas's thought is "but a
short step from Foucault's dictum that 'reason is torture'" (236) and, that Levinas's (and Derrida's) critique
of logocentrism "risks needlessly belittling" and "squandering" such valuable communicative potentials and
capacities as rationality and language (238).
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In his description of "totality," Wolin consistently states or implies only the
"hostile" and "pernicious" connotations of the notion that we glimpsed above. Our
contention the whole time has been, of course, that Levinasian totality and infinity are
originally interpretations of two fundamental perspectives of reality. Wolin insists,
however, that Levinas supplants totality (because it is somehow nefarious in essence) so
as to replace it with infinity.78 Wolin's mistaken strategy attempts to show that Levinas's
critique of totality is itself "totalizing," as he puts it, as opposed to merely immanent and
limiting. We soon clearly see that this is not the case, since Levinas's critique is
immanent, and since it seeks to preserve both elements rather than divorce them.
The passage we are going to consider below is one of Wolin's more direct and
engaging on "totality's" nature, and so it merits close attention. For the sake of context, it
follows on the heels of a stilted effort at lampooning, and then lambasting aspects of
Heidegger's thought (which, however, allegedly inform Levinas's pseudo-romantic
critique of rationality). Wolin would have it, then, that "Heidegger's influence" led
Levinas, "wittingly or unwittingly," to adopt a "totalizing" critique of Western thought
and rationality.79 Just as Heidegger allegedly champions misologous and quasi-romantic
elements over "theoretical reason," so too would Wolin have us believe that:
When Levinas, for his part, writes about the excrescences and misdeeds of
totality, he employs a similar idiom. In his thought totality becomes a figure for
the will to domination, which he identifies as the animating impetus of Western
philosophy. Reason's raison d'être is the subjugation of beings. Rather than
"letting beings be," it destroys their inherent multifariousness by perennially
reducing them to sameness. Reason must be reconceptualized, Levinas argues, as
hostility to difference…it functions as a universal solvent, employing its
theoretical "gaze"…to reduce otherness to ipseity or identity. (236, my italics)
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"Levinas and Heidegger," 244, 235, and elsewhere.
Ibid, 235-6.
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This passage betrays, as one sees with many polemically inexact critiques, a few
kernels of accurate description around which are housed many erroneous and or
misleading tangents. There is of course no doubt that Levinas is critical of particular
features and implications of rationality—but so too are Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre,
and many other important philosophers, one might add. It is a rather egregious fallacy of
composition, however, to say that Levinas's view of a part is his view of the whole.
Instead, Levinas's strategy consists precisely in reifying an immanent and rational
critique of such features by showing certain limitations and conditions in their structure.
The strategy thereby resembles Husserl's critique of the alleged primacy of the natural
attitude (which is analogous to totality, one should add) as well as Kant's critique of
particular uses and abuses of reason; as Kant's critique followed from his metaphysics,
moreover, so too does Levinas's.
Levinas explicitly states the chief philosophical ambition of Totality and Infinity
in the preface, and the first sentence of the following passage shows his explicit rejection
of a totalizing critique that would "replace" Western philosophy with something like the
Judeo-Christian narrative that Wolin suggests.
Without substituting eschatology for philosophy, without "demonstrating"
eschatological "truths," we can proceed from the experience of totality back to a
situation where totality breaks-up [se brise], a situation that conditions the totality
itself. Such a situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face
of the Other. The rigorously developed concept of this transcendence is expressed
by the term infinity. This revelation of infinity does not lead to the acceptance of
any dogmatic content whose philosophical rationality cannot be argued for in the
name of the transcendental truth of the idea of infinity. (T&I 24, my italics)
If Levinas intended a total, as opposed to an immanent, critique, he would thereby
try to "substitute" a completely different narrative for a rigorously philosophical
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narrative. This is not the case, however, since the claim is that totality admits of certain
limitations and conditions, namely the idea of infinity, whose articulation is thoroughly
conceptual and rational to boot. The quotes he places ("truths" and "demonstrating") to
emphasize the non-starter character of a would-be totalizing, as opposed to immanent,
critique further clarify that such a total substitution is neither intended nor warranted.
The phenomenological key to his genuine strategy consists instead in seeking to
find those interpersonal situations where a totalizing perspective breaks up. This means,
in one important sense, that Levinas describes situations where the self recognizes a
dependence on the Other for significant contributions to its economy that it cannot derive
from a purely totalizing aspect, whose phenomenological articulation we considered
above when we considered conversation, teaching, and erotic relations.80 This strategy is
Cartesian in inspiration, and distinctly Levinasian when we reckon with its unique
interpersonally phenomenological character in which he describes the self as
"overwhelmed"; that is, as a totalizing agent whose timing and lucid grasp are broken up
by the Other's contribution, and recognized as such "within" the self's economy.
Levinas's strategy thereby aims to show that a purely totalizing perspective is verily
incomplete, and thus not villainously obsolete. To illustrate this point by our recurring
analogy: just as it is grossly misleading to say that Husserl purely sought to "vilify" and
thereby abandon the scientific attitude, or that Kant simply sought to "belittle" pure
reason, so too is it misleading to claim that Levinas has similar designs with totality.
Wolin's language is loaded, then, to the extent that his insinuations about
Levinasian totality appear to rest on a pun. When Levinas articulates totality's
80

We see more precisely, in the next chapter, how Levinas ontologically articulates the conditioning
referred to in the above citation.
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ontological limitations, for instance, Wolin distortedly translates this as purely
"belittling," or simply as an exhaustive reflection of totality's nature: namely,
"excrescences and misdeeds."81 When certain uses of reason are unmasked as leading to a
solipsistic position (which, by the way, is hardly unique to Levinas), he translates this
critique as Levinas's view of reason tout court. When Levinas claims, furthermore, that a
totalizing perspective necessarily needs a complete grasp of its subject in advance, Wolin
would perhaps have us believe that "totality becomes a figure for the will to
domination."82 In addition, then, to a fallacy of composition, we can see the case that
Wolin's language is thoroughly disingenuous in its description of totality's complete
nature.
Wolin does not offer many citations from Levinas's middle period, although he
nevertheless criticizes that same period at great length. His only lengthy citation of
Totality and Infinity is taken from two different paragraphs the order of which is rather
oddly altered, and altered without mention, in his "Levinas and Heidegger." The
anachronic alteration itself is disingenuous as well because it makes it seem like "totality"
alone is the subject of what follows, whereas in Levinas's actual text, French or English,
this is not necessarily the case. In Wolin's text, however, Levinas's text reads as follows:
The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of Totality
[sic.] that dominates Western philosophy…[This line is in fact the topic sentence
of the second paragraph of Levinas's Preface, and "totality" is lowercase in the
French and English versions. The following begins 13 lines above this last line in
Levinas's actual text.] The ontological event that takes form in this black light
is…a mobilization of absolutes by an objective order from which there is no
escape…But violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating
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persons as in interrupting their continuity [and] making them play roles in which
they no longer recognize themselves. (236)
To be charitable to Wolin's recontextualization, "war" is Levinas's key thematic in
both of the passages from which Wolin draws, and he may have thereby felt justified in
recontextualizing the sentences as he did; although one should, however, make due
mention of such alteration. Wolin's recontextualization is disingenuous on a less
charitable interpretation, however, because it makes it seem like "black light," "no
escape," and "violence," for instance, pertain simply to "Totality," and not rather to an
aspect of being revealed in "war," which is merely one feature of "being" and "totality."83
If Wolin were to have interpreted Levinas's claim as, say, "Levinas thinks that war, being,
and totality have a certain relationship in so far as they overlap in certain respects…" then
we might appreciate what Levinas means in this difficult passage. It seems
hermeneutically disingenuous, however, that Wolin changes the word order, and
(wittingly or unwillingly) capitalizes the key term, furthermore, so as to make it seem like
"Totality" is simply defined by the bleak and discomfiting language that anachronistically
'follows'.84
Levinas's claims about totality, war, and Western philosophy are quite compatible
with our interpretation of totality, though. When he says that "the concept of totality
dominates Western philosophy," we should read this as part of his critique of the unique
philosophical primacy accorded to totality, which, however, he tries to immanently
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critique by showing that infinity and totality are ontologically necessary. The claim that
war and totality are intimately related in certain respects, though, is more of a platitude
than a revelation—who would seriously doubt that war requires a modicum of rational
efficiency, for instance, or a lucid and fixed representation of the enemy's situation?
Totality's function is clearly not merely limited to such aspects, however, as we saw
above.
When we examined Levinas's interpersonal phenomenology we saw that totality
and infinity are each importantly necessary functions that enable the full range of such
significant activities as conversation, teaching, and erotic relations. In chapter 3,
furthermore, we shall see that totality and infinity are necessary to complete the
ontological structure of such essential functions as objectivity and language, to give but a
few examples. Levinasian totality often shows up, then, as related to important and or
ethical activities, and hence it does not exclusively appear in allegedly obsolete and or
vile activities.
In its most basic formulation, Levinasian totality (and infinity, for that matter) is
simply immune to being "vile" or "pernicious," since it relates to a complex and variable
way of looking at the world. This way of looking at the world can sometimes be a means
to "vile" activities, but it need not, and often is not. In this important sense, then, Wolin's
critique rests on a fallacy of composition because it conflates the language of particular
uses of a thing with that same thing's essence. To purely abandon totality, then, would be
to abandon the rational and theoretical stability that "makes human society possible," as
Levinas puts it (T&I 119). More concretely, to say that the Levinasian agent (or
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Cartesian, for that matter) were somehow robbed of its ability to totalize would imply
that he or she not be able to realize many distinctly human tasks.
To merely totalize does lead to a lack, however, and we have seen elements of
this lack in both Descartes and Levinas. To merely be receptive to infinity would lead to
a lack as well, and hence Levinas's great work is "Totality and Infinity." Infinity, if one
wanted to look at it that way, moreover, could sometimes elucidate, or be a means to,
activities that are "vile" or "pernicious." Levinas's interpersonal phenomenology
describes accounts of both disrespect and homicide, for instance, which require the
infinity aspect as well as the totality aspect to make sense of their structure.85 Levinas
signals the dual-aspect structure we elucidated above even in interpersonal structures like
murder (as well as the more benign structures of conversation and such) as we see here:
The Other who can sovereignly say no to me is exposed to the point of the sword
or the revolver's bullet, and the whole unshakeable firmness of his "for itself" with
that intransigent no he opposes is obliterated because the sword or bullet has
touched the ventricles or auricles of his heart. In the contexture of the world he is
a quasi-nothing. But he can oppose to me a struggle, that is, oppose to the force
that strikes him not a force of resistance, but the very unforseeableness of his
reaction. (199)
Levinas's point is to describe two distinct and revealing perspectives in which we can
view the situation. As such, the murder scenario is described, on the one hand, as one of
lucid control and power that seeks to terminate and thereby silence the other considered
as an object in space. The triggered bullet's "touching of the heart" is a sufficient means
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aspect, at least insofar as the torturer might sadistically delight in, and or be informed by, the surprising
revelations of the Other's infinity, while clearly maintaining a totalizing aspect on the situation as well.
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to achieve this end; the other thus becomes a "quasi-nothing" in this aspect—the
murderer's lucid intention, furthermore, might expect no more and no less.
The scenario's description maintains, on the other hand, the Other's capacity to
"sovereignly" say "no" (that is, from a "height" or activity not commensurate with the
murderer's) as well as a capacity to "struggle"; not, however, by opposing equal or greater
"force" (which would still pertain to the totality aspect), but rather by surprising the
murderer and breaking up the murderer's circuit of intelligibility and control. As the
Other is dying his final words suggest to the murderer, for instance, that he withheld
information, which thereby thwarts the latter's practical design—"Damn! He was still
valuable to me and I shouldn't have killed him!"—or so the murderer might thereby
think.86
Levinas's intention in such descriptions is, of course, not to blame "totality" for its
allegedly innate wickedness, but, instead, it originally aims to show that features of
infinity and totality inform the structure in question—as we saw in conversation,
teaching, and, in this case, even murder and heroic resistance. The Other's final words
and expression need to be thematically suggestive from a totalizing viewpoint,
furthermore, in order to have the effect on the murderer. Alternately, both the murderer
and victim need a capacity to totalize, or there would be no thematic or objective world to
be shared by them. As we have seen, this is analogous to totality's importance in
conversation, teaching, and erotic relations. Without the infinity aspect, however, no
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"unforseeableness" would arise, that is, there would be no surprise or shock, and hence
no "teaching" or novel contribution to either party's perspective.87 Infinity and totality are
importantly related and conjoined, then, but Wolin's interpretation stubbornly seeks to
divorce them while it simultaneously looks for their origin in arbitrary and misleading
"pre-philosophical sources," as we soon explicitly see.
Levinasian "Totality" becomes, in Wolin's hands, a hydra whose heads need
decisive severing. And what should deliver such a fatal stoke, with one "totalizing"
swoop, no less? Wolin's answer is not surprising, for he would have us believe that
"Infinity" represents Levinas's "totalizing rather than immanent" critique as a remedy
against the "excrescences and misdeeds" of "totality."88 Wolin's final analysis, of course,
is that the disease is better than the cure, as it were, and therefore that Levinas is naively
mistaken when he allegedly jettisons "theoretical reason" or totality.89 We have seen a
direct case for his mishandling of totality, and we now turn to a similar perspective on his
mishandling of infinity.
Wolin's initial claim about the infinity aspect of Levinas's thought is arguably
uncontroversial, for he writes that "the originary encounter with the face of the other…
formally parallels the encounter with divine transcendence."90 His qualification of this
claim, however, soon leads us spiraling astray from Levinas's philosophical roots and
intentions, and this for at least two important reasons. First, it neglects to account for the
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philosophical origin of such an "encounter" (i.e. the Cartesian element, as well as
Levinas's rich phenomenological inheritance) while also neglecting Levinas's actual
qualifications about how the "divine" gets transformed into the human, which, as we saw
above, is a key Levinasian gesture that does not receive due attention. The only genetic
justification offered by Wolin is theological, though, because he says infinity is merely
"patterned after the Almighty's absolute alterity."91
Second, Wolin's insight is that the seeds of Levinas's alleged theological
underpinning to infinity stem from two biblical sources: the "divinely ordained
injunctions" of the "Ten Commandments," which "betray the trait of transcendence"; and,
secondly, the Abraham dilemma or "parable," which "paradigmatically exemplifies the
logic of transcendence."92 This second "source" is said to reflect Levinas's philosophical
transformation of "credo, quia absurdum" into the "logic of transcendence" [read
"infinity."] 93 The first "source" of infinity, moreover, amounts to Levinas's
philosophical translation of "theistically mandated, inviolable ethical precepts" as found
in the Decalogue, which indicate that "they have a status that is superior to beings or
entities."94
Wolin's interpretations of one of Levinas's "two most powerful pre-philosophical
influences of his development" (with the other being "Russian literature") lend clear
support to his reading of infinity and totality in general. This is because we see an
interpretation of infinity's conception as anti-rational, theistically mandated, and
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"superior" to the worldly concerns of totality and theoretical reason, whose alleged
"misdeeds" we documented above, moreover. Many salient features of what Levinas
means by "infinity" on this reading (the "Other's resistance to the same," "transcendence,"
"alterity," etc.), when coupled with totality's allegedly "pernicious" essence, lead Wolin
to imply a causal connection between Levinas's "pre-philosophical" influences and the
actual philosophical text of his middle period. Levinas would thereby appear to have
been determined to supplant worldly totality while "totalizingly" replacing it in favor of
divinely mandated infinity. "Thus the animating antithesis of his work: totality versus
infinity."95
One could (perhaps naively) retort, for instance, that Levinas kept his
"philosophical" writings separate from his "religious" writings, (for instance, Levinas
went so far as to have separate publishers), and hence that Wolin's theological
interpretation of infinity is misplaced. Should one not rather look for a reification of
biblical themes exclusively in Levinas's "religious" writings? Did not Levinas
emphasize, on many occasions in his middle period, that his philosophy is not
theologically driven? Wolin briefly entertains the possibility of an affirmative response,
but his dismissal of such a possibility is equally brief, and rather disingenuously glib to
boot. Its language reveals, furthermore, another important flaw in his critique of Levinas.
Levinas always made a point of strictly separating his copious religious musings
from his narrow philosophical writings. As an heir to the phenomenological
tradition, he knew his ethical doctrines must bring demonstrable evidence to bear
on their subject matter. For all that, when one steps back to survey his
philosophical project at distance, there can be no doubt that one of its central
leitmotifs concerns the attempt to play off "Athens versus Jerusalem"—a contrast
that, in his work, far redounds to Jerusalem's credit. (229, emphasis mine)
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Here, again, we see a specious argumentative strategy that resembles other key
passages in his polemic. The first sentence insinuates, by playing off the contextually
vague adjectives "copious" and "narrow," that Levinas was more involved with "religious
musings" than with philosophy. The second sentence rightly elucidates, however, an
important standard by which one should judge a philosopher's work; yet, as soon as it is
stated, we see a return to the pattern of specious argumentation: "For all that…at a
distance…no doubt…central leitmotif…Jerusalem's credit." For "all what," one wonders,
since there is little, if any, probing engagement in Wolin's essay with Levinas's
phenomenology and argumentation? So, instead of appropriately stepping in to the realm
of "demonstrable evidence," there is rather a "step back" that mercurially changes the
issue from "demonstrable evidence" to "central leitmotifs." We see immediately
thereafter a clever attempt to fuse "Totality versus Infinity" with "Athens versus
Jerusalem," which, moreover, "far redounds to Jerusalem's credit."
An important feature of Wolin's argument, then, is that Levinas's "prephilosophical" religious influences caused him to formulate a "totalizing" critique of
philosophy that is faithfully reflected in such works as Totality and Infinity. A further and
importantly related feature is that the very notions of "totality" and "infinity" are
fundamentally informed by these same influences. One of the strategy's main
shortcomings, however, is precisely the dearth of serious engagement with Levinas's
actual philosophical and phenomenological arguments (and therefore "demonstrable
evidence") that patently exist within the same Levinasian text that Wolin critiques. Had
he considered Totality and Infinity beyond his own "narrow" pre-philosophical confines,
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Wolin might not have written so "copiously" on Levinas's allegedly over-determining
quasi-philosophical formation.
The real issue in critiquing Totality and Infinity, however, is not whether, or to
what extent, Levinas kept his "philosophy" and "religion" separate, but what the bulk of
Totality and Infinity has to say—be it philosophical, theological, or otherwise. To this
extent, Wolin caustically criticizes this very work yet only obliquely engages it. For there
is only one direct consideration of Levinas's magnum opus proper (aside from the above
citation, which was drawn, rather awkwardly, from the Preface) and it concerns a critique
of Levinas's "politics," which does not directly relate to totality and infinity.96
When we consult Totality and Infinity, however (including but also beyond its
prophetically cryptic and dense Preface) we find a challengingly rewarding
phenomenological account of the human situation. As we have seen above, the text itself
is replete with interesting and provocative phenomenological claims. Moreover, the
text's chief philosophical ambition—a critique of the pure primacy of totality, coupled
with a reification of an infinity aspect that informs a totalizing perspective—can be
extracted from numerous passages. We have seen elements of this ambition when we
analyzed important, and distinctly Levinasian, interpersonal phenomenological accounts
of conversation, teaching, and erotic relations.
Levinas's only real totalizing target, in Wolin's sense, is history considered as a
scientific discipline (T&I, 22, 40, 55). Levinas's dispute with a historical perspective is
not necessarily the discipline as such, but rather the "unforeseeable" that a historical
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perspective necessarily misses by way of the limited data and perspective available.97
This, when coupled with a vain stance that confuses a necessarily limited historical scope
with 'everything that happened,' is the true object of Levinas's critique.
The following two passages reflect Levinas's precise thoughts (in Totality and
Infinity) on the relationship between totality and history. They evoke a rather poignant
meditation on the connection between death, survival, and the irreparable loss that
humanity incurs when we try to reckon with the dead from a purely totalizing (or perhaps
any) perspective. On the one hand, he thinks that "only history" could "accomplish" a
pernicious strain of pure totalization, but in fact, and as the second passage conveys,
history, like any other interpersonal perspective, always misses importantly human
features of reality from a purely totalizing perspective, and thus such a perspective is
incomplete.
Totalization is accomplished only in history—in the history of the
historiographers, that is, among the survivors. It rests on the affirmation and the
conviction that the chronological order of history of the historians outlines the
plot of being in itself, analogous to nature. The time of universal history remains
as the ontological ground in which particular existences are lost, are computed,
and in which at least their essences are recapitulated. (55)
But to say that the other can remain absolutely other, that he enters only into the
relationship of conversation, is to say that history itself, an identification of the
same, cannot claim to totalize the same and the other. The absolutely other, whose
alterity is overcome in the philosophy of immanence on the allegedly common
plane of history, maintains his transcendence in the midst of history. (40,
emphasis mine)
Levinas's thoughts on the totalizing perspective of the "history of the historiographers,"
when coupled with his thoughts on the limitation of such a perspective, simply maintains
his phenomenological and hermeneutic bivalence that our interpretation is elucidating. It
97
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does not, then, entail a conclusion that history should be outlawed or jettisoned in favor
of some radical alternative. It states, rather, that a certain historical perspective is simply
incomplete by virtue of the Other's undocumented contributions to various selves and
epochs that never made the "historical" cut—whether because of ignorance, lack of
access, or simply limited means and an arbitrary perspective on the part of the
historiographers. It is important to note, furthermore, that Levinas's language on the
relationship between history, totality, and infinity is the closest to fulfilling Wolin's
general claim that "infinity" would replace "totality"; yet even in the starkest apparent
condemnation of "totality" in Levinas's actual text, this is not the case.
When we carefully examine the rich language of Totality and Infinity we see,
further, that Levinas originally understands totality and infinity as two distinct and
essential phenomenological perspectives that we can adopt in our engagement with the
world. Hence it is simply inaccurate to conclude, as Wolin does, that Levinas's
philosophical intention is to somehow eradicate the totality aspect so as to "totalizingly"
replace it with the infinity aspect. As we saw above, as well as just now in the most
marginal of cases, Levinas's intention is to show how both totality and infinity inform our
world.
To recapitulate, Wolin's polemic fails to be persuasive precisely because it
mischaracterizes important aspects of Levinas's thought, and thereby makes false and or
tendentious conclusions about that same thought. The reasoning used is often specious
and fallacious, then, to the extent that it relies on a fallacy of composition. It uses loaded
and disingenuous language, moreover, in an attempt to deflate one of the most important
philosophers of the 20th century. His polemic hyperbolically inflates certain aspects of
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Levinas's intellectual pedigree to the philosophical deflation of important others. Lastly,
the polemic remains glib in the sense that it actually employs minimal philosophical
engagement with a philosophical text that it maximally attempts to criticize.
A Levinasian Remedy against other Harmful Supplements: Badiou
One important feature of Wolin's inaccurate critique of Totality and Infinity aims,
as we saw, at "supplementing" Levinas's philosophical terms and sources with other
notions whose origins largely stem from outside the text itself. These supplements
prematurely kill-off, or simply ignore, resources within the text that resist such a critical
and uncharitable reading—as such, the alleged necessity and importation of these
supplements are tendentious at best, or they simply rest on an inaccurate reading of
Levinas. In different terms, the arbitrary importation of such external supplements
needlessly supplants a more salubriously accurate reading that should be extracted from
the text. The counter claim, then, is that such "quasi-philosophical supplements" attempt
an external critique of the work without sufficiently examining the textually internal
argument, which, however, can be construed to resist these supplements.
Badiou's critique of Levinas, in his (2001) Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding
of Evil, importantly relies on the importation of such a quasi-philosophical supplement.
His critique, generally speaking, is at once subtle, curt, and potentially devastating to
Levinas's ethical ambition of grounding certain pre-predicative moral claims upon the
Other. The critique superficially resembles Wolin's, moreover, because it argues that
Levinas's ethical claims ultimately need recourse to the dubious supplement of an
"ineffable God," who could only be "accessed" in some kind of "infinite devotion" (read:
quasi-mystical experience), rather than phenomenologically accessed through the Other's
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ontological guarantee. We make the case that Levinas's phenomenological ambitions
remain largely untouched by his critique, however, and in this vein our interpretation of
the totality-infinity structure anticipates the next chapter's attempt to bolster the cogency
of that which Levinas means by "ethics" and the "Other." For we shall see that Levinas
does, indeed, have a more robust ontological argument for the "ethical primacy of the
Other" than Badiou and others would acknowledge.
Before we get into the substance of Badiou's specific critique of Levinas, it is
important to point out that some of his key assumptions about the human being actually
map on to the infinity aspect of the Levinasian structure that we detailed above. We shall
show, then, that Badiou and Levinas are far closer than the former would admit, and so
part of our strategy will be to turn Badiou's weapons against himself, as it were; that is,
against his own critique of Levinas. It must be asserted, though, that his Ethics: an Essay
on the Understanding of Evil is admittedly an excellent and provocative work in general;
our intention, accordingly, is not to downplay its significance as a whole, but rather to
merely point out that certain aspects of his Levinasian critique rest on the quasiphilosophical supplement strategy, as well as a lack of proper context concerning what
Levinas means by totality and infinity.98
Leading up to his critique of Levinas, Badiou heavily criticizes the "contemporary
ethical" idea that relegates the human being to the status of "the being who is capable of
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recognizing himself as a victim."99 His critique, in a nutshell, unearths the "contemptible"
and negative ground that such a description indicates about humanity. He aims to show,
accordingly, that this description actually extols the predictably animal and calculably
fragile aspect of humanity to the detriment of what he calls "the immortal singularity" of
humanity.100 This singularly "immortal" character of human being importantly conditions
humanity's worth in Badiou's eyes, however, because it conditions the possibility to
negate the status of, for example, mere animality and victimhood, as well as the
possibility to positively "break radically with what is," that is, to singularly transcend the
actual by virtue of "working towards the realization of unknown possibilities."101
Badiou illustrates an example of such worthy transcendence when he (rather
boldly) juxtaposes the generally animalistic status of human torture victims with the
marginal and exemplary human effort to resist the status of "victim" or "animal" in such
situations. The latter capacity indicates, on his analysis, that the humanity of the person
can be reified "through an enormous effort" of "almost incomprehensible resistance" that
shows the person to be "something other than a mortal being."102 Badiou goes on to
qualify this "something other" as "an immortal," and he claims, furthermore, that, "in
order to think any aspect of Man, we must begin from this principle."103
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Badiou's claim is clearly not that we 'live forever' or some such, but rather that a person can, e.g., "run
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Badiou is quite close to Descartes in his description of this distinctively human capacity, moreover, for he
writes that the "starting point" of "being an immortal" "can be summarized, very simply, as the assertion
that Man thinks, that Man is a tissue of truths" (12).
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Badiou thereby paints the human ethical condition through two distinct
perspectives. One perspective—"the immortal"—conditions the worth and transcendent
possibilities of the human as such, that is, it is "sustained by the incalculable and the unpossessed….by non-being [non-étant]."104 The other perspective—e.g.,"the animal" or
"the potential victim"—represents a kind of fixed generalization of the biologically
human type, or, a normalizing, but ideally-to-be-transcended (or negated) aspect of
humanity.105 His claim clearly extends to a description of humanity as such, and so not
merely to this or that particular case.
And we know that every human being is capable of being this immortal—
unpredictably, be it in circumstances great or small, for truths important or
secondary. In each case, subjectivation is immortal, and makes Man. Beyond this
there is only a biological species, a 'biped without feathers,' whose charms are not
obvious. (12)
The rather vague relationship between "subjectivation" and "immortal" is immediately
qualified, moreover, with "the assertion that Man thinks, that Man is a tissue of truths"
(12).
It is remarkable to note at this point that Badiou's description of the positive and
worthy human agent strongly and relevantly resembles the infinity aspect of the
Levinasian perspective we described above in our elucidation of the totality-infinity
structure. We note, in abstract, the essential aspect of humanity that Badiou basically
characterizes as: transcendent and resistant; incalculable and unpredictable; having the
capacity to negate the normal and actual through resistance or surprise; "immortal" and
marked by "non-being," and hence of a different register than a totalizing perspective
104
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could account for; a singular and thinking "tissue of truths," and so a robust subject who
is individuated through its unique thinking economy; lastly, a being who can precisely
transcend the normal or actual by externalizing these singular truths. The elements of this
aspect are opposed, moreover, to aspects that are "abstract," "statistically general," and
rooted in an immanently predictable biological and theoretical understanding of
humanity.
We also note that the phenomenological description we considered several pages
ago neatly corresponds with Badiou's assumptions about the ethical worth of humanity;
namely, Levinas's description of a case of murder and heroic resistance. For we saw, on
the one hand, the prospect of reducing the other person to a contemptible "quasi-nothing"
whose description remained at the purely biological level ("piercing of the ventricles,"
etc.). We importantly saw, on the other hand, the would-be victim's capacity to negate or
transcend such a conception through his "struggle," that is, his distinctive ability to
"surprise" and disrupt the purely immanent consideration of the same person as victim or
body. Such a capacity for "struggle," which Levinas takes pains to distinguish from the
biological order of things, moreover, importantly conditions an aspect of the ethical
meaning of the situation.
In our analyses of conversation, teaching, and erotic relations we also detailed the
Levinasian articulation of the infinity aspect, wherein the reification of a singularly
human stance that resists or negates a pre-comprehended or theoretical grasp makes up
an important feature of these descriptions. Levinas's interpersonal infinity is hence quite
close to Badiou's "positive" and worthy characterization of the human as such.

117
To be precise, it is not our contention that Badiou "clandestinely" articulates a
dual-aspect interpersonal phenomenology that would be homologous to Levinas's. It is
our contention, however, that the worthy or positive aspect of humanity to which Badiou
appeals relevantly resembles Levinas's infinity aspect. Hence, that which Levinas
articulates as a foundational phenomenological and ethical structure of the human
situation is relevantly coextensive with (at least many of) Badiou's assumptions about a
positive account of human ethics.106 Our further claim, then, is that Levinas's
phenomenology would actually lend support to Badiou's situation of the human ethical
type, and so in an important sense Levinas's phenomenology may stand or fall with
Badiou's assumptions about humanity. We shall also see that one can readily extract an
ontological framework from Totality and Infinity that serves to deflate Badiou's major
criticism of Levinas, which now leads us to Badiou's actual critique.
Badiou argues that Levinas's phenomenology is insufficient to support the thesis
that the Other necessarily informs and grounds the self in meaningful ways. Badiou
claims, for instance, that the "phenomenological analyses of the face, of the caress, of
love, cannot by themselves ground the anti-ontological (or anti-identitarian) thesis of the
author of Totality and Infinity" (21).107 One of Badiou's insights is that, for all one knows,
even Levinas's Other "resembles [the self] too much for the hypothesis of an originary
exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true" (22).
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Badiou further argues that without a phenomenological or ontological "principle
of radical alterity" that "guarantees" that the other is not a feature of the self's "mimetic"
construction, then Levinas ultimately needs recourse to some other necessary guarantee
of "infinite" alterity, which Levinas sometimes calls the "Altogether Other." Badiou
claims, moreover, that the only other candidate for a finite self's sanction of alterity, aside
from the (now-eliminated) radical alterity of the real other person, is "God the ineffable."
This recourse is, of course, stillborn because such a makeshift source of alterity, far from
founding a philosophically original "ethics" in Levinas's sense of the term, actually leaves
us with a "pious discourse without piety," that is, a pseudo-philosophical account that
masks its fundamentally "religious character" (23). So, instead of guaranteeing access to
the Other as an originary and fundamental experience, which would make Levinas's
philosophy authentically committed to truth and experience, Levinas, in fact, leaves us
arbitrarily substituting "God" into this alleged void.
To elaborate upon the claim that Levinas's phenomenology is insufficient to prove
his "anti-identitarian" thesis, Badiou rather charitably states that such an objection is
"fairly superficial" at first glance. This is because even though one could appeal, against
the grain of Levinasian ethics, to cases of the self's interaction with other people that
purely mask the self's "narcissism" or "aggressivity," we are nonetheless "a very long way
from what Lévinas wants to tell us" (21). Badiou's insightful point is that if one is to
radically critique Levinas's ethics, one should not merely point to possible interpersonal
cases that attest to purely "selfish" situations, as opposed to those that attest to
meaningful contributions from the other person as an independent reality. One should,
rather, "make explicit the axioms of thought that decide an orientation" of whether "the
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experience of alterity be ontologically 'guaranteed' as the experience of a distance, or of
an essential non-identity, the traversal of which is the ethical experience itself" (21-2).
To this extent, Badiou's critique has a two-fold agenda. His more explicit task is
to debunk the very ethicality of the ethical in Totality and Infinity, which most
Levinasians take as essential to the guiding intention of the work itself, namely, an
ethical defense of such claims as "ethics is first philosophy." Such a defense leads many
Levinasians to claim, for example, that the Other (actually) has a pre-predicative moral
claim upon the self, or perhaps the more sweeping idea that the everyday meaning of
"ethics" as such needs a complete overhaul because of what Levinas articulates. In these
senses, at least, Badiou's aim is to show that these aspects of Levinas's thought amounts
to the failed attempt par excellence to ground "philosophy in religion."
Badiou's less explicit task, which is connected to the first, is to deflate the
ontological relevance of Levinas's phenomenology. If Badiou can show that Levinas's
claim to ontologically "guarantee" the Other's "infinite" distance in the other person is
not as secure as Levinas thinks it to be, then he can try to account for what Levinas
"really" needs to provide such a guarantee. Badiou does, of course, claim that "nothing in
the simple phenomenon of the other contains such a guarantee" because "the finitude of
the other's appearing certainly can be conceived as resemblance, or as imitation, and thus
leads back to the logic of the same" (22). He follows up with the claim that since the
other person allegedly cannot provide such a guarantee, then Levinas really needs to
incorporate the quasi-mystical infinite "alterity" of God as such a sanction. Such a move,
of course, relegates Levinas's Other to the status of a "religious" experience, and is hence
not of the order of "demonstrable evidences."
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As the next chapter's work makes more explicit, however, Levinas does have a
philosophically ontological argument of the sort Badiou is looking for within the text. Its
articulation shall encompass the majority of the next chapter, and only then shall we be in
a position to respond to the full scope of Badiou's critique. Our response, by way of
anticipation, will show two overlooked ontological considerations that Badiou does not
consider (that is to say, two ontological considerations of the Other that are different in
kind from the generic other person, and the Judeo-Christian God). Both considerations
show that Badiou does not consider the dynamic interplay of totality and infinity in
Levinas's phenomenology, that he does not see the full ontological scope of the Other,
and, hence, they show that his critique does not sufficiently probe the actual resources of
the text that he maximally criticizes.
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Chapter 3:
Levinas's Conditions—"A field of research hardly glimpsed at…"

Every thought you now have and every act and intention owes its complexion to the acts
of your dead and living brothers. Everything we know and are is through men.
William James108
The Problem
Many Levinas commentators argue that Totality and Infinity's argumentative structure is
deficient because it merely "argues by assertion," or because it merely relies upon "quasiphilosophical" argumentation. Other commentators add that it is a mistake to attribute a novel
metaphysical and ontological dimension to Levinas's thought, because such an attribution
allegedly does hermeneutic "violence" to the Levinasian agent's perspective.

The Projected Resolution
I argue that Levinas does employ a rigorous argumentative strategy in Totality and
Infinity, and, further, that this same strategy commits him to a robust metaphysical and
ontological framework. The argumentative strategy is best understood as elucidating several
essential ontological and transcendental structures that show how "infinity conditions totality,"
which also reflects that which Levinas calls "transcendental conditions" in his later work. Levinas
uses these conditions to exhibit an interhuman standard of intelligibility with which egological
and theoretical activities are symbiotic, and they reflect a preobjective domain of experience that
is not experienced as such, but that informs or organizes certain types of experience. We shall see
that Levinas is a traditional metaphysician and ontologist in certain respects, as well as a novel
one in others, as his reappropriation of, and departure from, Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, and
others suggests.
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James, William. Letter to Thomas W. Ward, 1868. In The Letters of William James. Henry James (ed.).
Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press (1920): 123.
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The Importance of the Notion of "Infinity Conditioning Totality"
Levinas's "conditions" refer to the way that infinity "conditions" totality, which is
arguably the most crucial and sustained philosophical idea in Totality and Infinity.109 By
his "conditions," I mean the conditioning interhuman structures of being that are posited
or implied in his account of "totality" and "infinity." My chief ambition in this chapter is
to make Totality and Infinity's general argumentative structure explicit, and this is
important, first, because Levinas's arguments are usually implicitly expressed. Second,
commentators such as Moran, Lyotard, and Wolin claim that there is essentially no
philosophical argument in Totality and Infinity.
My second, but related, goal is to demonstrate how infinity serves to "condition"
totality in the sense of a limit that both disrupts and informs totality's activity. I describe
this informative and limiting "breaking up," as Levinas calls it, in terms of a process
through which one should situate the conditioning rapport between totality and infinity. I
thus develop a perspective wherein infinity and totality are essentially intertwined, and
this perspective shows that infinity and totality are two sides of a metaphysical coin, as it
were.110
Levinas generally neglects to explicitly indicate the argumentative structures that
inform his work, however, and this neglect includes the way that infinity conditions
totality, as well as the various senses of "the Other" that he uses when he describes
109

In the preface, Levinas describes one of the work's chief ambitions as the elucidation of the procedure
from "the experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the
totality itself. Such a situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the Other. The
rigorously developed concept of this transcendence is expressed by the term infinity" (24-5). We shall
examine the particulars of this claim in great detail below.
110
My argument will require, as the previous chapter similarly argued, that we interpret totality and
infinity as essentially complementary, and as working in tandem. Totality and infinity are therefore not
opposed in an eliminative or preferential sense, and we critiqued these kinds of erroneous interpretations in
the last chapter when we considered Wolin's and Hutchens' interpretations.
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infinity's relationship with totality. He is utterly derisive, moreover, of the importance of
making one's philosophical method transparent. This lack of explicit argumentation,
especially when coupled with his contempt for methodological clarity, helps to explain
why many commentators attribute a dearth of systematicity and coherence to his
philosophy. I show, however, that there is a rigorous and sustained argumentative
strategy in his magnum opus, and the exposition of the ways in which "infinity conditions
totality" opens the door to a clear appreciation of this strategy. I therefore argue that to
appreciate Levinas's argumentative rigor is to appreciate an accurately nuanced
relationship between totality and infinity.
If one adopts the proper perspective and recontextualization of Levinas's work,
one sees distinct ontological and phenomenological arguments that are otherwise not
salient in Totality and Infinity. The phenomenological study conducted within the second
chapter of my dissertation gives us a proper perspective, because it shows examples of
the relationship between "infinity" and "totality" in interpersonal situations like
conversation, teaching and learning, and erotic relations. It also provides us with
distinguishing features of the rapport between totality and infinity, and these features are
pivotal for a clear appreciation of the ways in which infinity conditions totality.
When I critique the interpretations of "totality" and "infinity" that one finds with
commentators like Wolin and Hutchens, my point is to show that Levinas's two most
crucial notions ought to be understood as working in a tandem way that completes the
existential potential of situations like conversation, for example. Hence, they should not
be understood as essentially opposed in an eliminative sense, because when one
understands "totality" and "infinity" in this erroneous way it leads to errant and or
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tendentious conclusions, as we saw explicitly with Wolin. I thus present concrete
examples of how totality and infinity dynamically, and interdependently, relate in
specific face-to-face situations whose existential scope is realized by a consideration of
both the totality and infinity aspects.
In this chapter, our goal is to clarify the relationship between the way that infinity
both limits and informs totality in interpersonal situations. We will also see the case for
how totality and infinity relate in a general, broader context that explicates the
relationship between them in such important contexts as: politics, history, economics,
and education, to name some examples.
I shall outline the general argumentative structure that underlies the
phenomenological study of the previous chapter in order to explicate the implicit
arguments that inform how an "infinity conditions a totality." I shall also develop a
different, but related sense of the "Other" that is phenomenologically distinct from the
Other considered previously, wherein the Other was described from an interlocutory
perspective. In addition to the self's relation to the Other as a "you," then, we see a related
sense of the Other that refers to the third person perspective—that is, the Other as a "he,"
"she," or "they." The way that Levinas uses this sense of the "Other" informs his general
strategy because it is often a premise in his phenomenological arguments that show how
infinity can condition totality in a way that extends beyond interlocutory or "dialogical"
relationships. By way of anticipatory indication, this sense of the Other refers to a
genealogical notion of the Other that Levinas's uses to indicate a preobjective domain of
experience that can meaningfully alter the self's perspective on a given datum or ontic
consideration.
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We will explicitly see the case for this different sense of the Other, as well as for
the related notion of an "infinity conditioning a totality." It is important to tersely
recapitulate the senses of "totality," "infinity," and "the Other" that we have considered
hitherto, because these notions hang together with the general, broader interpretation in
this chapter. They hang together because the previous chapter's analysis of "totality" and
"infinity" represents particular cases of the general strategy that informs the whole of
Totality and Infinity. These particular cases all refer to the experience of the way that a
person's understanding can be changed or altered by a source or agency that one does not
lucidly assume or anticipate. This other-regarding agency can be related to the person
whom one faces (in the infinity aspect of the self's experience) or it can be the Other
considered as a transcendental genealogical influence upon the self's perspective and
understanding. In the latter case, Levinas uses a different sense of the Other than one's
interlocutor, and hence it is important to clarify this different sense, which is our task in
Chapter 3, The Preobjective Other Considered Genealogically, and as a Third Person.
There is an important connection, however, between the Other considered as one's
interlocutor and the Other considered in a third person sense. In both cases, Levinas's
arguments and descriptions are designed to show how the Other's infinity ontologically
informs, or conditions, what he means be "totality." When we will have clarified the
relationship between the various ways that the Other's infinity informs the self's
possibilities as a totality, we will have thereby clarified his most robust, if implicitly
stated, argumentative strategy.111 Our chief goal is to further elucidate a rapport between
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Briefly stated, the Other enables the self to see the world as informed and contested by others, and thus
the world no longer simply appears as a precomprehended structure of egological intelligibility; which also
means, in a broader sense of the Other, that the Other enables the self to see the world in normatively

126
totality and infinity that deepens their ontological interrelation. In order to elucidate the
rapport between the two key notions, it is useful to recapitulate some of the analyses of
the last chapter that pertain to the dynamic interplay between totality and infinity.
I have presented an interpretation wherein infinity represents a surprising, fluid,
and repellent limit to what one's cognitive powers cannot fully comprehend, and totality
ensures a conceptual, stable, and assertive grasp with which one organizes, and hence
stably appropriates, the world. When these two aspects are seen as essentially intertwined
in a feedback loop of sorts, they thereby signal the most robust argumentative structure
within Levinas's central work.
This dynamic totality-infinity structure informed our analysis of Levinas's
interpersonal phenomenology in chapter 2, whose chief task is to show that totality and
infinity should be understood as essentially symbiotic. We have accordingly seen that it is
simply misguided to claim, as Richard Wolin claims, for instance, that totality and
infinity are caustically opposed in the eliminative sense of "Totality versus Infinity."112
The full scope of Levinas's conditioning interhuman structures of being could not be
rigorously expressed, however, because these conditions presuppose a broader sense of
the Other, as well as a broader idea of the ways that infinity conditions totality. These
broader notions relate to a genealogical understanding of the Other as a conditioning
fundament of Levinas's ontology of the self and its capacities.113

evaluative ways that derive from others. In this last way, the self's perspective opens up to evaluative and
moral considerations that were not hitherto salient to the same self's worldview. This latter understanding
of the Other is explored in Chapter 3, The Preobjective Other Considered Genealogically, and as a Third
Person.
112
Richard Wolin. "Levinas and Heidegger," 230.
113
Levinas's genealogical understanding of the Other is thus formally analogous to the opening citation
from William James, because it represents Levinas's articulation of an ontological debt to other people
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So far, we have advanced a tandem and coequal understanding of "totality" and
"infinity" in face-to-face situations such as conversation, teaching and learning, and erotic
relations. In each case, the description shows two distinct perspectives or stances that a
person can adopt when s/he phenomenologically considers another person in "real time,"
as it were, or simply in actual, two person relations. The other person in this sense can be
appreciated in the totality aspect, on the one hand, and in the infinity aspect, on the other.
In the totality aspect, the self or agent lucidly grasps the other person in such a
way that the agent precomprehends, and assimilates, the other person as an extension of
the agent's intelligible nature. In different terms, the self in this phenomenological aspect
asserts a rigid perspective on the other person that assimilates him or her to a fixed
representation. In the infinity aspect, by contrast, the other person exhibits an agency
against the backdrop of which the self finds itself responsively dislocated, disrupted, or
simply receptive to a source of human "alterity" with which it cannot clearly identify. 114
That is, the self is altered or "significantly overwhelmed," as Levinas puts it, by the
"Other's infinity" or "alterity" precisely in proportion to the meaningful shock it receives
in such interpersonal activities as conversation, teaching, and erotic relations, for
example.

upon which the self relies, at least in part, for one's ability to learn, reflect, see the world, and, eventually,
understand that the world is composed of intersubjective and normative standards. In Levinas's case, the
genealogy appeals to one's cultural and intellectual predecessors who can be appealed to as a condition of
the self's current capacities, which include standards of right and wrong, and evaluations like "good" and
"bad."
114
Hilary Putnam aptly describes this presence of the Other as the "encounter with a fissure, with a being
who breaks my categories" ("Levinas and Judaism," 42). Putnam does not read a bivalence into the
description, however, which leads him to assert that the Other's "reality proves its own existence by the
very fact that its presence in my mind turns out to be a phenomenological impossibility" (42). That is,
rather then reading two equally important, but simultaneously incompatible, descriptions into the
appreciation of the Other, he reads the Other as purely incommensurable with the self's experience.
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My interpretation of the totality-infinity structure thus reflects a balance of, or
feedback loop between, the self's moments of representational clarity and assertion, on
the one hand, and the self's moments of unforeseen receptivity to a personal agency who
can meaningfully shock and inform the self, on the other hand. I have argued that these
two phenomenological aspects are not simultaneously compatible from the agent
perspective, but they are, however, equally necessary to complete the existential structure
of the interpersonal situation in question; hence, rather than compete with each other in
an eliminative sense, the two aspects instead balance and complete each other.
Additionally, I make the deeper claim that either of these aspects can transpire at any
given time within the interpersonal situation in question, and that the aspect that counts as
relevant depends (in large part) upon the agent's phenomenological attunement to either
the totality, or infinity, aspect.
So, the Levinasian totality aspect requires a fixed conception of reality that
precomprehends its objects, and in doing so it determines which features are to count as
salient ahead of time. Objects (and people considered objectively) considered in this
aspect seem to "offer no resistance" to the self's perspective on them.115 Following our
Gestalt switch interpretation of the totality-infinity structure, however, the same person
can also be attuned to a different aspect that relates to the same situation in question. This
aspect is attuned to the margins of interpersonal experience that resist our grasp, or that
are seen in their elusive aspect. A person (in the infinity aspect) is "on his heels," as it
were, when he is meaningfully shocked, informed, or simply altered by his interlocutor,
partner, or teacher. In other words, the infinity aspect evinces the appreciation of an
115

This, as we saw in the last chapter, is clearly not a value-laden or moral "resistance," but rather a
phenomenological resistance that is precisely attuned to the aspect in question.
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activity that is of a different register than the self's lucid, totalizing circuit of control and
stability, which is why Levinas takes pains to emphasize the "surprising,"
"overwhelming," or simply novel character of the Other's contribution to the self in this
regard.
The second chapter has thus argued that the totality and infinity aspects are
interrelated within the subject's experience, and that their tandem activity fulfills the
existential potential of situations like erotic relations, conversation, and teaching. I refer
to this structure as "ambivalent" (or "bivalent," in an importantly qualified sense of
interdependence and not utter exclusivity) then, precisely because the agent can adopt
both perspectives on the interpersonal situation in question, and because both aspects of
totality and infinity are needed to complete the full description of the interpersonal
situation in question. In other words, the totality-infinity structure literally entails two
relevant ways to interpret the same situation within the same agent's experience; this is
the reason for my use of the terms "ambivalent" or "symbiotic," and this is also the reason
why the "Gestalt switch" analogy is useful.
Hence, the ambivalent application of the totality-infinity structure completes the
description in question, and we saw evidence for this interpretation when we analyzed
Levinas's descriptions of conversation, teaching, love, and even murder (see Chapter 2,
Conversation, Teaching and Learning, and Eros and the Caress). Someone who would
experience only the totality aspect in an interpersonal situation, or only the infinity
aspect, would miss out on the deeper potential of the situation, whereas a consideration of
both aspects helps to imbue the interpersonal description with a fuller, more authentic
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range of significance that faithfully reflects a robust notion of, say, conversation,
teaching, and even homicide and heroic resistance.116
Our consideration of the Levinasian structure of conversation, as an example,
reveals a bivalent interpretation of how the Other's "face" can be a transcendent activity,
on the one hand, which "undoes the form it presents at each instant" and thereby leaves
the self passive to an unpredictable activity that he cannot lucidly manipulate or
precomprehend (T&I 66). The Other's face, on the other hand, can simply be the static
representation of the other person's visage and words that the self clearly sees. In this
aspect, the "other can indeed present himself as a theme," that is, the other person can be
appreciated as simply a reflection of the agent's thematic comprehension (195).
An accurate perspective of the interplay between totality and infinity dispels the
apparently paradoxical character of many of Levinas's claims about the agent's
perspective, moreover. When he asserts that "the essential of language" is "the coinciding
of the revealer and the revealed in the face," we should read this "coincidence" as a
feature of his phenomenology, wherein one can appreciate a revelatory, independent
activity at work, from one perspective, as well as a clearly seen "revealed" state of affairs,
116

In different terms than those used in Chapter 2, "Totality" and "Infinity": Passing the Torch from
Descartes to Levinas, Conversation, and Teaching and Learning, we can illustrate the tandem and bivalent
importance of totality and infinity with the following example. In the structure of conversation, for
instance, someone who adopts a purely totalizing perspective would miss important contributions of
meaning from his or her interlocutor. A purely totalizing perspective in this case would really turn the
"conversation" into the self's monologue, as it were. In other words, this perspective would amount to an
autistic or a narcissistic assessment of the "conversation"; one's interlocutor would not really be heard and
appreciated as an independent reality who is capable of surprising and teaching the self, and, instead, the
self would simply assimilate what it "wants to hear." Someone who only adopted the infinity aspect during
a conversation would, conversely, be conceptually blind to the important moments of necessary
recapitulation, lucid critique, and clear assessment of what is being said. If one could adopt a pure infinity
aspect on a conversation, it would perhaps amount to being an interlocutory "sponge," as it were, since the
lack of self-assertion and assimilation would leave the self purely passive and hence unable to assertively
contribute to the conversation.
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from another perspective. The former attunement to the other person reflects the infinity
aspect because the self is receptive to an activity that orchestrates the meaning of the
situation wherein the self finds itself responsive and disrupted. The latter attunement
reflects, however, the way that the self also needs a clear and static representation of the
other person in order to maintain a conversation. It thus reflects the totality aspect insofar
as it needs a modicum of assertive thematization and representational stability.
We can see further support for this dual reading in the following passage, which
suggests a sense in which the Other is both utterly resistant to the self's comprehension,
as well as importantly related to the self's own intelligible (and totalizing) nature.
The relation with the face, with the other absolutely other which I can not contain,
the other in this sense infinite, is nonetheless my Idea, a commerce. (197,
emphasis mine)
Levinas's thoughts on the ontological structure of language can appear to be either
inconsistent or paradoxical, however, but what he means (on my interpretation) is that
there are two ways to read the situation, and that an appreciation of both the totality and
infinity aspect is essential to describe the interlocutory relation.
Language is a relation between separated terms. To the one the other can indeed
present himself as a theme. The word that bears on the Other as a theme seems to
contain the Other. But already it is said to the Other who, as interlocutor, has quit
the theme that encompassed him, and upsurges inevitably behind the
said…Speech cuts across vision. (195, emphasis mine)
Levinas arguably uses the lower case "other" in the second sentence because he
refers to the other person in the totality aspect, that is, he refers to the other person as a
projected "theme" that the self assertively casts upon the other, which seems "to contain
the Other." In this aspect, the self views the other person as a static and comprehended
entity tout court. But then (and ontologically "already") the perspective of totality breaks
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up, and the Other "upsurges inevitably behind" that which is said and thematized; that is,
the self experiences the aftershocks of an independent human activity that he can no
longer "contain." In this aspect, the self recognizes that the Other has "quit" the self's
circuit of clear appraisal and lucid organization of the Other, and in doing so he realizes
that he does not fully see the other person—the self, instead, appreciates a surplus or fund
of meaning that he did not anticipate, but with which he must now reckon.
So, in the totality aspect, the self has clear thematic "vision" of the other person
and her utterances, yet in the infinity aspect, the Other's "speech cuts across" this clear
vision, which serves to carve out a distance that is not merely spatial, but that is also a
"distance" that indicates an activity that is of a different register than the self's.117
Levinas's general, ontological claim that "language is a relation between separated terms"
ought to be read with our bivalent consideration, wherein one of the terms evinces the
totality aspect, and the other the infinity aspect. When we read his claims in this dual
way, it helps to clarify the demarche of totality and infinity that Levinas employs in
interpersonal situations.
In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my theme
and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the theme that seemed a
moment to hold him, forthwith contests the meaning I ascribe to my interlocutor.
(195, emphasis mine)
Such passages reflect the give-and-take between the totality aspect consideration
that thematically "holds" or precomprehends the other person, and the infinity aspect
consideration that "contests" such a tentative hold by disrupting or limiting the totality
117

"The presence of the Other, or expression…is heard as language, and thereby is effectuated exteriorly"
(T&I 297). The thought here, on my interpretation, is that the other person is clearly seen in the totality
aspect, which imposes a static and assertive grasp on the other person. But the Other is "heard" in the
infinity aspect, which connotes a semantic "distance" from, and receptivity to, an agency that is not purely
commensurable to the self's intelligibility.
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aspect. It is crucial, however, that we see infinity's disruptive limitation as informative,
and not merely "disruptive" as such.118 Levinas's point in such passages is that the
meaning of the situation is contested or disrupted in such a way that fosters a different
perspective, or, that conditions the self's ability to truly learn something new. His point is
not, as Wolin would have it, that "infinity" is to be championed so as to jettison "totality."
Rather, Levinas's description is designed to show a meaningful limitation to the self's
totalizing activity that reciprocally modifies the totality aspect itself. When one's asserted
theme is "contested" by the Other, one has also thereby learned something new, which in
turn serves to modify or "condition" the self's future possibilities of experience. The self's
default theory of the world, in different terms, is importantly altered by a surplus that one
did not assume, but with which one must now tarry.
A similar bivalent perspective emerges when we view Levinas's thoughts on
"teaching," since they evince a tandem and conditioning relationship between infinity and
totality. The phenomenological analysis of teaching shows the dynamic blend of lucid
appropriation of content learned, on the one hand, and the novel, and initially disruptive,
contribution from the Other's activity, on the other hand. Teaching thus involves a
totalizing "thematization of phenomena" on the self's part, and, conjointly, it "is a way for
truth to be produced such that it is not my work, such that I could not derive it from
myself" (T&I 99, 295). This latter aspect, which is distinct from the totality aspect,
reveals a human activity that the self does not assume, as well as an activity that can
118

This is why Levinas emphasizes the difference between the way that the "elemental" alters the self, and
the way that a person alters the self. In the former case, experiencing an earthquake, say, would indeed alter
one's experience in unanticipated ways. But this sort of alteration has no clear semantic significance to it—
the "agency" behind such activity "cannot speak," as Levinas puts it. When the self is altered by a person,
however, the self "can be taught," that is, the self can appreciate the Other's novel language, criticism, or
insight.
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meaningfully "impart" the teaching to the self from a source that the self cannot clearly
see; but this is also a source that the self can appreciate.119
The Levinasian structure of teaching requires, then, both aspects in order to
complete the structure. That is, in this case, as well as in conversation and erotic
relations, aspects of totality and infinity are both essential in the description of the
structure in question, even though one cannot simultaneously "have" both perspectives.
The deeper claim, moreover, is that either aspect is possible (at any given time) within
the agent's experience, and, further, that the aspect that one adopts depends upon one's
particular attunement.120 Therefore, it is possible to see the same situation from two
distinct perspectives that are simultaneously incompatible, in the analogous way that one
can see both a "duck" and a "rabbit" in the Gestalt case.121
Levinasian totality and infinity ought to be interpreted in this way, both because
this interpretation is faithful to his descriptions, and because it dispels the seemingly
paradoxical language in which he couches the relationship between the totality and
infinity aspect. He often characterizes the agent's experiential relationship of these two
aspects as happening "at the same time," or as the "door" to them being "at the same time
closed and open," to name some examples (T&I 149, 148). He also claims (just as
paradoxically) that the relation between the same and the Other is "both present and still
to come" (T&I 225). What he really means, however, is consistent with my bivalent,
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"Teaching is not reducible to maieutics, it comes from the exterior and brings more than I can contain"
(51).
120
That is, one can be overwhelmed or surprised by the Other at any point in one's experience, and one can
alternately adopt what Levinas takes to be the default totalizing attitude at any point in one's experience.
121
Of course, the claim is not that one literally sees the Other, but that one "sees" that one does not see, or
that one recognizes an agency that is incommensurable with the self's. In the totality aspect, however, one
clearly sees the other person, albeit as a static and thematic entity.
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Gestalt interpretation. In one kind of attunement, the phenomena reveal themselves in the
"totality" aspect, and in another kind of attunement, the "infinity" aspect governs the
structure. At any given moment, however, the one or the other can be salient.
It is important that we preserve a tandem and symbiotic relationship between
totality and infinity, because this symbiosis is relevantly similar to the very idea of an
"infinity conditioning a totality." This symbiosis reveals how totality and infinity work
together in specific, two-person situations, and it gives an initial indication of how
totality and infinity limit, and hence inform each other. I will pattern the general sense of
totality and infinity on this model, and this pattern is not arbitrary because it faithfully
reflects the dynamic between self and the Other that one finds in Levinas's oeuvre. This
pattern also reflects his Cartesian heritage and subsequent reappropriation, since it begins
with the self "as a totality," as both Descartes and Levinas put it, who then "discovers"
the transcendental traces of the Other's "infinity."
One is in a better position to appreciate what Levinas means by the Other's
infinity "conditioning" a totality when one reflects on the dynamic phenomenology of
conversation, for instance. If we understand the self's perspective from the point of view
of totality, and the Other's disruptive presence as a catalyst for the infinity aspect, then we
provisionally see how the infinity aspect of the relation informs the totality aspect. That
is, we "can proceed from the experience of totality" and then return:
Back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality
itself. Such a situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face
of the Other. The rigorously developed concept of this transcendence is expressed
by the term infinity. (T&I 24-5)
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I will clarify this pivotal passage in several ways throughout this chapter, but for
now it is useful to give a general, preliminary indication of the way that the
phenomenology of conversation informs this passage. The following illustration of
potential conversations between two people reflects a sketch of the general
phenomenology wherein infinity conditions totality, and it is a helpful glimpse of this
"rigorously developed concept" that Levinas does not, however, rigorously develop in a
straightforward way.
So, let us begin with the "experience of totality" with one of the interlocutors
("Jane"). We note that the salient features of Jane's perspective include a lucid and stable
conception of what she is saying, and how she views the situation. In this aspect, Jane
"knows" what the conversation is about; that is, she lucidly asserts her point of view and
she explicitly or implicitly has a clear grasp of her interlocutor's ("Jim's") position. But
suddenly Jim challenges her assertion, and his disruptive words force her to tarry with a
different perspective wherein she is now reeling, or "caught off guard" as one says. She
might now thereby think to herself that, "I never thought of it that way…"
Or, let us suppose that Jim laughs sardonically at the end of a story that Jane just
recounted (whose conclusion she believes to be depressingly morbid, however). She
might thereby ask herself: "But how can he laugh like that? I thought I knew him well
enough for him to sympathize with me about the story." As with the above case, Jane's
hitherto clear circuit of lucid and stable representation is now disrupted or altered—that
is, her experience from a totalizing perspective has been "broken up" by the Other's
"gleam of exteriority," which is tantamount to saying that something that Jane did not
assume has enabled her to change her perspective on the same situation. Jane's view as a
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totality has been conditioned by the Other in such a way that her perspective switches to
that of an appreciation of the Other's "infinity."
Her perspective on the same situation (as a totality) has been transformed by Jim's
disruptive "presence" (that is, by that which Levinas calls "the Other's infinity") but this
presence is not something that she can totalizingly grasp—for she is overwhelmed (if but
momentarily) and "sees," rather, that she does not see everything so clearly. She is
initially passive in this aspect, and this passivity is attuned to an activity that she can
heed, but cannot master. In the totality aspect, however, "Jim" qua Jane's clear
anticipation and assessment offers no "resistance," as Levinas puts it. That is, Jane's
totalizing view of Jim was static and predictable, and in this aspect she expected more of
the same, although this same perspective gets "broken up" to reveal something that
informs or "conditions" it.122
While she is "altered" by Jim's "alterity," as it were, Jane must reckon with this
alteration that she did not assume, and this different perspective informs her in significant
ways.123 As Levinas puts it, "the face is a notion of meaning prior to my initiative, and
independent of my power" (51). This change in perspective was neither chosen nor
anticipated by Jane, yet the change contributes to the informative elements that maintain
the conversation as a real two person relation—that is, as a relation between two beings
who are similar in certain respects, yet relevantly dissimilar in others.124
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Hence Levinas's seemingly strange verbiage about such situations: the "welcome of the Other expresses
a simultaneity of activity and passivity" (T&I 89).
123
Levinas's further claim, as we soon see, is that once "Jane" notices this disruption and the fact that she
did not assume it, she then has "the idea" of infinity: "which means: to be taught" (T&I 51).
124
When we consider their relationship as an authentic conversation between two people, we see ways that
Jane depends on Jim as a catalyst for this change in her perspective. If one sees Jim as a catalyst for the
change from the totality to the infinity aspect, then one appreciates a way that the Other's "infinity
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The situation's alteration also attests to the Gestalt switch, and bivalent, features
that we are considering within the totality-infinity structure, because it shows two
simultaneously incompatible perspectives that inform and complete the description of the
conversation. The tandem and bivalent interplay of infinity and totality is arguably what
Levinas means, moreover, when he makes the initially paradoxical claim that "to be in a
relation while absolving oneself from this relation is to speak" (T&I 215). Yet, from the
proper perspective, this claim is simply a modification of Levinas's bivalent
phenomenology of the structure of infinity and totality.
In one aspect, the self is attuned to the totalizing features of the interlocutory
"relation" that assertively organize the self's perspective. In the infinity aspect, however,
the self is attuned to the margins of the same situation that it did not anticipate, and these
surprises stem from the Other's critical presence (whose "presence" is not simply spatial,
but rather evinces a disruptive agency that is distinct from the self's lucid circuit of
agency and control). The self in this aspect has literally been released, or "absolved," as
Levinas puts it, from merely one perspective or relation, and s/he can thus partake in both
of the "relations" that his language implies. It is also important to indicate that these
punctuations of lucidity and surprise can transpire at any given moment within a
conversation, for instance, and these punctuations can take place within many other
interpersonal structures, such as teaching and learning.
Levinas suggests the tandem character of a person's bivalent capacity for lucid
agency in concert with meaningful disruption in passages like the following. He also

conditions totality" by "proceeding from the experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks
up…to the gleam of exteriority in the Other's face."
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implicitly suggests therein that the Other is a condition for both the maintenance of an
authentic conversation, as well as the self's capacity to learn.125 The way that the Other's
infinity conditions totality is thus importantly related to the structure of teaching and
learning.
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at
each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is
therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means to
have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. (51, my boldface)
It is crucial to note that the Other's disruptive presence should be seen as a
constructive and informative limit to the general structure of conversation and teaching,
for example. When one sees it in this way, the Other's novel contribution is neither
essentially a "disruption" in the sense of a threat, nor is it merely an acerbic dissolution of
the self's activity; it is, instead, and most basically, a conditioning aspect that enables an
important change in a person's phenomenological perspective.126 Levinas's point, in a
nutshell, is that these unanticipated limits and disruptions contribute to the self's "being
taught" by the Other. In a related sense, the Other's novel contribution to the
conversation, and the self's assertive grasp on the same conversation, can be essentially
intertwined in a feedback loop that enables and perpetuates the two aspects of the

125

"Speech, better than a simple sign, is essentially magisterial. It first of all teaches this teaching itself, by
virtue of which alone it can teach (and not, like maieutics, awaken in me) things and ideas. Ideas instruct
me coming from the master who presents them to me: who puts them in question" (T&I 69).
126
This change can be identified within a conversation, for instance, but from a more general perspective
this informative change reflects the cultivation or acquisition of intersubjective norms and evaluative
standards that the Other enables. Whether it is one's interlocutory position, or the more general notion of
acquiring social norms and preferences, the self finds its perspective altered by the Others' infinity. On a
more general plane that considers the Other's role in normative reason, I should say that I am indebted to a
fine lecture given by Steven Crowell, whose talk largely confirmed and encouraged my interpretation, and
in a few cases helped me to revaluate the normative implications of the Other's transformation of the self's
perspective. This came from a Keynote Lecture given on 5/29/10 at the University of New Mexico, in the
"Philosophy in the Desert" symposium organized by Professor Iain Thomson.
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conversation in a way that deepens the possibility of learning from each other.127 This
feature of being-intertwined is all the more apparent when we stress Jim's reciprocal
capacity to be overwhelmed by Jane's "infinity," as it were.
If one assumes that in order for the situation to truly count as a conversation, and
not rather a two-fold and simultaneous monologue, nor as a mere emission of sounds
from both of the interlocutors, then one needs to see the Other as a meaningful limit to
the self's representation of the situation. We may also assume that the other person
reciprocally needs the self for this same kind of informative semantic limit. Levinas's
descriptions focus exclusively on the self as the person who is overwhelmed, however,
but this is because (as we also see with Descartes and his Other) there is an asymmetry
built in to the phenomenology of the description. Since one cannot ever truly begin from
the Other's perspective in terms of identification, strictly speaking, Levinas always begins
to "describe how alterity is possible…only starting from me," that is, from the firstperson perspective of the experience (T&I 40).128
In order for a conversation to count as an authentic instance of language, in
Levinas's terms, there needs to be a conditioning rapport between self and Other that
shows how it is both the case that they clearly relate to each other, but also, and
seemingly paradoxically, that they are somehow at an "infinite" distance from each
other—that is, that the two terms of the relation exhibit different agencies, on my
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From a more distant perspective, the totality aspect or drive lucidly asserts itself, and the infinity
component limits, disrupts, or checks totality when it presents a perspective that the former can neither
fully anticipate nor assimilate. This process, in a word, faithfully reflects the dynamic totality-infinity
structure of relationships like conversation, teaching, and erotic relations.
128
This asymmetry can lead one to read Levinas as giving a preference to infinity's role in the description,
but this preference is arguably a result of the need to begin from the self's point of view, and it is not a
moral preference in the last analysis, as our tandem and coequal reading of Levinas indicates.
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interpretation. This bivalent rapport reflects the alternating moments of what I call the
"totality-infinity" structure, then, because it shows, first, the importance of the totality
aspect that an agent adopts on the other person, which serves to establish a clear and
stable assessment of the situation. The totality-infinity structure also shows, however, the
way that the Other's "infinity" can meaningfully disrupt the self's totalizing perspective,
and it thus indicates a "separated," "exterior," or simply an alternate agency with which
the self must reckon, but that the self cannot totalizingly and assertively grasp.
Language can be spoken only if the interlocutor is the commencement of his
discourse, if, consequently, he remains beyond the system, if he is not on the same
plane as myself. (T&I 101)
Levinas's "only if" standard for authentic language accordingly implies that there
is a sense wherein the other person necessarily "remains beyond" the self's system of
totalizing intelligibility and self-identification. In this aspect, the agent's experience is
attuned to the unanticipated contortions and disruptions of the other person's activity that
indicate that the source (or "commencement") of the "discourse" is not purely
commensurable with the self's own nature. As we have seen, however, the self also needs
(and initially begins with) lucid moments of totalizing or thematic assertion in order to
maintain the relation as a relation with exactly this person whom one faces. One needs to
"have an Idea" of the other person, and one needs to sometimes "present the other as a
theme," but these totalizing features need to be seen as working in tandem with the aspect
wherein the Other "breaks with the theme that seemed to hold him a for a moment" (T&I
51, 195). When these aspects are seen as working in a tandem feedback loop, they
thereby complete the conditions for authentic Levinasian conversation and "language."
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Levinas's ontological conditions for authentic language presuppose a sense of the
other person that is refractory to the self's totalizing grasp, and hence the above
consideration is a relevant sense of the way that the Other's infinity "conditions" totality.
His descriptions and analyses of conversation begin with the "experience of totality" that
reflects the self's initially assertive, totalizing grasp on the other person, and from there
the analysis goes to a "situation where totality breaks up…a situation that conditions the
totality."129 The Other's infinity as a condition reflects a limiting, and initially disruptive
agency that the self cannot master, but that the self can at best only appreciate at a
remove. As we have maintained the whole time, however, this limiting disruption is
importantly meaningful, both because it informs the self in unanticipated ways, and
because it serves to establish and maintain the potency of interpersonal relations like
conversation, teaching and learning, and erotic relations.
Our deeper goal in this chapter is to further clarify a sense of the Other's infinity
"'conditioning" a totality that includes, but extends beyond, the face-to-face
phenomenology that we considered. By extension, when we will have elucidated this
general argumentative structure, we will see a more solid counter-example to claims that
Levinas merely "argues by assertion", or that Levinas "has no philosophy."130 Perhaps
more importantly, we will also see an accurately nuanced, and robust, illustration of the
rapport between totality and infinity that Levinas does not rigorously explicate.
I will use three methodological insights in order to further elucidate his general
argumentative structure, which extends to a broader sense of infinity and totality, as well
129

T&I 24-5.
We see concrete illustrations of such claims below when we consider the critiques of Moran, Badiou,
and Wolin.
130
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as to all of his uses of the personal "Other." First, I consider Levinas's sparse comments
about his own philosophical method in order to justify my interpretation of the central
ambition of Totality and Infinity, which is, namely, my interpretation of the way that
infinity conditions totality. Second, I draw upon the particular interpersonal cases that we
analyzed above, and in the previous chapter, in order to extract the significant features of
totality and infinity that are relevant to the ways that "infinity conditions totality." This
analysis yields a two-person (or interlocutory) sense of what he means by totality being
conditioned by infinity, and this interlocutory sense informs his third-person sense of the
"Other," because it shows a related way that one can be informed or conditioned by the
Other.131 In this last way, the conditioning takes the form of the self's acquisition of
intersubjective norms—it opens the self's eyes, as it were, to a world that is contested by,
and imbued with, normative meanings that do not derive from the self's economy.
Third, I analyze numerous textual passages that point to this different, more
general sense of the way that infinity conditions totality, which encompasses a broader
sense of "totality," as well as a broader sense of the "Other." The broader sense of "the
Other" (and hence the Other's "infinity") pertains to the other person as a he, she, or they,
and thus the perspective is not simply from the point of the self and his or her partner,
interlocutor, or teacher whom one faces. The non-interlocutory sense of the Other also
refers to what Levinas calls "transcendental conditions," the nature of which we develop
in Chapter 3, The Preobjective Other Considered Genealogically, and as a Third Person.
131

By "a two-person sense" I simply mean Levinas's description of the interrelation between exactly two
people. We saw this sense in numerous examples when we considered examples of conversation, erotic
relations, and teaching and learning. By a "third-person" sense I understand Levinas's descriptions of the
self's relationship to a "they" or "them," or to a person referred to beyond an immediate interlocutory
capacity, as in, for instance, "I spoke of them earlier," or, "Her work taught me many things." In brief, this
sense of the Other encompasses the third-person singular, and plural, grammatical categories.
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By a "broader" sense of totality, I simply refer to Levinas's uses of totality that extend
beyond interlocutory relations to such ontic regions as "science," "politics," "the school,"
and "objectivity," to name some prominent examples.
The development of these three considerations will clarify the chief, but implicitly
stated, argumentative strategy of Levinas's great work. Certain scholars (like Moran)
claim, however, that there is no systematic argument to be found in this work. Others
claim that if there is an argument, it allegedly "masks its fundamentally religious
character," as Badiou and Wolin claim, albeit for different reasons. Their respective
conclusions commit them, however, to an interpretation of the Other that is "patterned on
the Divine" (Wolin), or in need of "God, who does not exist" (Badiou). These
interpretations neglect a more accurate reading of Levinas that shows that the Other is
thoroughly human and interpersonal, and that a proper sense of the Other presupposes an
accurately nuanced sense of totality and infinity.
Lastly, commentators like Putnam claim that it is a non-starter to attribute a novel
metaphysical and ontological dimension to Levinas's thought, because this dimension
would "do violence to the Levinasian agent perspective."132 I shall show that Putnam is
mistaken in this claim, however, precisely to the extent that the novel ontological and
phenomenological dimension within Levinas's thought is the pivotal sieve through which
one should extract a systematic and thorough exposition of his work.
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Putnam's concern is that attributing a metaphysical realism to Levinas's thought amounts to making "the
agent point of view disappear" ("Levinas and Judaism," 43). My ontological and metaphysical
interpretation of Levinas precisely asserts, however, a robust "agent point of view" that is indispensable to
understanding his argumentation. This assertion is also consistent with Levinas's appropriation of
Descartes, whose metaphysical "agent point of view" is equally indispensable.
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My interpretation of Levinas's methodological strategy reveals that there is a
distinct and rigorous argument, that it is thoroughly philosophical, and that its novel
metaphysical and ontological structure clarifies his work.
The Problem: Totality and Infinity Allegedly Has No Philosophical Argument
The clarification of Levinas's arguments and descriptions that establish the ways
that infinity conditions totality are important for at least two reasons. First, certain
commentators have expressed frustration, or even stark disapproval, with the perceived
lack of argumentation in such works as Totality and Infinity. Dermot Moran, for
example, in his Introduction to Phenomenology (2000), clearly evinces such a frustration:
[Levinas's] style is to make assertions, followed by further assertions, without any
attempt to justify them, other than through some kind of appeal to deeply human,
perhaps even mystical, intuitions, or alternatively, to phenomenological insight,
though such notions are never systematically explicated by him. (321-2, emphasis
mine)
Moran's critique ramifies in three directions that do not augur well for the inclusion of
Levinas into the philosophical pantheon. First, Levinas "merely" argues by repetitive
assertion, and we can read that to mean that Levinas really does not argue at all. Second,
if there is an argument, then at least one crucial premise relates to a "deeply human" or
"mystical" intuition, and so the "argument" relies on a presumably dubious, quasiphilosophical source. Third, one can perhaps justify Levinas's assertions
phenomenologically, but since he never explains these notions systematically, this
approach turns out to be a non-starter.
For our purposes, the first and third prongs of Moran's critique are the most
interesting, because our counter-claim is to show that there is a rigorous argumentative

146
strategy in Levinas's work, and that this strategy is intertwined with Levinas's
phenomenology.133
The perceived lack of argumentation and systematic phenomenological exposition
hence leads Moran to seemingly dismiss Levinas's philosophical worth.
[Levinas] simply presents his analysis as if it were the way it must be for
everyone, not a position, to paraphrase Levinas himself, open to the views of
others. We are, in Levinas's own terms, sucked into the sphere of the same. (352)
Totality and Infinity's argumentative strategy uses, however, an often implicit
logic of presupposition. In abstract, it commits Levinas to the notion that A is a
prerequisite condition for B, or that P is not possible without Q. We have seen one
distinct form of this general strategy when we considered Levinas's claim that "language
can be spoken only if the interlocutor…remains beyond the system, if he is not on the
same plane as myself" (101, my emphasis). In terms of the strategy's general content,
moreover, Levinas often makes claims of the following register that extend to many ontic
regions, and so not simply discourse: "the Other is the condition for theoretical truth and
error" (T&I 51). "A surplus of humility, responsibility, and sacrifice are the conditions for
political equality" (64). "The world becomes our theme, and hence our object, from a
primordial teaching, which is required by scientific work" (92). These kinds of claims
are ubiquitous in Totality and Infinity, and at first glance, they can seem like nonsequiturs, or as Moran puts it, forms of "argument by assertion."
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It is also worth noting that Moran, generally speaking, is a very gifted interpreter of the
phenomenological tradition. I find his work on Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty to be highly
edifying. I interpret his underestimation of Levinas's argumentative and philosophical worth as due to the
fact that Levinas's arguments are generally implicit, and because Levinas bears a certain contempt for
clarity of exposition, as we soon see.
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Our analysis below will serve to philosophically bolster Levinas's claims by
indicating the general argumentative strategy that implicitly informs them, and this will
require attributing an ontological dimension to Levinas that many would outright reject.
His general strategy consists, simply put, in implicitly indicating the various ways in
which infinity ontologically conditions totality; or, and what amounts to the same thing,
the ways in which the Other informs the self as a totality.
The second reason (for why it is important to elaborate Levinas's implicit
argument) is that even some of Levinas's staunchest supporters claim that it is a nonstarter to look for phenomenological and or metaphysical argumentation in his work.
Hilary Putnam, for instance, in his "Levinas and Judaism," explicitly rejects the notion
that Levinas is trying to articulate a (novel) metaphysical or transcendentalphenomenological account of human reality. He claims that "it is important to keep in
mind that Levinas does not intend to replace traditional metaphysics and epistemology
with a different, non-traditional, metaphysics and epistemology,"134 and that instead,
Levinas allegedly insists upon "the impossibility of a metaphysical grounding for
ethics."135 We shall put forward the contrasting view, however, that Levinas precisely
articulates a metaphysical and or ontological grounding for what he calls "ethics," and,
further, that this grounding leads Levinas to carry forward, and hence sometimes to
radically alter, traditional metaphysical views.
Putnam also holds the view that Levinas tries to demonstrate the "underivability"
of the "fundamental obligation" to respect the Other, thereby "showing a problem with
134

Putnam, Hilary, "Levinas and Judaism," in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Simon Critchley and
Robert Bernasconi, eds., Cambridge UP, (2002), 43.
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Ibid., 36.

148
metaphysics, not ethics."136 He further asserts that a rival metaphysical account will "do
just as much violence to the agent point of view" as, say, the "violence" he takes
"Husserlian phenomenology" to do to that point of view.137 The previous chapter's work
indicated, though, that it is possible to rebuild novel metaphysical and phenomenological
notions of Levinasian subjectivity that leave a robust and ethical agent in place.
I argue, pace commentators like Moran, Putnam, Badiou, and Wolin, that one
both can, and should, extract systematic arguments from Levinas's middle period that
indicate a phenomenological, ontological, and metaphysical structure at work in this
same period. The "can" is argued for below; the "should," moreover, stems in part from
the need to understand Levinas as a distinct heir to several important philosophical
precursors, rather than as a maverick or patricide within that tradition. Levinas's
metaphysics, and ontological phenomenology are however novel in certain respects, and
this novelty signals his legacy's brilliance. He should be read as carrying forward that
tradition, and through this interpretation we shall lend more support for the inclusion of
Levinas into the philosophical pantheon.
The Projected Solution: The Elucidation of Levinas's Conditions
Levinas characterizes the background of what I term his "conditions" through
three related themes, all of which indicate their (generally dormant) possibilities for
philosophical reflection. These three themes are intended as anticipatory indications, and
Chapter 3, De Boer: Levinas's Other Is Ontologically Foundational will explicitly ramify
these general patterns. First, they have been "forgotten" by philosophers in general (T&I
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28). Second, they have an implicit structure, both from the agent perspective as well as
from a theoretical perspective (T&I 138-9). Lastly, they have a hidden or elusive
structure that is resistant to totalizing perspectives (T&I 99, 79), whose character we saw
last chapter, and to which we return below. This chapter's strategy consists, then, in remembering the implicit, forgotten, and hidden pieces of Levinas's conditions so as to
make them explicit.
These conditions also need to be situated against the backdrop of what Levinas
means by "ethics," both because the claim that "ethics is first philosophy" implies his
conditions, and what he means by "ethics," most basically, is the "relation between men"
that involves "signification, teaching, and justice" (T&I 79)—which is to say, a
transcendental interhuman relation that enables the self to adopt intersubjective normative
standards. When Levinas describes "ethics" as "a field of research hardly glimpsed at," he
is arguably referring to the dearth of sustained elucidation regarding his conditions for
human being and intelligibility (79).
There is only one explicit elaboration of the way that infinity conditions totality,
and it is embedded in the prophetically dense preface to Totality and Infinity. We
examined this same passage in the last chapter for different reasons—namely, as a
counter-example to some claims in Wolin's polemic—but for our present purposes we
will scrutinize the particulars of the claim, and not simply the general theme. I also
presented this same passage earlier as a lens through which to illustrate the
phenomenology of conversation that underlies the structure of infinity conditioning
totality. We are now in a clearer position to explicate the distinguishing features of his
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sparse comments on the relationship between infinity "conditioning" totality in a general
way.
We can proceed from the experience of totality back to a situation where totality
breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself. Such a situation is the
gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the Other. The rigorously
developed concept of this transcendence is expressed by the term infinity. (24-5,
my italics)138
His remarks arguably house the entire philosophical intention of Totality and
Infinity, and for two important reasons. First, it is the only passage wherein one actually
finds "totality" and "infinity"—the work's namesake, after all—conjointly discussed.
Second, it evinces a logical connection between "the totality" and that which conditions
or enables it; namely, the Other's "exteriority or transcendence," whose philosophical
exposition (that is, when considered as a "rigorously developed concept") is simply what
Levinas means by the Other's "infinity," as well as the general "idea of infinity" that is
"produced" in "the oppositional character" of interpersonal relations (T&I 196).
Levinas gives little formal indication as to how, exactly, infinity will condition
totality (here or elsewhere), and his glosses on "the gleam of exteriority" and "the face of
the Other" offer no robust indications in themselves. For this reason, it is important to
clarify what he means by "infinity conditioning totality," and this is exactly what the
elucidation of his conditions does.
To the extent that he does specify a formal methodology, we see only a denial of
dogmatism, on the one hand, and a guarded appeal to a "transcendental" strategy, on the
other.
138

Since we examined the first part of this passage last chapter, and commented on its significance, which
indicates what Levinas is not trying to do in Totality and Infinity, I have omitted it above. The omitted
portion reads as follows: "Without substituting eschatology for philosophy, without philosophically
'demonstrating' eschatological 'truths,' we can proceed…"
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This revelation of infinity does not lead to the acceptance of any dogmatic
content, whose philosophical rationality cannot be argued for in the name of the
transcendental truth of the idea of infinity. For the way we are describing to work
back and remain on this side of objective certitude resembles what has come to be
called the transcendental method (in which the technical procedures of
transcendental idealism need not necessarily be comprised). (T&I 25)
One might be tempted to think that the translation is a barrier to understanding
this passage, for it is among the denser passages in the already critically saturated Totality
and Infinity. Alphonso Lingis's translation is quite good, however, both in this case and in
general. My translation, which preserves the syntax and idiom as much as possible, only
lends a few different shades of nuance to the content, especially in the last sentence:
This revelation of infinity does not lead to the acceptance of any dogmatic
content, and one would be wrong to uphold infinity's philosophical rationality in
the name of the transcendental truth of the idea of infinity. For the way to
reascend and to remain on this side of objective certitude that we have just
described draws near to what one has agreed to call the transcendental method,
without needing to understand this notion all the way up to the technical
procedures of transcendental idealism. (my translation, my italics)
My version highlights how Levinas's method "draws near to" (se rapproche de)
the transcendental method, that is, it approaches, or approximates, the transcendental
method, as opposed to having a mere resemblance with it. This is important, because in
what follows we shall advance the thesis that Levinas rebuilds his own transcendental
strategy, which largely stems from his appropriation of intentional analysis. And although
it indeed approximates certain kinds of canonical transcendental idealism, it also reflects
significant dissimilarities as well.
In terms that approximate a transcendental method, Levinas's strategy seeks to
elucidate a more basic or prior function that conditions or subtends theoretical activity,
which amounts to the Other's "infinity" conditioning "totality." This part of his strategy
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mirrors Kant's attempt to formally indicate "categories" that inform or condition
cognition in general, for instance. His strategy also mirrors Heidegger's, or MerleauPonty's, search for a preobjective world that conditions the theoretical world.139 More
specifically, Levinas intends to show that the preobjective Other enables a normative
shift in the self's rational perspective. In terms that are dissimilar, however, Levinas
radically alters traditional transcendental paradigms when he argues that this more basic
function (or source) is both thoroughly human, as well as originally "other than" the
self.140
The final clause in my translation thus indicates that Levinas's "transcendental
method" does not completely mimic "the technical procedures of transcendental idealism"
in its quest to remain "on this side of objective certainty," that is, within the realm of
demonstrable phenomenological evidence. It indicates, rather, that something else is
intended.
The way that Levinas rebuilds or founds his own "transcendental strategy" draws
upon past works, but at the same time it founds such "transcendence" on the ontological
structure of the interhuman Other. So even though Descartes, Kant, Husserl, and
Heidegger, most notably, are always in the background of Levinas's transcendental and
existential strategy, his foundational difference lies in his claim that interhuman
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With Heidegger, this preobjective world amounts to the indication of a "clearing" that enables beings to
show up as particular beings, and with Merleau-Ponty the preobjective "world" turns out to be what he calls
the "lived body," which conditions perception.
140
As we explicitly see below, I interpret Levinas as claiming that the Other enables the self to alter its
perspective from totality to infinity, and to thereby change the self's conception of totality within an
indefinite process.
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relations—that is, what he means by "ethics" most basically—subtend or condition
theoretical activities.141
Levinas scholars are often justified, however, to express frustration with the lack
of apparent Levinasian method, if only because Levinas is either cryptic about his own in
Totality and Infinity and elsewhere, or because he is utterly dismissive of the importance
of philosophical method in general. In 1975, for instance, while he was engaged in an
honorary "Question and Answer" debate at the University of Leyden, Levinas wryly
disparages the worth of making one's method translucent:
I do not believe that there is transparency possible in method. Nor that philosophy
might be possible as transparency. Those who have worked on methodology all
their lives have written many books that replace the more interesting books that
they could have written. So much the worse for the philosophy that would walk in
sunlight without shadows.142
His rather extreme stance on the worth of "transparency" in method shall not,
however, lead us to the converse problem, and thus it is important that we interpret
Levinas with a modicum of consistency and clarity of exposition.143 As Simon Critchley
notes, moreover, "while the opacity of Levinas's prose troubles many readers, it cannot be

141

As Kant thought that the categories of the understanding "filtered" human experience, so too does
Levinas articulate a similar view, with the exception that the Other in a general sense serves as an important
"category." As Levinas puts the point, (without, however, specifying what is entailed): "the role that Kant
attributed to sensible experience in the domain of understanding belongs in metaphysics to interhuman
relations" (T&I 79). Levinas's middle period represents the elucidation of a phenomenologico-ontological
account of such a gesture, and its novelty is best seen when we consider the primacy of the personal or
"interhuman" in his philosophy. This primacy is opposed to the theistic, idealistic—or, in a word,
impersonal—which we find in such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, and even Kant. The following
passage also reflects Levinas's reappropriation of Kant, wherein we see the sketch of Levinas's
"categories."
"Separation and interiority, truth and language constitute the categories of the idea of infinity or
metaphysics" (62, emphasis mine).
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Levinas, "Questions and Answers." Of God Who Comes to Mind, Bettina Bergo, (trans.). Stanford:
Stanford UP (1998), 89.
143
Levinas's apparent deflation of the importance of method may well contribute to his obscure prose and
lack of explicit indication, as well as the tortuous paths through which he wends the main arguments of
Totality and Infinity.
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said that his work is without method. Levinas always described himself as a
phenomenologist and as being faithful to the spirit of Husserl."144
In the same debate noted above, Levinas clarifies his relationship to "the spirit of
Husserl" to which Critchley refers, as well as to a "transcendental method" in his work.
His clarification is in response to a provocative set of questions posed by Theodore de
Boer, who prefaces the following question as one of "method."
How can one express in discourse the metaphysical relation to the Other? In the
preface to Totality and Infinity, you refer to Husserl's transcendental method. You
assert that you have followed the intentional analysis that goes back to the origin
prior to every origin, to the most radical foundation of theory and practice. (86)
Levinas's response begins with an acknowledgment that "fundamental questions"
are at issue, and it is clearly attuned to the various stakes of the question. It is also one of
the few passages in print wherein Levinas gives a concise summary of his take on
phenomenology's proper worth and labor.
What is said in the preface of Totality and Infinity remains true, all the same, to the end

for me with respect to method. It is not the word "transcendental" that I would
retain, but the notion of intentional analysis. The dominant trait, which even
determines all those who no longer call themselves phenomenologists today, is
that, in proceeding back from what is thought to the fullness of the thought itself,
one discovers—without there being any deductive, dialectical, or other
implication therein—dimensions of meaning, each time new. (87, my emphasis)
His mention of "what is thought to the fullness of the thought itself" (which is
arguably the dominant trait of Levinas's bivalent phenomenology) reflects his Cartesian
heritage and subsequent reappropriation, and this is important for two reasons. First,
Levinas's ontological account of totality and infinity is essentially patterned on the
initially paradoxical Cartesian "more within the less" that we explored in previous
chapters. Its basic formulation essentially commits Levinas to understanding the "more"
144
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as "infinity," which is contained in the "less," as it were, or "totality." Second, the
bivalent structure therein mirrors the ontological structure of infinity conditioning
totality. This chapter's work accordingly elucidates his ontological structures (conditions)
that are at work "behind" or beyond the interpersonal phenomena.145 These structures
implicitly condition the phenomena by enabling a bivalent stance that one can adopt on
the same situation in question, and this bivalence opens up possibilities to the self's
perspective that were previously inaccessible.
The following citation stems directly from the previous one, and we can readily
see the seeds for this dual reading of Levinas's strategy.
It is the fact that if, in starting from a theme or idea, I move toward the "ways" by
which one accedes to it, then the way by which one accedes to it is essential to the
meaning of the theme itself: this way reveals to us the whole landscape of
horizons that have been forgotten and together with which what shows itself no
longer has the meaning it had when one considered it from a stance directly
turned toward it. (87, emphasis mine)
At work here is the methodological reification of a polyvalent phenomenological
attitude, with the highest emphasis placed on the different ways "to accede to," or
approach, phenomena. So, from a thematic view of the phenomenon in question (that is,
"directly turned toward it") we can grasp certain features of its "horizon." This is nothing
less than a gloss on traditional phenomenology, after all, and to this extent Levinas
arguably has Husserl's "spirit" in mind. From another consideration, however, we see an
approach that emphasizes an indirect "way" that teases out the "forgotten" and
semantically altered variations on the same theme. Levinas's distinct contribution here is
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These structures "infuse" or inform a given totality with a background world of significance, and
thereby put "more" into the "less," as it were. We shall consider more concrete examples of this structure
when we examine his thoughts on politics, equality, freedom, objectivity, and representation in Chapter 3, .
The Preobjective Other Considered Genealogically, and as a Third Person
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his effort to make the Other "appear" as an enabling constituent of the self's shift from an
egological creature to a civilized person who can reckon with intersubjective norms. This
latter approach hooks up with our infinity aspect, and it even purports, rather
paradoxically, to denude the noumenal.
Phenomenology is not about elevating phenomena into things in themselves; it is
about bringing the things in themselves to the horizon of their appearing, that of
their phenomenality; phenomenology means to make appear the appearing itself
behind the quiddity that appears, even if this appearing does not encrust its
modalities in the meaning that it delivers to the gaze. (87)
It is worth juxtaposing the formal parallel between Levinas's remarks about the
face-to-face encounters we have described with the above thoughts about "things in
themselves" that lie "behind the quiddity that appears," even if this manner of
"appearing" is not thematically straightforward (that is, not delivered "to the gaze"). We
have seen phenomenological accounts of the Other person who, in the infinity aspect, can
reveal himself "behind" the phenomenal quiddity—namely, as an activity or purposive
agency that informs, surprises, or simply disrupts the self in interpersonal ways. The
same person can also be straightforwardly judged, doubted, and seen in a way whose
"modalities" are "encrusted" in a clearly "delivered meaning," that is, s/he can be seen
from a totalizing point of view. Above, though, we see Levinas's methodological account
of phenomenality in general, and this general sense lends support to my interpretation of
totality and infinity because it reinforces the dynamic, bivalent, and interrelated features
of their relationship in a general way.
When we compare the following passage from Totality and Infinity with the
above remarks about "bringing things in themselves to the horizon" of their
phenomenality, we see relevant similarities with his general account of phenomena.
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To disclose, on the basis of a subjective horizon, is already to miss the noumenon.
The interlocutor alone is the term of pure experience, where the Other enters into
relation while remaining kath auto, where he expresses himself without our
having to disclose him from a "point of view," in a borrowed light. (67)
One's initial reaction to the first sentence might be, and for a very good reason:
"How does one not miss the noumenon?" This is because by canonical definition, the
noumenal "is" at best a theoretical approximation, an ideal limit, or a transcendental
postulate whose ontological status requires agnosticism, at best, or perhaps even outright
skepticism. What Levinas means, however, is that two distinct perspectives can
contribute to one's experience of a given datum. In the totality aspect, one adopts the
default phenomenological attitude that precomprehends, or discloses, its object in
advance (in this case, the interlocutor), which establishes a fixed "point of view" and
casts a "borrowed light" or intentional ray upon the object. In the infinity aspect, though,
one can be disrupted, passive, or simply receptive to an agency that (temporarily) disrupts
one's self-identification; that is, the Other can be appreciated as the source of the self's
occurrent disruptive experience, and Levinas describes this source with the term "Other,"
"infinity," (and, less frequently, kath auto or "noumenon").146
To recapitulate some of the previous chapter's labors, we have seen the case for
how another person can phenomenologically overflow, inform, or disrupt the self in an
interlocutory or "face-to-face" situation. In order to dispel the apparently paradoxical
character of Levinas's claims about such situations, we need to read the bivalent "totality-
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In what follows, however, we should see that the "Other" also stands for an ontological fundament of
being, and this in addition to the interlocutory sense that the totality-infinity structure supported in the last
chapter. The Other in this sense is more of an interhuman category, but Levinas's signature gesture consists
in indicating that it originally refers to other people as "she" or a "they," for instance. In fact, this sense of
"Other" relevantly resembles William James's prefatory citation above: it is a genealogical and
transcendental account of human influence, indebtedness, and the prerequisite conditions for intelligibility.
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infinity" structure into such descriptions. This reading indicates (in the infinity aspect)
that Levinas is referring to a transcendental source or activity that the self is receptive
toward, and in other senses (the totality aspect) this reading indicates that he is referring
to the self's lucid and spontaneous organization of the other person. It is crucial,
moreover, that we see that these aspects are essentially complementary—that is, a
consideration of both aspects completes the existential structure that Levinas implicitly
indicates.
We are now in a position to amplify the notion of infinity's conditioning role in
Levinas's thought in general. This will include a brief segue to Theodore de Bore's
interpretation of Levinas's "transcendental strategy," because de Boer sketches a good
framework through which to juxtapose the historical similarities, as well as the salient
points of departure, of Levinas's transcendental strategy. I shall then clarify the ways that
Levinasian infinity (as an interhuman, genealogical, and ontological structure) anchors
the self as a "totality" in such ontic regions as "science," "politics," and "economics," all
of which reflect his use of the Other as a "s/he" or "they." The point is to thereby show a
distinct and prolific argumentative structure in Totality and Infinity that is at once
implicitly indicated, clearly related to previous philosophical models, and yet
philosophically novel in important respects.
De Boer: Levinas's Other Is Ontologically Foundational
Theodore de Boer's The Rationality of Transcendence makes important
observations about the general tendencies in Totality and Infinity.147 This is because he
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This is also because de Boer deftly blends, and properly nuances, that which is unique to Levinas with
that which is entirely borrowed (or even violently appropriated) from his historical predecessors. By
contrast, many Levinas commentators (pro and contra) seek to show the extent to which Levinas's thought
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reads Levinas as searching for overlooked "transcendental foundations" of the self and
the same, and this search clearly commits Levinas to a robust ontology and/or
metaphysics. De Boer also importantly qualifies Levinas's metaphysical and ontological
views within an historical continuum, which encompasses Descartes, Kant, Husserl, and
Heidegger. In what follows we see a case for how Levinas "samples," or repeats with a
difference, the general metaphysical and ontological strategies of his philosophical
predecessors. This "sampling" shows that Levinas is a highly skilled interpreter of the
tradition, and, furthermore, that he carries forward the tradition by shedding the skin of
the pupil, as it were, in order to authentically repay his masters with a highly original, and
important, difference—the essential and formative importance of the interhuman Other.
In his "An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy," de Boer devotes several pages
that show "how the Other is a transcendental foundation of the Same" and the self. Pace
Putnam's claim that Levinas does not intend to "replace traditional metaphysics and
epistemology with non-traditional" models, de Boer rightly argues for a nuanced counterexample to such a claim. This is because Levinas's "metaphysics" (the infinity aspect of
the Other in a general, interhuman sense, on my interpretation) is actually symbiotic with
"ontology," which he situates in the domain of "totality" and "the same."148 This

is purely unique or maverick, and this is often to the detriment of a more complete understanding of
Levinas's precursors and Bildung. Richard Cohen, for instance, insists that Levinas is "the most worthy"
philosopher of the 20th century, precisely because of the "ethicality" of his work. Hilary Putnam claims,
citing Isaiah Berlin's distinction between "hedgehogs" and "foxes," that Levinas "knows one big thing," as
opposed to those thinkers who know "many small things" (58).
148
In Totality and Infinity Levinas often qualifies the "idea of the infinite" and the "search for exteriority"
as "metaphysics," and so de Boer's terminology is not arbitrary. As we saw in the last chapter, the "Same"
is a relevant function of "totality" for Levinas.
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importantly means that he sees that these two structures are necessarily interwoven, as
against those who interpret a caustic antagonism between the two.149
The very idea of a "transcendental foundation" is prima facie nebulous, and an
elucidation of de Boer's transcendental interpretation of Levinas is therefore important.
Like myself, he sees certain affinities with Kant and Levinas, especially to the extent that
Levinas is articulating an account of that which precedes or informs any particular
experience.150 When we couple his insights into Levinas's use of "non-objectifying
consciousness," or simply that which underlies or conditions consciousness and objective
representations, we see an important aspect of how totality can be conditioned by
"infinity" in the guise of the "Other's face," or simply the Other considered in the infinity
aspect.
A clearer perspective of the difference between Levinas's method and his
predecessors' emerges when we consider de Boer's remarks about Totality and Infinity's
subtitle, "An Essay on Exteriority." He notes that Levinas's choice of words reflects his
"concern with thinking an exteriority that is not an object, a theme, a noema, [or] a result
of meaning-giving by a subject."151 Positively, he claims that Levinas intends, instead,
"an aspiration to the radical exteriority… of metaphysics."152 This understanding of
"metaphysics" informs Levinas's transcendental strategy that claims to surpass previous
philosophical attempts—in short, it is the Other considered as a transcendental and
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He writes that Levinas's "metaphysics is not a separate realm above ontology. The relation-to-the-Other
["metaphysics"] is the spirit or breath of ontology, the inspiration vital to criticism" (23).
150
In addition, and unlike the vast majority of Levinas scholars (who downplay, often merely pro forma,
the affinities between Levinas and Heidegger) de Boer is right when he points out relevant connections
between Levinas' Other and Heidegger's Being, as we see below.
151
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ontological foundation that reflects the primacy of such a "radical exteriority," or
"metaphysics."153
Citing remarks that were inserted into the 1967 edition of Levinas's Discovering
Existence with Husserl and Heidegger, de Boer adds that Levinas "seeks inspiration from
Husserl's work even while distancing himself from it."154
[Levinas] holds that if certain Husserlian concepts are radicalized, the idealistic
character of his thought can be overcome and opened up toward metaphysics…If
we explore the [representational] horizon via intentional analysis, i.e. by
penetrating the implications of the object of representation, we discover that it is
embedded in non-objectifying consciousness. Levinas writes that the strictly
cognitive relation has "transcendental conditions." These conditions lie
underneath and beyond representation, in corporeal and cultural existence. (25)
This notion of "penetrating the implications" of standard intentional
representation is key, since it indicates a search for what conditions or enables
representation.155 With Levinas, that which is "discovered" reveals structures that lie
beneath, as it were, "the strictly cognitive relation"; the discovery reveals structures that
are either corporeal (that is, of the kind that Merleau-Ponty makes especially explicit) or
structures that reflect "the Other's infinity," which Levinas tries to make explicit.156
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De Boer does not give concrete illustrations of the positive phenomenological component that indicates
Levinas's difference with his predecessors, however, and this is another reason for why the
phenomenological elucidation of infinity and totality is important. Instead, he gives a very Husserlian
reading of Levinas's descriptions of the Other's foundational role, and this reading neglects to accentuate
Levinas's originality.
154
These same remarks have been reprinted in "Signature," the final section of Difficult Freedom.
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This kind of search is importantly a canonical theme in Western philosophy; Kant, after all, attempted
just this when he sought to formally indicate the categories of the understanding as "organizing" functions
of intuitive data. Husserl sought, moreover, to radically found the transcendental ego as an underlying
source of organizing intelligibility. Heidegger can be read, furthermore, as trying to "complete" Kant's
categories by way of indicating existential-ontological horizons of meaning that organize or enable ontic
experience.
156
These latter two structures, in different terms, enable or (help to) make possible the normal, default
manner of seeing and communicating things. In fact, the "field of research hardly glimpsed at" to which
Levinas refers in Totality and Infinity is, on my interpretation, precisely a reference to the "transcendental
conditions" inherent in "cultural existence": these are the conditions for human civilization that ground and
support the species of "objectifying consciousness" that renders the world totalizeable. They organize and
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Levinas's structures indicate a preobjective domain that conditions the self's experience
through the Other's infinity. I thus argue that Levinas's distinctive contribution to this
traditional phenomenological strategy consists in his search for the ways that the Other
alters or changes the self's "cognitive relations" in interpersonal situations, and, further,
that the most appropriate way to appreciate this strategy relies on an accurately nuanced
understanding of totality and infinity.157
It is also highly important to note the methodological parallels between Heidegger
and Levinas, although the literature is often reluctant to point them out. Like myself, de
Boer takes note of this important connection, and he notes that Levinas will try to dig
deeper into the pre-theoretical world that Heidegger opened up (which is precisely when
Levinas shows the foundational importance of the Other as such considered as an
essentially human structure). De Boer importantly adds that, "on Levinas's interpretation,
Heidegger's significance is…in his exploration of the preobjective areas of human
experience and in the implicit understanding of being" (22). This gloss on the
philosophical similarities between the two seminal thinkers helps both to set my
interpretative stage for Levinas's historically borrowed "transcendental" strategy, as well
as to see the ways in which Levinas significantly departs from his historical
predecessors—namely, through an exposition of the primacy of the human Other via my
interpretation of the totality-infinity structure.

formally indicate the very ability to make the world thematically common and stable. They also provide
the implicit social or "civilized" world in which we operate as civilized creatures, and they thereby serve to
provide the self with normative standards. Put differently, these structures are Levinas's conditions, which
the next section supports with numerous textual passages from Totality and Infinity.
157
We should add that this change can be identified within a conversation, for instance, but from a more
general perspective the informative change can reflect the cultivation or acquisition of intersubjective
norms and evaluative standards that the Other enables.
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There is a formal similarity in that both thinkers take their point of departure in a
dimension which, while not itself experienced, is the foundation of experience.
Formally, the face of the Other has a function identical to Heidegger's notion of
Being: it is the first signification, primum intelligible, the light or clearing in
which beings appear but which does not appear as such and hence can be
approached but indirectly. (28-9)
De Boer's mention of "the face of the Other" as a formal analogue to Heidegger's
Being is crucial because it indicates a requisite horizon of intelligibility, or "clearing," out
of which objects (and people) show up as this or that particular object. In this sense, the
Other considered transcendentally resembles Kant's categories, Heidegger's existential
analyses of Being, and Merleau-Ponty's lived body. When he claims that Levinas goes
further than his predecessors, he means that Levinas carries the torch in this search for the
"pre-objective," so as to light up the interhuman Other's role in such a "clearing."158
Our task in the following sections, accordingly, is to clarify the connection
between the "preobjective" Other and its relationship to the way that infinity conditions
totality. By way of anticipation, the preobjective domain that informs Levinas's
understanding of intentional analysis is simply what he means by an "infinity
conditioning totality." It is important that we continue to stress the tandem and coequal
importance of totality and infinity in Levinas's thought at ontological and metaphysical

158

De Boer also importantly highlights an ethical dimension embedded within this "calling into question"
of the self and or the Same. This is because, first, the Other clearly can rupture a potentially narcissistic
and or egotistical conception of the world. In more practical terms, the Other can also serve to correct
errant and or idiosyncratic observation. Such a breach into the "interiority of the same," as Levinas puts it,
is a catalyst for self-criticism, learning, and the establishment of communal standards. The standards
pertain to objectivity in the above case, but we can readily see that the Other's role in general is an
important fundament to any negotiation of ontic considerations whatsoever: academic and political
institutions, social policy, and, in a word, normativity. In this "meta-normative" sense, then, the Other's
general role in the determination of the self's socio-political possibilities clearly has ethical ramifications.
The general thought, in different terms, is that a fund or surplus of humanly mediated signification
underlies the appreciation of a particular subject's consideration of a particular object. This sort of
genealogical inheritance, or signification, happens most basically through language and "rendering the
world common."
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purviews, because this will serve to dispel some otherwise odd implications in his notion
of an "infinity founding a totality." This will then serve as a good segue into a refutation
of Badiou's Levinasian critique (Chapter 3, Badiou Reconsidered), for we shall see a
complex and compelling case for hastily overlooked, but relevantly crucial, alternatives
to the dilemma Badiou proposes.
The Preobjective Other Considered Genealogically, and as a Third Person
There is an important semantic linkage between the "preobjective world," "nonobjectifying consciousness" and the very idea of the Other (or "infinity") as a condition
for theoretical, thematic, and socio-political structures. This condition (that is, the Other's
infinity considered ontologically) of the totality aspect is simply the "more basic" quality
of such preobjective or "non-objectifying" forms of consciousness and representation.
Levinas tersely states the importance of a preobjective attunement or "nonobjectifying consciousness" in his remarks that he inserted into the 1967 edition of
Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger.
To hold out one's hands, to turn one's head, to speak a language, to be the
'sedimentation' of a history—all this transcendentally conditions contemplation
and the contemplated. (292)
First, there is a fairly obvious reference to Merleau-Ponty's "lived body" as that
which undergirds cognition or perception, and thus that which conditions it in relevant
respects.159 Second, when Levinas notes the foundational and genealogical importance of
language and the vestiges of one's civilization (that is, one's historical "sedimentation"),
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Levinas arguably gets a fair amount of inspiration for what I call his conditions from Merleau-Ponty. In
Totality and Infinity he often cites Merleau-Ponty approvingly, as in the following passage in which he
applauds Merleau-Ponty's debunking of the very idea of disincarnate thought and speech. "Merleau-Ponty,
among others, and better than others, showed that disincarnate thought thinking speech before speaking it,
thought constituting the world of speech…was a myth" (205-6).
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he is referring to what he calls "cultural existence" six years after the publication of
Totality and Infinity. This cultural existence is simply synonymous with his analysis of a
preobjective, interhuman world that purports to be more basic than the self's actual
cognitive, perceptual, and socio-political capacities. The Other's "cultural existence" is
more basic in the sense that it is an enabling or conditioning structure that allows the self
to experience the world as intersubjectively normative, codified, and preestablished by
others. In other words, that which Levinas calls "cultural existence," or "the Other" in a
preobjective sense, "makes reason possible" for the self, and it allows the self to enter
into an interhuman arena wherein it must reckon with preexisting standards of right and
wrong, good and bad, ugly and beautiful, apt or inept, among other standards (T&I 119).
Levinas's description of a preobjective world shows a different, but related sense
of the way that the Other's infinity conditions the self's totalizing capacities. In face-toface situations like conversation or teaching, respectively, the self's perspective of totality
becomes informed by an independent agency that alters this same perspective in ways
that the self does not clearly see, and in ways that reflect a dependence upon the Other's
agency. This alteration ontologically conditions the self precisely in proportion to the
unanticipated change that it effectuates "within" the self's perspective. Once altered, the
self is now able to see things in a different manner—he or she has a transformed
perspective and understanding, and Levinas's phenomenology indicates that the "face,"
the Other's "infinity," or simply "the gleam of exteriority" is the catalyst for this change
in perspective.
In the first section of this chapter, we interpreted the Other in face-to-face
situations as one instance of a "preobjective" source of the self's totalizing capacities. The
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Others' infinity in such situations indicates an independently existing source of, or
catalyst for, the self's altered understanding and perspective.
Levinas's understanding of the genealogical, third person Other reflects
significant points of similarity with the interlocutory Other, because in both cases the
self's totalizing capacities are ontologically informed by the Other's infinity. In
interlocutory cases of the Other, this preobjective domain is reflected in the Other whom
one faces. In the cases we are about to consider, however, the Other's "gleam of
exteriority" is reflected in a genealogical consideration of the cultural, ancestral, and
formative Other as a source of the self's totalizing capacities. As with the interlocutory
case, the self does not experience the Other as such, but Levinas's strategy is to show that
the Other is a preobjective fundament to the self's civilized capacities—that is, its ability
to reason, evaluate, and act according to norms. In the genealogical sense, the Other is
referred to as a past "they" who are appealed to as a conditioning source of the self's
civilized being.
We see preliminary evidence for this interpretation of the Other's infinity as a
preexisting, preobjective genealogical source (as opposed to an interlocutory source) by
drawing on a passage in Totality and Infinity that follows a reference to Merleau-Ponty's
debunking of the idea of "disincarnate consciousness."
Already thought consists in foraging in the system of signs, in the particular
tongue of a people or civilization, and receiving signification from this very
operation. It ventures forth at random, inasmuch as it does not start with an
antecedent representation, or with those significations, or with phrases to be
articulated. (206)
The "already" here is crucial because it suggests a prior (conditioning) fund or
source of intelligibility, and it also attributes a humanly genealogical dimension to this
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activity. In different Levinasian terms, this is a feature of what he means by "the idea of
infinity," which, like Descartes' idea of God, both preexists (genealogically) and
conditions (via consciousness, language, and conceptualization) the self in its endeavor to
totalize reality.160 This "foraging" indicates, moreover, a preexisting horizon or
"clearing," as Heidegger might say, that informs objective representation and thought—
that is, it indicates a thought that comes from either an individual or an existing
theoretical framework that derives from other people—from a "them" or a "they." On my
interpretation, it is highly important that the accent be placed on the notion of "people"
and "civilization," for this perspective is precisely where Levinas stands out from his
teachers and contemporaries, and it signals the "field of research hardly glimpsed at" to
which Levinas refers. This budding "field" is also stated as "one of the present objectives
of Totality and Infinity," and it is regrettably a field of Levinas study that has hardly
received any attention, let alone resolution.161
Levinas's implicit point in such passages is to show that the Other represents a
way that other people inform or alter our understanding. This is, of course, relevantly
similar to the way that the Other whom one faces changes one's understanding, but it is
remarkable to note that Levinas refers to the Other in a third person sense, that is, as a
human fund of civilization out of which the self draws in order for "thought" to happen as

160

As Levinas also claims about the "idea of infinity," "I cannot account for it by myself," and "it moves
consciousness" (T&I 267; 27).
161
"It is our relations with men, which describe a field of research hardly glimpsed at…The establishing of
the primacy of the ethical, that is, of the relationship of man to man—signification, teaching, and justice—a
primacy of an irreducible structure upon which all other structures rest…is one of the objectives of the
present work" (T&I 79).
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it does.162 In the above citation, Levinas indicates "a system of signs" and the particular
language that one has inherited as candidates for "the gleam of exteriority" that is not
clearly seen as such, but that informs the self and his or her totalizing possibilities.
The Other here is not directly referring a particular person encountered in
conversation, for instance, yet the Other refers to an interhuman or "civilized"
background of intelligibility that informs the self. That is, this is the Other considered as
a "they," and it refers to the self's genealogical, normative inheritance, which is one of the
ways that Levinas understands a preobjective domain of the self's experience.
The Other's infinity, in the third person, genealogical sense, is a foundation for
such "totalizing" activities as thematization, objectivity, and empirical science. We will
now scrutinize the general principles that inform this sense of infinity conditioning
totality by referencing them to a strong and relevantly diverse sample of his use of "the
Other," or "the idea of infinity" qua the Other, as a conditioning structure of a totalizing
activity.
First, we will consider the general patterns that inform these types of assertions,
which densely populate the landscape of Totality and Infinity. Second, we shall transition
to more complex cases—"politics," "equality," and "economics"—so as to identify the
nuances inherent in Levinas's rather sweeping use of the genealogical interhuman
"Other," which extends, for instance, to the "teacher," the "master," and even "the
school."
What I communicate is therefore already a function of others. (210)
162

In these kinds of cases, the "gleam of exteriority" that is appealed to in the infinity aspect is thus not
restricted to interlocutory situations; instead, it refers to a genealogical chain of people who have created
certain cultural conditions that enable one to speak, think, and ethically act in certain ways, even if the
exact correlation between this Other and oneself be "random."
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The Other is the first rational teaching, the condition for all knowing. (203)
Representation comes from the first teaching of the teacher. (100)
The Other's word is the condition for theoretical truth and error. (51)
The school, without which no thought is explicit, conditions science. (99)

One can readily see that such claims all point toward a prior or more basic
condition for the theoretical, thematic, or—in a word—totalizing activity in question.
Whether in the sense of "already," "first," or "condition," the general thought is that a
preexisting structure of human intelligibility informs the totalizing activity in question—
whether it be the activity of "science," codified communication, "knowing," or simply
standards of "truth and error." This structure is essentially a function of "others," the
Other," the "teacher," and the "school," which are (some of) Levinas's multifaceted terms
for the transcendent and ontological sense of the Other's "infinity."163
In one sense, the Other refers to those other people who taught one how to think
in a certain way, and or to the person that taught him or her, for example, and to this
Other's other, etc. The Other considered in this genealogical way reflects, furthermore,
the "gleam of exteriority" that Levinas equates with infinity's activity, which is to say that
these terms indicate an independent interhuman organizing category or condition that he
thinks has been forgotten, overlooked, or that simply lies dormant in the history of
philosophy.
His thoughts on such interhuman conditions help to inform his deeper, ontological
claim about an infinity founding a totality. We saw earlier, when we considered Levinas's
163

He also uses "the stranger," "the widow," "the orphan," "the master," and the "feminine," to name some
other examples.
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vague remarks about his own philosophical method, that "the idea of infinity" is simply
the "rigorously developed concept" of the "gleam of exteriority or transcendence in the
Other's face" (T&I 24). When we consider these remarks beyond the face-to-face realm,
he also means that the "gleam of exteriority" extends to the idea of the Other's infinity in
the senses just mentioned—as the transcendent trace, or simply the "face," of "the
teacher" as such, or "the school" or Other as such.
Consider, for example, that the "idea of infinity" is "the introduction of the new
into a thought," and "I cannot account for it by myself" (T&I 219, 267). It both "moves
consciousness" and evinces "the overflowing of finite thought by its content" (T&I 27,
197). In addition to the general Cartesian inspiration that informs these claims, then, we
can also see an appeal to a prior or preobjective interhuman category that is motivating
the objective theoretical and normative practices mentioned: "truth and error";
"representation"; and "communication." When he notes, further, that the verbal sense of
"infinity" is "to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I," I interpret this as
perfectly in line with his thoughts on "the school," or simply the Other, as the preexisting
source of this donation (T&I 51).
Beyond the face-to-face significance of this structure, he is more generally
indicating a genealogical and ontological human standard of intelligibility that "gives"
abilities to the self that would otherwise be beyond its capacity. These abilities refer to
the more concrete "reception" of learning from the Other, in the self's distant past, who is
designated as a "she" or "they." This reception would include learning to speak in
intersubjective, and not merely private, terms; the ability to learn to conceptualize, and,
further, to see the world in terms of preestablished normative criteria of right and wrong,
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good and bad, legal and illegal, as some examples of the Other's catalyst in the self's
hitherto egological perspective.
When he claims, furthermore, that "the school makes thought explicit" and
"conditions science," I interpret this (in very different terms than the aforementioned) as
his indication of an evolving transmission of cultural genes, so to speak, that provide for
our present civilized wherewithal to actually do science in the ways that it is presently
done (T&I 99). One way to explain this point includes the following relevant
preconditions for the manner in which science is presently conducted: the series of
empirical trial and error that people endured and documented; the ongoing (and always
disputed!) definition and re-definition of what science "is" and does, as well as the
possible objects and regions that count as "scientific"; the tremendous and documented
(but also undocumented) struggle of individuals who persisted, and persist, against
dogma and custom in order to perform and embody the emerging scientific ideal; and a
host of other potential "genealogical" candidates could easily be added.
The thought is that an interhuman genealogy informs the possibilities and
situation of "science," in this case, but his general description extends more basically to
any theoretical and cognitive endeavor whatsoever. The further claim is that, in addition
to a totalizing historical and material purview that importantly informs such a
perspective, there are also culturally genealogical factors that enable totalizing activities
of any register. Tersely stated, these "genealogical" conditions all reflect an interhuman
and civilized background out of which things show up as this or that specific thing, and
this background is not experienced as an object or a denotative state of affairs, but, rather,
it enables the world to show up in these intersubjective, normative, and codified ways.
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To illustrate this initially strange position by an analogy, when a branch of
evolutionary theory asserts that it was necessary for "our ancestors" to have done (or not
done) a certain activity in order that we be as we actually are, and be capable of what we
actually do, I interpret Levinas as making a similar point. Levinas's "data," of course, are
of a different caliber than those of archeologists and anthropological hermeneutists who
speculate about what caused certain changes in the genetic continuum, but the general
thought is that certain prior human activities enable or condition the actual human
situation. Levinas's "data" precisely concern the social, political, and theoretical fund of
civilization that "transcendentally" and genealogically "conditions" the self and totalizing
activities.
To go further in this vein, just as one rarely, or never, really thinks of oneself as
the inheritance of certain necessary permutations of primates and "lesser" animals, so too
does one rarely, or never, think of oneself as determined by the inheritance of a complex
and (in some regards) more primitive cultural evolution. That these conditions are
forgotten or overlooked, however, does not mean that they are insignificant.
We can also see at least one more formal similarity between the evolutionary
theorist's strategy and Levinas's, namely that in both cases the data are always incomplete
and in need of being filled in from a perspective that cannot have a clear, thematic
assessment of all of the relevant data. That is, just as the theorist cannot 'go back in time'
and actually see the particular adaptation or environmental change that conditioned the
mutation in question, so too does Levinas's cultural "data" find itself limited in this
regard. In Levinas's case, the analogous point is that it is presumably impossible for the
self to point to the exact moment in the past when it was "breached by the Other" so as to
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become open to an intersubjective world. But in each case, Levinas's or the evolutionary
theorists, the thought is that meaningful speculation can be done about what led to the
present by regressing on the past data available, and "filling in the gaps." For Levinas,
this filling-in takes the form of the interhuman Other, as we see in the examples below,
and his "adaptations," as it were, require such inherited structures as language,
responsibility, generosity, sacrifice, learning, norms, and Bildung.
When we compare the following passage of Levinas's analysis of his conditions
for human freedom, we see a case for the "evolutionary" genealogical interpretation just
ventured, as well as for the "forgotten" or "hidden" character of the conditions themselves
that we noted above.
Freedom is not realized outside of social and political institutions, which open to
it the access to fresh air necessary for its expansion, its respiration, and even,
perhaps, its spontaneous generation. Apolitical freedom is to be explained as an
illusion due to the fact that its partisans belong to an advanced stage of political
evolution. An existence that is free, and not just a velleity for freedom,
presupposes a certain organization of nature and society. (241, my emphasis)
The presupposed "organization of nature and society" is simply an instance of his
conditions for how the perspective of infinity disrupts and informs the perspective of
totality. An important feature of his claim is that a preexisting "organization of society"
and human nature is necessary for true "political freedom." It is presumably only after
others have struggled, for generations upon generations, that a stable standard of
"political evolution" emerges. These others cannot be described, however, as a denotative
fact that specifies every discrete person who contributed to this "advanced stage," but
they can be referred to in Levinas's third person sense of the Other. This Other is a
transcendent and genealogical "they" or "them" that is appealed to as a condition of the
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modern "advanced stage of political evolution." The Other in this sense indicates, or
attests to, a prior interhuman structure that represents the surplus of past human endeavor
that also informs the self and the same as a "totality."
A further claim is that because one is at the relative end of such a process, one can
"illusorily" believe that the fruit needed no tree, so to speak. That is, one can overlook the
human struggle and sacrifice necessary to achieve the fruit of lasting political stability,
and hence one can think that the self's default situation is "how things must be."164 In an
important way, then, the self's perspective can be "broken up" by the "gleam of
exteriority" when the self comes to see itself as the heir to an advanced and ongoing
"political evolution" that requires the Other. So, if one began with a perspective that sees
only the result of the struggle, for instance—"hey, I am a free political agent, and this is
the natural state of affairs!"—then one's perspective can be disrupted and meaningfully
altered by a consideration that attests to the genealogical interhuman conditions that have
enabled this same freedom to see the world in terms of political norms and ontic
freedoms. One might thereby think, "I am free, but this same freedom presupposes
vigilant political struggle and effort, and it is hence precarious."
In analogous fashion, Levinas's use of totality and infinity is generally designed to
point out an underlying, but overlooked, condition of theoretical activity—in this case,
"political theory" and ontic political freedom. This passage illustrates, accordingly, an
appeal to the requisite "cultural existence" that we cited above, which is an instance of a
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It is in some such sense, no doubt, that parents tell their children that "this (money, privilege,
entitlement) doesn't just fall from the sky, you know!" The point to such a reprimand is to indicate the
struggles and difficulties that were necessary to obtain the good in question, and the "child" in this case
simply sees the good as "natural" or available, and does not see the struggle that it takes to obtain it., and
hence to use it and value it responsibly.
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condition for "true political freedom," in this case, as well as Levinas's implicit account
of why such an "evolution" gets overlooked.165 In different terms, we could call the
"advanced stage of political evolution" the result of past human action that now informs
the self as a totality, and we could call the appeal to the conditions that lead to this
totality the "infinity" of the work of countless, and often nameless, past others—even if
the individual "illusorily" believes otherwise.
Levinas employs a similar strategy when he discusses the "conditions for
equality," and after we have clarified some of his technical terms, we then see the case
for the culturally evolutionary situation of his conditions, as well as a more precise
formulation of how they work.
Politics tends toward reciprocal recognition, that is, toward equality; it ensures
happiness. And political law concludes and sanctions the struggle for recognition.
Religion is Desire and not struggle for recognition. It is the surplus possible in a
society of equals, that of glorious humility, responsibility, and sacrifice, which are
the conditions for equality. (64, my italics)
He uses the initially misleading term "religion" to transition to his conclusion
about transcendental conditions, but he importantly defines "religion" as "a relation with
165

There is an interesting similarity in the way that the infinity aspect of the other person is not lucidly
graspable by the agent or individual, and the way that the infinity aspect of his conditions resists such a
perspective. This is because the totality aspect of his conditions would fall into branches of history, science,
political theory, and such—these are fields that have been "more than" glimpsed at, or that are robust and
thriving, simply put, and Levinas knows quite well that others (e.g. experts in such fields) are in a better
position to do this kind of research. If we draw on the previous example to illustrate the distinction
between this totalizing perspective and the "infinity" perspective that Levinas articulates, we can see that
there are certainly numerous textbooks and experts that/who indicate several presumably necessary
conditions for the modern political state in, say, The United States of America. One could easily cite the
"influences" of the French Revolution, American Independence from Britain, and "Manifest Destiny" as
relevant factors in shaping who we tend to be, and how we tend to think, as American political agents. One
could even cite every single documented and relevant fact that purports to explain how we are today
because of who "we" were, in a totalizing sense. The Levinasian "infinity" thought, however, is that this
kind of totalizing perspective necessarily misses something important. Namely, it misses the
undocumented and unforeseen individuals who did not, or could not, make the historical cut, so to speak. In
a sense, just as we ethically celebrate the "unknown soldier or martyr" with monuments, the infinity aspect
of his conditions ethically celebrates the "unknown Other."
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another that does not constitute a totality" (T&I 80), that is, as a relation between the self
or same, and a transcendent source that "preserves both terms" without synthesizing
them; or, as an infinity conditioning, without actually being, a totality. "Desire,"
furthermore, and as we saw last chapter when we analyzed erotic relations in Levinasian
phenomenology, is importantly one of his technical terms for "the search for radical
exteriority," which is what he means by "metaphysics or transcendence" (T&I 82).
So, first, Levinas formally indicates an instance of an "objective" or totalizing
institutional practice, in this case "politics," and he then proceeds to indicate that which
imbues it with a significance of a different register. Here it is the residual "surplus" of
people who actually (and perhaps even "gloriously") conscientiously revolted in
presumably "responsible, humble, and sacrificial" ways. On my interpretation, Levinas is
not only referring to some actual ontic individuals Joe, Jane, and Jack who contributed to
a particular political cause, but he is also referring to a general human structure of
"responsible sacrifice" that is a condition for either the maintenance, or establishment, of
real political recognition. In the former case, one could consider that, for instance: "Joe,
Jack, and Jane are the particular historical individuals who furthered Irish-American
political rights in 1892."
In the infinity aspect, however, the general human structure that is appealed to,
without appeal to this or that particular person, suggests that the general Other qua
sacrifice is a condition for the political as such. In this aspect, importantly, one cannot
completely know the full enumeration of the particular human others who "responsibly
sacrificed"—how could one ever be certain of exactly "who did what" leading up to the
present? The Levinasian thought is that such human sacrifice was necessary, however,
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and that it informs the political totality.166 In a way, then, the infinity aspect of his
conditions is an analogue to our ethical memorials "dedicated," initially in a strange way,
to the "unknown soldier" or "unknown martyr." This is because it points to a source or
activity that is not explicitly thematized, but is nonetheless appealed to as a cause or
significant factor to the situation in question.167 This appeal is importantly patterned on
the way the self's totalizing perspective gets broken up by the Other, which leaves the self
with a different perspective on the situation in question. In the "sacrifice" case, this
amounts to seeing the need for a monument to the "unknown," although this perspective
is incompatible with the totality aspect that maintains that there is no unknown; there is
only the denotative documentation of history considered as a totality.
We can also see the case for Levinas's conditions at work in the essence of what
he calls "economics" and "objectivity," since he argues that the Other is a primordial
fundament of "the original dispossession of the ego" that "conditions the subsequent
generalization of things by money" (T&I 75-6, my italics). Levinas ambivalently claims,
concerning the character of objectivity in general, that it is "not simply the object of an
impassive contemplation," which would merely be a totalizing point of view, but rather it
is also a function of "the presence of the Other" (T&I 75, my italics).
166

In this case too, it is easy to see how such a "surplus" or residue of past civilized action gets overlooked,
forgotten, or simply spun as irrelevant in its formative role in conditioning the present. How many people
actually struggled, sacrificed, and perhaps even died ("in vain" or not) in order to attain reasonable stability
(in any given totalizing and ontic arena) for their predecessors? There is clearly no extant way to answer
the question in a straightforwardly quantitative way, and, in a further Levinasian vein, it is not clear that a
numerical answer would satisfy the human sense of justice and ethics that such a question deserves.
167
Levinas further indicates the "illusory" character of freedom as being purely an individual matter when
he writes (clearly while taking a shot at Sartre, as well as perhaps drawing on his own prisoner camp
experiences): "Even he who has accepted death is not free. The insecurity of the morrow, hunger and thirst
scoff at freedom. And, to be sure, in the midst of torture understanding the reasons for torture reestablishes
the famous inward freedom, in spite of the betrayal and degradation portended. But these reasons
themselves appear only to the beneficiaries of historical evolution and institutions. In order to oppose
inward freedom to the absurd and its violence it is necessary to have received an education" (241).
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His initial characterization of the ego, however, is one of "enjoyment", that is, of
the ego in its pre-ethical or immature stage wherein it spontaneously sees the world as a
set of possible "inalienable" things that can satisfy its creature comforts, to paraphrase
Levinas. The objects in the ego's world at this stage are merely other, because they are
purely assimilable to the self's own circuit of desires and conceptions—the self in this
stage is akin to a baby who only knows the words "mine" and "more," as it were. Levinas
notes that at some point in the ego's development it encounters "the Other's presence,"
which "is equivalent to the calling into question of [one's] joyous spontaneity of the
world" (T&I 76). The self thus confronted by the Other begins not only to robustly "learn
language" and hence to classify things objectively, but also to "share the world" in what
Levinas calls "generosity," or "a point of view independent of the egoist position" (T&I
75-6). The self, after it is "breached by the Other," begins to reckon with an
intersubjective world replete with norms and general standards that alter one's previously
egological perspective.
This connection between the Other's role in objectivity, language, and economics
is crucial, both because it conforms to his general argumentative strategy, and it helps to
clarify his thoughts on the Other's role in the world's general stability considered as a
totality. So, once the self has been "breached" by the Other's presence, it begins to have
the tools to communicate, to conceptualize, and eventually to see the world in a general,
as opposed to a purely self-referential, sense. 168This catalyzed transition lays the
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As chapter 1 illustrated, this maturation of the self formally parallels the development of Descartes' ego
cogito, in that the ego initially begins with a limited and (potentially) auto-poetical sense of perception and
cognition—as if it "were a totality," in Descartes' language— but then it eventually "discovers" the supreme
Other, "in whom all the treasures of wisdom and science lie." This Other is also discovered as being the
condition for a reliable and objective world, and the self is dependent upon this Other in these ways. So
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foundation for the ability to reckon with things as having a universally designated name,
value, or price, for instance, which is proportionally "equivalent" to other things, goods,
and services.
To bolster this interpretation, after we consider his remarks on language, we will
transition to his thoughts on the connection between conceptualization, objectivity, and
economics.
To recognize the Other is therefore to come to him across the world of possessed
things, but at the same time to establish, by gift, community and universality.
Language is universal because it is the very passage from the individual to the
general, because it offers things which are mine to the Other. To speak is to make
the world common. Language…lays the foundations for a possession in common.
(76, my italics)
So, once the genealogical and personal Other has set the stage for this common
world, through the introduction of language, the self also learns "conceptualization" from
the Other, which "is the first generalization and the condition for objectivity" (T&I 76,
my italics). That is, once the self has actually learned from the Other, or been given by
the Other, the tools to conceptualize, it is now able to "share" the common world, and to
"give" or contribute its own unique perspective to, and through, the common world to
which it now has access.169 So, the very abilities to speak, reason, and reckon with a
general world are all mediated or conditioned by others, and these conditions open up
existential possibilities to the self that would otherwise lie fallow.170 In this way, the

even if the ego cogito is first chronologically, it eventually finds out that it needed the Other's "guarantee"
and "innate ideas" in order to do what it does. Levinas arguably replaces these "innate ideas" with his
cultural conditions, and God's "guarantee" with the (human) Other's guarantee.
169
"Consciousness of a world is already consciousness through that world" (T&I 153).
170
In very different terms, it is no accident that a child raised without any adult supervision and education
whatsoever be deficient in all aspects of "rationality," language, and abstract social considerations.
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preexisting intersubjective world can enable or condition the self or same's theoretical
capacities.
The budding Levinasian self can also overcome its default understanding of
reality as simply an extension of its needs—for it no longer purely sees the world as the
trove of "inalienable property" that merely serves its autopoetical and narcissistic wants.
Objectivity coincides with the abolition of inalienable property—which
presupposes the epiphany of the other…The generality of the Object is correlative
with the generosity of the subject going to the Other, beyond the egoist and
solitary enjoyment, and hence making the community of the goods of this world
break forth from the exclusive property of enjoyment. (76, my italics)
His first point is that objectivity requires a social attunement to things that is catalyzed by
the Other's infinity (which we considered, above, with an assessment of Levinasian
language and conceptualization) and this entails that the self has "generously" left its
autistic orbit, so to speak (that is, it maturely left its "egoist and solitary enjoyment").171
At this point in the genetic description, there is a correlation between the self's plunge
into the social world and its ability to see things as general, common, and shareable. The
"community of goods" breaks forth, in Levinas's language, and this effects a change in
the self's phenomenology—the world now appears as a common, stable, and
intersubjective world that is susceptible to an objective and economic purview.172
Similarly, when Levinas writes "what I communicate is therefore already a
function of others," there is essentially the same argumentative strategy at work as in the
"freedom," "political equality," and "economics" examples. If we begin with the "what I
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Reciprocally, the self now has to speak in common terms to articulate what he or she wants and desires.
It is interesting from a Levinasian point of view that, in all ages of civilization, the ancestral "founders"
put their stamp or image on money. On a canonical reading, this simply reflects a certain narcissism,
megalomania, or "rule of the same," but on our bivalent interpretation, it could also reflect the reminder, or
remainder, of the Other in the foundation of the conditions for civilization.
172
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communicate" clause, we can see that this stands for a thematic, objective activity that
would fall into the class of a "totality." That is, that which one communicates falls into
objective propositions, phonemes, signs, and such that are all used to express and codify
the self and the world. The reciprocal Levinasian thought is that the Other's infinity qua
civilized linguistic inheritance serves as an underlying ontological condition for
communication within this totality—that is, the genealogical Other provides the self with
linguistic "tools" that become "ready-to-hand," to employ a Heideggerian vernacular.
If we return to our example a few pages above, which concerns "thought already
foraging in a system of signs," which is condition for the self's actual ontic deployment of
thought, we see relevant similarities with the "what one communicates" case. This is
because the "already" in both cases indicates a cultural fund or surplus out of which the
self draws in order to communicate, and this surplus refers to the past others who have
given the self, by way of a civilized dowry of sorts, the conditions to communicate. In
different terms, it is not purely random, or inessential, but rather meaningfully
conditioned, that this turn of phrase, or that language, or (and more importantly) these
standards of communicatory salience and normativity be used in any particular form of
"what one communicates."
It is also important to recall that when Levinas appeals to a totality and the
infinity aspect that conditions it, his point is not to "belittle" the totality aspect in
question, or even to eradicate it, as Wolin suggests, but precisely to show that its
philosophical exposition requires a more nuanced and balanced consideration than
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previously acknowledge.173 As we see with his thoughts on political equality and
freedom, Levinas's language clearly does not suggest that such practices are somehow
pernicious in themselves.174 His description, rather, is meant to show that these important
institutions "presuppose a certain [interhuman] organization" or need certain
"conditions," without which they can be ill conceived and forsaken as regards the interest
of preserving and establishing justice, freedom, and political equality. In brief, his
thought is that such objective institutions require an ontological consideration of the
Other as a genealogical and third person structure that mirrors, and sometimes hangs
together with, the interlocutory Other's function. That is, in some cases one's experience
of totality gets informed by the Other's infinity in interlocutory situations, and in Other
cases one's experience gets informed by the Other genealogically.
Levinas sometimes refers to this general sense of the foundational, genealogical
Other as "the third party," and he arguably uses this term to make a distinction between
the particular Other with whom one speaks, and the Other in the genealogical ontological
sense we have been considering.175 He writes that the "presence of the face, the infinity of
the other is…a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks
at us)" (T&I 213). When he describes this sense of the Other's "face," however, as the
"whole of humanity which looks at us," it can seem like a hyperbolic claim, or a non
173

"Ultimately, Levinas's devaluation of practical reason—which he confines to the woodshed of
ontology—is self defeating. It dismisses out of hand prospects of progressive social change. The binary
opposition between "totality" and "infinity" that governs his work makes it nearly impossible to
conceptualize meaningful intersubjectivity. As soon as one leaves the terrain of ethics as defined by the
face of the Other, one succumbs to the inescapable sway of "totality": the "every man for himself" ethos of
self-preservation run amok (Wolin, "Levinas and Heidegger," 241).
174
See Wolin, "Levinas and Heidegger," 240-2.
175
Levinas is (regrettably, in my opinion) inconsistent with his use of many key technical terms, and "the
Other" and the "third" are no exceptions. He sometimes uses "other" (as in the fully assimilable other, like
"nourishment") when one would think he means "Other."
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sequitur. But when we couple such a claim with my interpretation of his conditions as a
transcendental and genealogical human structure that underlies objective or theoretical
practices, the claim simply fits in with the general argumentative strategy of the text. That
is, the "whole of humanity looking at us" is one of his ways of describing the preexisting
fund of civilization, teaching, and human effort that has enabled us to be what we are, at
least to a large degree. In brief, he is referring to the interhuman relations that subtend or
condition our theoretical, thematic, and objective practices.
Accordingly, when he writes that "representation comes from the first teaching of
the teacher" (T&I 100) it is simply a part of his general argument, on my interpretation. If
we substitute "representation" with his thoughts on language, politics, or freedom, and
"first teaching" with a preexisting interhuman background of meaning, then the claim is
just a more basic modification of his general logic. Namely, in addition to the particular
and documented historical, material, and contextual conditions that enable someone to
"represent" objects as organized in a certain way, Levinas is furthermore trying to carve
out a field of philosophical research that also incorporates background cultural
"conditions" into the organization of reality. The "civilized" or "interhuman" conditions
that he illustrates refer to what he will call, in later works, the "traces" of the human effort
that leads to the background structure of intelligibility out of which things appear as they
do.
His claim, on my interpretation, is that that which a particular individual can
"represent" to himself is mediated by "the first teaching of the teacher," which is simply
his gloss for an individual's cultural predecessors qua the background of intelligibility out
of which theoretical activities and possibilities take their shape. In this sense his remark
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about how "infinity moves consciousness" is more clear, because he means that the
Other's role in the formation of the self and consciousness shapes or "moves" the self 's
conscious possibilities. It is also consistent with such thoughts as the basic character of
"the overflowing of objective thought by a forgotten experience from which they live"
(T&I 28, my emphasis).
These conditions refer, moreover, to a "beyond" the totality aspect of the field or
activity in question, and so they hook up with his thoughts on "infinity" and the Other's
"face." That is, just as in the infinity aspect the other person can be appreciated as a
source or activity beyond the self's lucid precomprehension and calculation, we can also
view his conditions as interhuman organizing activities, or inherited genealogical
functions, that inform the self and its possibilities as a totality.
To recapitulate, the basic structure of the ways that infinity conditions totality is
arguably the guiding methodological thread of Totality and Infinity. For the sake of
economy of prose, our present analysis has confined itself to a limited (although
relevantly diverse) sample of the various ways that an interhuman "infinity" founds or
conditions a totality. Pace commentators, pro and contra Levinas, who claim that he
"merely argues by assertion," like Moran, or that Levinas "delights in paradox and
contradiction," like Hutchens, or that he is simply misologous, as we saw with Wolin, it
is my general contention that Levinas attempts to found a new field of phenomenological
and ontological research, and that it has a distinct, if oddly stated, argumentative pattern.
This pattern, when interpreted against the background of Levinas's philosophical
precursors, actually serves to dispel the apparent paradoxes, contradictions, and nonsequiturs that allegedly inform his philosophical ambitions.

185
We can readily see the same kind of argumentative thrust at work in the above
examples when we consider his claims, for instance, that "thought can become explicit
only among two" (T&I 100), and that "from the master comes the possibility of truth"
(101), or, even in claims such as "attention is attention to something because it is
attention to someone" (95). In each case, Levinas is indicating a more basic interhuman
structure (that is, "two" people, teaching, and simply "someone") that relevantly
conditions the "totalizing" or theoretical activity in question. Whether it be through the
self's need to have learned language from the Other, or to have been taught how to
reason, conceptualize, and theorize by the Other, or to have been given the socio-political
wherewithal to see the world in sophisticated and ethical ways, the point is that the self
"owes" a part of its selfhood to the Other at least in the general ways described. Levinas
also extends this inheritance (or his conditions considered in a third person sense) beyond
the self, to theories, institutions, and "objective" structures, which reflect "the same": but
the basic point is similar—such institutions "owe" their character to the Other. Hence, he
often makes such initially implausible, non sequitur, or simply platitudinous claims as, "I
cannot disentangle myself in society from the Other" (T&I 47). But when we interpret
such claims as a modification of the general paradigm of the way that the Other's infinity
conditions the self's perspective of totality, then the claim is simply part and parcel of
Levinas's argumentative demarche.
The other, but related, prong of his demarche is exhibited in our consideration of
the interlocutory Other, whose ability to surprise, critique, and inform the self evinces
another way that the Other's infinity conditions the self's perspective of totality.
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Badiou Reconsidered
As we return to Badiou's critique of Levinas, it is first important to briefly survey
the basic patterns of the work done so far. This is because the chapter's work has
indicated an ontological and transcendental sense of the Other that includes the particular
other person whom one faces, and it additionally indicates ontological structures of
(interhuman) intelligibility and transcendence that condition, or help to enable, certain
theoretical and objective activities. We saw these structures at work in our analyses
above, which described a "totalizing" activity as mediated and catalyzed by a prior,
interhuman ontological structure. Such structures were described as linguistic, cognitive,
or socio-political and economic, and they all presuppose a human, or simply civilized,
element.
After his magnum opus, Levinas (often vaguely) refers to these structures as
"cultural existence," "transcendental conditions," or "pre-objective consciousness," but
they find a more concrete reference when we amplify these thoughts with a retroactive
examination of Totality and Infinity. We have called these structures Levinas's
conditions, and they arguably flesh out the guiding thread of Totality and Infinity's
method—the "rigorously develop concept" of how an "infinity" can found a "totality" in a
general and ontological way. In different terms, this chapter has detailed an account of a
phenomenological and ontological sense of the Other that Badiou (and many others)
precisely overlook.
To recapitulate, Badiou argues that Levinas's phenomenology is insufficient to
support the thesis that the Other necessarily informs and grounds the self in meaningful
ways. Badiou claims, for instance, that the "phenomenological analyses of the face, of the
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caress, of love, cannot by themselves ground the anti-ontological (or anti-identity) thesis
of the author of Totality and Infinity" (21).176 One of Badiou's potential insights is that,
for all one knows, even Levinas's other "resembles [the self] too much for the hypothesis
of an originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true" (22).
Badiou further argues that without an ontological "principle of radical alterity"
that "guarantees" that the other is not a feature of the self's "mimetic" construction, then
Levinas ultimately needs recourse to some other guarantee of "infinite" alterity. Badiou
claims, moreover, that the only other candidate for a finite self's sanction of radical
alterity, aside from the (now-eliminated) radical alterity of the real other person, is "God
the ineffable." This recourse is, of course, stillborn because such a makeshift source of
alterity, far from founding a philosophically original "ethics" in Levinas's sense of the
term, actually leaves us with a "pious discourse without piety," that is, a pseudophilosophical account that masks its fundamentally "religious character" (23). So,
instead of guaranteeing access to the Other as an originary and fundamental experience,
which would make Levinas's philosophy authentically committed to truth and experience,
Levinas (so the argument goes) leaves us arbitrarily substituting "God" into this alleged
void.
Badiou essentially patterns his critique as a constructive dilemma, then. Either
Levinas can "guarantee" the ontological difference between self and Other with the
philosophical resources of Totality and Infinity, or Levinas "really" needs a quasiphilosophical appeal to God—the "altogether Other"—so as to "justify" his philosophy.

176

It is not our contention, again, that Levinas attempts to ground an "anti-ontological" thesis in Totality
and Infinity. Hence we will simply be dealing with Badiou's (more accurate) claim about the "anti-identity"
thesis.
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In order to eliminate the former option Badiou writes that one needs to first:
make explicit the axioms of thought that decide an orientation [of whether] the
experience of alterity be ontologically 'guaranteed' as the experience of a distance,
or of an essential non-identity, the traversal of which is the ethical experience
itself. (21-2)

If Badiou can show that Levinas's claim to ontologically "guarantee" the Other's
"infinite" distance in the other person is not as secure as Levinas thinks it to be, then he
can try to account for that which Levinas "really" needs to provide such a guarantee—
that is, he can account for that which "decides" Levinas's orientation. Badiou argues that
"nothing in the simple phenomenon of the other contains such a guarantee" because "the
finitude of the other's appearing certainly can be conceived as resemblance, or as
imitation, and thus leads back to the logic of the same" (22). He follows up with the
claim that since the other person allegedly cannot provide such a guarantee, then Levinas
really would need to incorporate the quasi-mystical infinite "alterity" of God as such a
sanction. Such a move, of course, relegates Levinas's Other to the status of a "religious"
experience, and is hence not of the order of "demonstrable evidences." If the latter road is
taken, then Levinas "has no philosophy," but he rather has a crypto-theology instead.
This latter horn, then, is what really "decides" the axioms of Levinas's thought on
Badiou's analysis.
Badiou essentially overlooks other horns in the dilemma, however, and thus his
dilemma is hasty. The third and fourth horns, which are different in kind from either
"proving" that the generic other person "exists," or "proving" a robust notion of God for
that matter, is precisely what we have been articulating during the entire dissertation. My
interpretation of Levinas reveals an ontological and transcendental consideration of the
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Other that is both non-theological as well as within the fold of phenomenological and
ontological "evidence." This overlooked alternative importantly focuses on the
Levinasian self's experience and the possibility of this same experience being altered by
sources that one does not anticipate or choose. When pitched at this level, Levinas is
clearly not concerned with "proving" that others, or other minds, exist (and so Badiou's
charge is something of a philosophical cheap-shot, moreover, since Levinas's
phenomenology is not pitched at the level of a "refutation of idealism," or the so-called
"problem" of other minds.)
The "axioms that decide the orientation" of Levinas's phenomenology, on one of
my interpretations, originally refer to two distinct and simultaneously incompatible
perspectives that unfold within an agent's experience—the self's experience as a
"totality," on the one hand, and the self's experience in the infinity aspect, on the other
hand. My further claim is that these distinct perspectives limit and hence inform each
other, and when they are seen in two distinct, but mutually informative senses, one gains
an accurate perspective of Levinas's phenomenology that dispels the seemingly
paradoxical and inconsistent nature of his claims about discourse, teaching, and erotic
relations, for instance.
As we have seen in both this chapter and the previous chapter, the totality-infinity
structure reveals an interhuman and ontological sense of the Other that does not rely on a
"mimetic" construction of the world in order to "guarantee" an ontological difference
between self and Other. It relies, rather, on a nuanced interpretation of totality and
infinity that shows aspects of the self's experience that are consistent with a source that
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the self does not assume, from one perspective, and a source with which the self clearly
relates, from a different perspective.
My interpretation of the genealogical consideration of the Other's infinity
represents another overlooked horn in Badiou's dilemma, because this sense of the Other
"decides the axioms of Levinas's thought" in a way that neither relies upon the "self's
mimetic construction" nor "upon "God the ineffable." Our analyses of the genealogical
Other is articulated precisely as a structure in being that does not need the self's guarantee
of a difference from an other person ontically encountered, but rather shows how the self
is ontologically and genealogically conditioned by the Other's formative difference in
general (that is, in the ontological structures of language, conceptualization, and the
socio-economic arena that enable intersubjective and normative possibilities within the
self, to name some prominent examples that we considered).
When Badiou paints Levinas's options for the Other's difference into the corners
of either "God," or "absolute difference" from an auto-mimetic viewpoint, he thereby
seems committed to the notion that Levinas's Other refers to some "extra-human" entity
that floats in ethereal space, or that completely differs from the self in some kind of extrahuman sense. In the starkest possible contrast, however, we must stress that the Other
simply represents the phenomenological ways that alter or change our understanding and
perspective, and this is why Levinas takes pains to situate the Other's activity in terms of
the self's alteration, formation, and future possibilities. As he emphatically puts the point,
"alterity is possible only starting from me" (T&I 40). 177
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So far I have been critical of Badiou's neglect of Levinas's ontology of the Other, but as I detailed in the
previous chapter, there is (oddly) a strong and relevant connection between the ethical agent that Badiou
describes and the Levinasian agent that we have described. The further thought, which is thoroughly
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Up until now I have been critical of Badiou's work insofar as it hastily paints a
dilemma that ignores important considerations of Levinas's thoughts on the ontology of
the Other. Badiou's Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil is, admittedly, an
excellent and provocative work in general, and a further thought is that unbeknownst to
Badiou, his positive description of the robust ethical agent therein bears striking, and
deep, similarities to the Levinasian agent described in chapters 1 and, especially, 2. We
have more explicitly seen the case for how Badiou's and Levinas's agents are respectively
similar in the previous chapter (pp. 116-8).
For the sake of future scholarship, it would be highly interesting to see work that
fuses Badiou's notion of ethics, and the robust "immortal" ethical agent that he describes,
with (something like) Levinas's account of ethics and totality and infinity that I have
sought to describe in this dissertation. For one reason, both Badiou and Levinas, although
they are apparently strange bedfellows, are committed to the notion that contemporary
"ethical" debate is in need of a robust consideration of the transcendent possibilities to
which the human situation bears witness. Badiou's work may well provide the "space" in
which such transcendent possibilities can be enacted, because his (admittedly curt)
dismissal of the "negative" and "contemptible" situation of modern ethical debate
nonetheless provokes a true rethinking and reflection of the ground of today's ethical
situation. Like Levinas's, his work aims to rethink the radix of the human agent so as to
crystallize a positive account of this agent's activity and situation. Badiou's Ethics does

constructive, is that it could turn out that Levinas's phenomenological ontology complements and informs
Badiou's "ethics." This is because both agents bear numerous formal similarities in their transcendent
possibilities, and the general background out of which Badiou situates his agency seems to hook up with
our bivalent totality-infinity structure (at least in consideration of the agent point of view).
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not seem, however, to provide a robust indication of the kind of agent that would inhabit
his transcendent world. Yet if it is accurate (and I think that it is accurate) that the
Levinasian agent described in this dissertation relevantly resembles the agent whom
Badiou sketches, then the Levinasian agent that we have elucidated could very well
provide the content for such a sketch, assuming that the necessary modifications would
be enacted.
Conclusion
The third chapter, which draws upon the first two, has sought to clarify the chief,
if implicitly stated, argumentative strategy of Totality and Infinity, which reflects the
various ways that "infinity conditions totality." In one sense, Levinas understands the
conditioning rapport between the two in terms of an interpersonal notion of infinity
conditioning totality that unfolds in interlocutory or dialogical situations. In another
sense, he understands this rapport as the self's connection to a preexisting, genealogical
relationship to the past Other that unfolds in a relationship to a "them" or "they." In each
case, though, infinity represents an informative limit that informs or alters the self's
perspective as a totality, and this informative alteration or modification enables the self to
adopt a different perspective that reflects an intersubjective and normative inheritance.
The explicit articulation of this argumentative structure, which generally lies
implicit within Levinas's work, serves to show that there is a prolific argumentative
strategy that is phenomenologically developed within Levinas's great work. This same
structure also shows that, pace Putnam's claim that Levinas should not be read as
articulating a novel ontological and metaphysical grounding for what he means by
"ethics," Levinas does, in fact, articulate a novel ground for "the ethical…the relation
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between man to man" (T&I 79). Even though Levinas does not engage "ethics" at the
level of prescriptive norms, analysis of consequences, or patent virtues, he nonetheless
articulates the self's ontological debt to the Other for the ability to reckon with the world
in intersubjective and normative lights. When we keep Levinas's ontological account of
the Other in mind, we may now reread our introductory citation from William James with
a more clear indication of its implications and relevance to Levinas's articulation of the
Other.
The dissertation in general has sought to shed light on aspects of Levinas's
thought that either seem paradoxical, do not receive due attention, or, in some cases, that
are arguably misread by many commentators. In order to attempt to clarify (a very few,
admittedly) matters I have, in at least some cases, ventured forth significantly novel
interpretations of familiar Levinasian themes and problems. If I have been
hermeneutically violent at times in my interpretations of Levinas's thought, one will
perhaps excuse me on the grounds that that same thought can remain in the shadows
unnecessarily, and it may sometimes need a forceful hand to dispel the miasma of
paradox that supporters and critics sometimes laud, and sometimes vilify.
At any rate, it is my most sincere hope that this dissertation has been edifying to
those reading it, and that it provides good food for thought.
Yours,
Christian C. Wood
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